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M 
In Elizabethan literary criticism the term 'allegory' is used to 
describe two quite different phenomena. As might be expected, it can 
refer to an extended analogy, involving the (more or less) systematic 
substitution of the terms of the literal sense for those of the 
allegorical sense. But there is also a looser definition, encom- 
passing exemplary moral fiction. Spenser's Letter to Raleigh draws on 
both these definitions, and both are apparent in the poetic practice 
of The Faerie Queene. The thesis explores the rhetorical and logical 
effects which follow from this fact. 
The Introduction begins with a brief discussion of analogy, and 
maintains its importance in any definition of allegorical writing. 
This is followed by a historical survey, in which Elizabethan opinions 
on the structure and purpose of allegory are examined. Two types of 
allegory are identified - analogical and exemplary. An art of 
allegorical decorum is proposed, the purpose of which is to mediate 
between analogical and exemplary interpretations of a text. 
Chapters 1,2 and 3 each explore different aspects of this decorum. 
Chapter 1 examines the allegorical environment of Faerie, including 
the intermittent analogy between narrative sequence and cause and 
effect, and between physical location and moral state. Chapter 2 
concentrates on the use of iconography, and considers the empathetic 
effects of embedding emblematic descriptions within a larger narra- 
tive. Chapter 3 continues the discussion of empathetic response, 
focusing on the question of 'character'. 
The Conclusion identifies two opposing concerns in The Faerie Queene: 
the maintenance of the fictive illusion, and an insistence on the 
artificiality of the mode. It is argued that this conflict becomes 
the basis of a dialectic which points the reader beyond the contra- 
dictions of the poem, towards ultimate union in God. 
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INTRODUCTION 
READING ALLEGORY. 
1. Analogy and its Application to Allegory 
First there is the paradox that, to the characters partici- 
pating in an allegory, nothing is allegorical. ' 
C. S. Lewis 
The young Socrates of the Parmenides has a problem. He has been 
explaining his theory of Forms, according to which individual objects 
acquire their various qualities by participating in essential Forms, 
or Ideas. Good things derive their nature adjectivally from the Form 
of Goodness, for example, and beautiful things from the Form of 
Beauty. In this exposition, Socrates assumes that Forms are them- 
selves independent entities, and that they exhibit the very qualities 
of which they are the essential source. The Form of Goodness is 
itself good, therefore, and the Form of Beauty beautiful. Against 
this, Parmenides points out that, if a quality of an individual entity 
is derived from its participation in a Farm, then Socrates' assumption 
will lead to an infinite regression. If the Form of Beauty is 
beautiful, both it and all other beautiful things must derive that 
quality from some further, transcendent Form, which in turn derives 
1, C, S, Lewis, $penser's lniages of Life, ed, Alastair Fowler (C, U, P  1967), 
pp. 28-29, 
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its own beauty form yet another Form, and so on. This regression 
could be avoided only if the Forms did not exemplify their eponymous 
qualities. But if the Form of Beauty is not beautiful, what qualities 
can be attributed to it? And if all beautiful things are beautiful by 
virtue of participating in that Form's nature, what can the nature of 
this participation be? 
Suppose, for instance, one of us is master or slave of 
another; he is not, of course, the slave of master itself, the 
essential master, nor, if he is a master, is he master of 
slave itself, the essential slave, but, being a man, is master 
or slave of another man, whereas mastership itself is what it 
is [mastership] of slavery itself, and slavery itself is 
slavery to mastership itself. The significance of things in 
our world is not with reference to things in that other world, 
nor have these their significance with reference to us, but, 
as I say, the things in that world are. what they are with 
reference to- one another and toward one another, and so 
likewise are the things in our world. 
Parmenides, 133d-134a' 
The philosophical problem that Parmenides' objection raises for 
Socrates' theory is not one I intend to pursue here. But for literary 
criticism it brings with it the seed of a related aesthetic problem, 
one which lies at the heart of all discussion of allegory. I high- 
light this passage because it represents, to my knowledge, the 
earliest clear statement of the distinction between metaphors of 
similarity and metaphors of analogy: that is, between comparison of 
objects based on a simple observation of shared attributes, and, 
comparison based on a perceived equivalence within a pair of isomorph- 
ically mappable structures. Mastership and individual masters are 
related, not because they have any qualities in common considered in 
1, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, ed., The Collected Dialogues of Plato 
(Princeton: Princeton U, P  1961), p, 
928. 
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isolation, but because within their respective, unmeeting worlds they 
are in analogous positions. 
Dedre Gentner, in her essay 'Are Scientific Analogies Metaphors? ', 
describes the nature of analogy in a more formal way: 
A structure-mapping analogy from a base system B to a 
target system T is an assertion that 
(1) there exists a mapping M of the nodes b1, b2,..., b1, of 
system B into the (different) nodes ti, t2,..., to of system 
T. 
(2) The mapping is such that substantial parts of the 
relational-operational structure of B apply in T: that is, 
many of the relational predicates that are valid in B must 
also be valid in T, given the node substitutions dictated by 
H: 
TRUE [F(bi, bj)] implies TRUE [F(ti, tj)]... 
(3) Relatively few of the valid attributes (the one-place 
predicates) within B apply validly in T. 
TRUE [A(bi)] does not imply TRUE [A(t1)]. ' 
If (to use Gentner's example) I say that the sun is like an orange, 
I intend to convey that some of the sun's attributes - in this case 
its colour and shape - are shared by the orange. This is a simple 
metaphor, based on a coincidence of attributes. On the other hand, 
when Rutherford compared an atom to the solar system, he saw the sun 
as being equivalent to the atom's nucleus - not because they share 
individual attributes but because they occupy equivalent places in 
their respective systems. Both take part in relationships such as 'is 
the heaviest part of', is at the centre of', 'is orbited by', and so 
on. 
To summarise, an analogy involves the establishment of a mapping 
between two separate systems. The terms of the systems may or may not 
1, Dedre Lentner, 'Are Scientific Analogies Metaphors? ', in Metaphor; Probleas and 
Perspectives, ed, David Miall (Sussex and New Jersey: Harvester Press and 
Humanities Press, 1982), pp, 106-32 (pp, 108-109). 
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have attributes in common, but (given the mapping that has been made) 
the internal relationships of the-systems exhibit a high degree of 
similarity. In the light of this definition, the sort of analogy made 
by Plato's Parmenides -- the analogy between the particular and the 
abstract - emerges as a special case, for the condition concerning the 
similarity of relationships (Gentner's second point) does not, 
necessarily hold. The. -relationship between Mastership and 
Slavery is 
as inaccessible as their individual attributes: Mastership is simply 
'what it is (mastership] of slavery itself, " and slavery itself is 
slavery. to mastership itself'. The relationships which exist between 
individual masters and slaves (relationships such as 'owns' and 'is 
master to') cannot be inferred as existing between the Forms of 
Mastership and Slavery. In fact,, the only thing that can be known of 
the world of Forms is simply that an analogy between it and the 
phenomenal world exists. 
We must now ask to what extent this characterisation is applicable 
to allegory, and in particular to The Faerie Queene. Is allegory no 
more than an extended analogy between literal and allegorical senses, 
in which the objects in one system have 'reference to one another and 
toward one another', but not to objects in the analogous system; or is 
there a more complex interaction? 
For most of the last century, and for a large part of this one, the 
usual assumption has been that the first of these possibilities holds. 
Whatever else William Hazlitt meant when he made his assertion that if 
readers of The Faerie Queene 'do not meddle with the allegory, the 
-4- 
allegory will not meddle with them', ' he at least implied that the 
allegory can be left alone, and the rest of the poem remain intact. 
If allegorical meaning is to be gleaned, it seems, there must be a 
conscious act of translation, a crossing of some conceptual void 
between the stories of knights and ladies and monsters, and any moral 
or historical meaning those stories might conceal. 
Analyses such as this, in which a constant flitting back and forth 
between poem and meaning is seen to be necessary, served only to 
hasten allegory's decline into relative disrepute over the course of 
the nineteenth century. Allegory an this view involves (to put a 
Coleridgean objection in Coleridgean terms) a 'disjunction of 
faculties': 2 a separation of meanings lies at its heart. Even more 
damning perhaps is the observation that to perform the translation 
from narrative to underlying moral meaning the reader must already be 
in possession of the moral truths which the allegory is intended to 
shadow - otherwise how could the analogy between them be perceived? A 
narrative in which one must constantly refer to an external meaning to 
achieve understanding is clearly flawed as a means of unfolding that 
meaning. And if the narrative is not intended to convey its allegor- 
ical meaning, what is the point of yoking the two together in the 
first place? 
1. P, P, Howe, ed,, The Complete Murks of William Hazlitt in Twenty-one Volumes 
(London and Toronto: J, M, Dent and Sons, Ltd,, 1930), V, 38, 
2, T, M, Raysor, ed,, Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism (Cambridge, Mass,,, Harvard 
U, P  1936), p, 29, For the Coleridgean view of allegory as involving 'a comprom- ising relationship between the imagination and the logical powers of reason' see 
Angus Fletcher, Allegory; The Theory of a Symbolic (lode (Ithaca; Cornell U, P,, 
1964), pp. 15-19 (p, 16). 
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Over the last thirty years allegory has again begun to receive 
serious critical attention, and as a consequence this rather 
simplistic conception of its method has been drastically revised. 
Scholars such as Harry Berger, A. C. Hamilton, Thomas Roche and Paul 
Alpers' have, in their different ways, been at pains to show that in 
practice the distinction between literal and allegorical senses was 
never as clear cut as the pure 'analogical' view would imply - that 
the complexities involved in the reading of allegory are too great for 
such an inflexible and unresponsive distinction to reflect them 
adequately. Hamilton and Alpers in particular have argued that the 
allegory of The Faerie Queene is generally implicit in its narrative 
surface, and that the idea that one must look somewhere other than the 
poem for understanding is misguided. 
For such critics a more congenial view of the nature and action of 
allegory is to be found in such texts as Sir Philip Sidney's A Defence 
of Poetry (first published 1595, but circulated widely in manuscript 
after its composition, c. 1580). 2 In Sidney's eyes it is poetry's 
ability to move men to virtue that constitutes its main justification. 
Sidney's poet is the inspired architect of a new and 'golden'3 nature 
See Harry Berger Jr, The Allegorical reaper, Vision and Reality in Book II of 
Spenser's 'Faerie Queene' (New Haven and London: Yale U, P, and O, U, P,, 1957); 
A, C, Hamilton, The Structure of Allegory in 'The (aerie Queene' (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961); Thomas P. Roche Jr, The Kindly flame; a study of the 
'(aerie Queene' III and IV (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1964); Paul J, Alpers, The 
Poetry of 7ho (aerie Queene'(Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1967). 
2, This title is actually a hybrid of the titles of the two earliest editions, but 
it is adopted in the edition cited here: Sir Philip Sidney, A Defence of Poetry, 
ed, J, A, Van Dorsten (O, U, P,, 1966). 
3, Sidney, Defence, p. 24, 
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to which our 'erected wit" can aspire, a world peopled by prac- 
titioners of virtue on a heroic scale: 
[Nature has not] brought forth so true a lover as Theagenes, 
so constant a friend as Pylades, so valiant a man as Orlando, 
so right a prince as Xenophon's Cyrus, so excellent a man in 
every way as Virgil's Aeneas. 2 
To witness such virtue 'in poetical imitation'' leads the reader to 
noble desires of his own, partly amending his corrupted will: 'Who 
readeth Aeneas carrying old Anchises on his back, that wisheth not it 
were his fortune to perform so excellent an act? " Sidney's poet 
works by examples, yet he claims that the readers of poetry may 
through those examples 'steal to see the form of goodness (which seen 
they cannot but love) ere themselves be aware' .5 There is no great 
divide between example and essence here, one simply provides a per- 
spective onto the other. Aeneas does not stand for filial duty, nor 
yet is his act a common or garden example of it. Its heroic context 
allows it to be both exemplary and also to share in a universal 
significance, which awakes and shapes the reader's own awareness and 
desire to partake of that virtue. Sidney does not systematically dis- 
tinguish between literal and allegorical meanings: the mechanism by 
which examples of goodness may allow . one to 'steal to see the form of 
1. ibid., p, 25, 
2, ibid., p, 24, 
3, ibid., p, 40, 
4, ibid., p. 41, 
5, ibid. 
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goodness' remains obscure, buried within that smooth Neo-Platonic 
formula. The concern is rather to put the whole experience of poetry 
into the unifying context of moral improvement. 
One modern exposition of this approach is A. C. Hamilton's, in the 
first chapter of his The Structure of Allegory in The Faerie Queene'. 
Hamilton stresses the particular application to Spenserian allegory of 
Sidney's poetics: 
Once we allow that in reading Spenser's poem we should 
focus upon the image, rather than upon some idea behind the 
image, our understanding gathers around our response to the 
poem's literal level because it arises from it... Instead of 
treating the narration as a veil to be torn aside for the 
hidden meaning, we should allow Sidney's art of reading poetry 
by using the narration 'but as an imaginatiue groundplot of a 
profitable inuention. ' Once we allow this art of reading, 
then Spenser's allegory need not be read as a complicated 
puzzle concealing riddles which confuse the reader in 
labyrinths of error, but as an unfolding drama revealing more 
and greater significance as it brings the reader full 
understanding of its complex vision. ' 
Hamilton aims to guide the reader's attention back to the poem, 
away from ultimately inconclusive speculation about allegorical 
meanings which he regards as external to it. Although Hamilton still 
writes in terms of 'literal and allegorical levels', his is an 
approach which seems fundamentally antipathetic to the distinction 
between them. Rather, he seeks to present the poem as a unified 
structure which can be considered in its entirety. This stance is 
quite consciously a reaction to the earlier view of allegory which I 
have outlined: 
My quarrel with modern criticism is that by turning all too 
quickly to allegorical levels of meaning, it shortcircuits the 
1, Hamilton, Structure of Allegory, p, 43, 
-8- 
poem, so that the meaning which is offered to our under- 
standing (to switch metaphors) sells the poem short. ' 
This is certainly laudable, but Hamilton does not make it wholly 
clear to what extent he rejects the analogical approach to allegory. 
Is it simply that analogy-prone critics are hasty, 'turning all too 
quickly' to allegorical senses; or should the allegorical sense be 
rejected altogether? His description of the poem as 'an unfolding 
drama revealing more and greater significance as it brings the reader 
full understanding of its complex vision' betrays a similar lack of 
precision. Is this significance recognised through the perception of 
an analogy between it and the literal sense? If it is, then the dis- 
tance between Hamilton and those critics with whom he declares himself 
to be in dispute largely evaporates. If it is not, then in what sense 
can an allegory be distinguished from any other text? This is a 
problem which Hamilton never really meets head on. 
In the years since Hamilton's book criticism which treats allegory 
as having 'levels' has remained deeply unfashionable. Northrop Frye 
had denounced the term even earlier, 2 and subsequent gestures of 
I: disapproval have not been wanting: 3 
1, ibid., pp, 12-13, 
2, Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticise; Four Essays (Princeton; Princeton U, P  
1957), pp. 72-73, 
3. Although dissenting voices can be found, See, for example, Frank Kermode, "The 
Element of Historical Allegory' (1964)', in Peter Bayley, ed., The faerie Queene; 
A Casebook (London and Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1977), pp, 197-210; Maurice Evans, 
Spenser's Analoey of Heroisi a commentary on the 'Faerie Pueene' (C, U, P., 1970), 
pp, 47-51; Brian Vickers, 'Epideictic and Epic in the Renaissance', NLN, 14 
(1982), pp, 528-29, Michael Murrin writes in terms of levels, both in The Veil of 
Allegory; Some Notes Toward a Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric in the English 
Renaissance (Chicago and London: Chicago U, P., 1969) and in The Allegorical Epic; 
Essays in Its Rise and Decline (Chicago and London: Chicago U, P., 1980). 
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As soon as the critic begins to talk about poets telling 
stories on the allegorical level, he confuses the tenor and vehicle of this continued metaphor and misses the beauty and 
economy of the allegorical mode. To leap at random from the 
concrete embodiment of the universal in the narrative to an 
abstract statement of it can only flatten out the narrative 
and dull the experience that the allegorical narrative is 
attempting- to create in the reader. Like other men the 
readers and writers. of allegory cannot serve two masters. ' 
The notion of levels, unfortunately now a critical cliche, has 
served us very ill... 2 
[The poem is not best understood with] elaborate maps of 
levels of meaning and layers of analogy and allegory... 3 
... the metaphor of "levels" is... one that we ought to discard 
in speaking of allegory. 4 
To these two alternative approaches (not, I hasten to add, 
'allegorical levels') we should perhaps add a third... 0 
Yet this vertical conceptualization of allegory and its 
emphasis upon disjunct "levels" is absolutely wrong as a 
matter of fact., 
1, Roche, Kindly flame, p. 6. 
2, Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery., some mediaeval books. and their posterity 
(Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1966), p, 413. - 
3, Rosalie L. Colie, Paradoxia Epidesica (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1966, rpt. 
Archon Books, 1976), p. 351. 
4. Isabel 6, MacCaffrey, 'Allegory and Pastoral in The Shepheardes Calender', EL1136 
(1969), 88-109, rpt, in A, C, Hamilton, ed,, Essential Articles for the Study of 
Edeund Spenser (Hamden, Conn,: Archon Books, 1972), pp. 549-68 (p. 551), 
5, Humphrey Tonkin, Spenser's Courteous Pastoral, Book Six of The 'Faerie eueene' 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p, 43, 
6, Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory (Ithaca and London: Cornell U, P,, 
1979), p. 28, 
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While I agree with the general desire behind these remarks to 
acknowledge the unity- of Spenser's achievement, I would contend that 
the notion of levels of meaning (or of discrete senses, if 'levels' is 
too -objectionable a"metaphor) is as indispensable as it is dangerous, 
and that the sort of unity achieved by doing without it is necessarily 
reductive. 
It is, to begin with, in terms of double senses that allegory has 
traditionally been defined, not least by its practioners. ' Time and 
again in classical and Renaissance discussions of allegory the same 
phrases have been used to define its method: 'when one thing is told 
and by that another is understood'. 2 To George Puttenham, author of 
The Arte of Englishe Poesie, allegory's 'duplicitie of meaning'3 is 
central enough for it to be dubbed the 'Figure of the False Semb- 
lant'. 4 The etymology of the word itself [alias other + agoreueln to 
make a speech] suggests its doubleness, its capacity for ambiguity. 
This argument cuts little ice with Quilligan, who declares that the traditional 
definition is simply erroneous (Quilligan, pp, 25-29). However, this seems to beg 
the question, 
2, This is Sir John Harington's version of Plutarch - but similar declarations are 
common, Classical sources include the Rhetorica ad Harenniua (IV 46) ('Allegory 
is a manner of speech denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another 
by the meaning') and the Institutlo Oratoria (VIII vi 44) ('Allegory,,, either 
presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely 
opposed to the meaning of the words'), In Spenser's time, Henry Peacham provides 
a typical example; ('Aligoria, when a sentence hath another meaning, then the - 
proper signifycation doch expresse,,, '), See the Preface to Sir John Harington, 
trans,, - Ludovica Rriosto's Orlando Furioso (1591), ed, R, McNulty (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 2-16 (p, 5); Rhetorica ad Herenniua, trans, Harry 
Caplan (London and Cambridge, Mass,; Heinemann and Harvard U, P,, 1954); 
Quintilian, Inslitutio Oratorfa, trans, H, E. Butler- (London and New York: 
Heinemann -and 6, P, Putnam, 1920); Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1577), 
ed, R, C, Alston (Menston; The Scolar Press, 1971), 1ig, Dir-Div, 
3, George Puttenham, The Rr¬e of English Poesie (1589), rpt, in 6, Gregory Smith, 
Elizabethan Critical Essays (O, U, P  1904), 11, , 1-193 (p, 160), 
4, ibid., p. 169, 
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Richard Mulcaster, Spenser's headmaster at the Merchant Taylor's 
School, went so far as to declare that 'they be no poetes in that 
kinde of their writing: but where they cover a truth with a fabulous 
veele'. 1 Other factors connected with form, length, subject matter 
and didactic intent may be common or indeed invariable ingredients of 
allegory, but it is the conscious use of double senses which is 
insisted on as crucial for its definition as a genre. 
(Perhaps this last word calls for some qualification. The question 
of whether allegory is better described as a genre or as 'a theory of 
poetry12 has proved somewhat contentious in recent years -a debate I 
have no wish to enter. 3 By applying the word 'genre' to allegory I 
intend to convey merely that the knowledge that one is reading an 
allegory brings with it what B. D. Hirsch calls 'generic expectations1' 
-a set of memories and biases (articulated with varying degrees of 
clarity) that together form one's idea of the typical features -of a 
kind, of literary production, and which determine one's receptive 
orientation for productions of that kind. In the case of The Faerie 
1, Richard Mulcaster, Positions, ed, Robert H, Quick (New York: Longman, Green and 
Co., 1888),. p, 169, cited James Lem Atterbury, 'Bartholomew the Englishman and 
Edmund Spenser: Medieval Platonists', Doctoral Dissertation, Univ, of Texas, 
1961, p. 63, 
2, James Nohrnberg, The Analogy of the 'Faerie pueene' (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 
1976), p, 89, 
3, Nohrnberg is of the anti-genre party, The refusal to allow allegory the status 
of a separate genre derives ultimately from Northrop Frye's declaration that all 
texts are allegorical (Anatomy of Criticism, pp, 89-90), On the other hand, 
Quilligan (Language of Allegory, pp, 13-20) makes a strong case for allegory as a 
genre in its own right, For a summary of the argument, see Carolynn Van Dyke, 
The Fiction of Truth, Structures of Meaning in Narrative and Dramatic Allegory 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell U, P., 1985), pp. 15-22, 
4, E, D, Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven and London: Yale U, P,, 1967), 
p, 73, 
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Queene the knowledge that we are reading an allegory (rather than, 
say, a-Dickens novel) may make us more sensitive to such aspects of 
the narrative as temporal sequence - so that, for instance, we are 
inclined to notice the short interval between the defeat of Error and 
the appearance of Archimago (FQ I. D, and to make a causal connection 
between the two occurences. Conversely, we may become less sensitive 
to apparent inconsistencies, like the unremarked disappearance of 
Una's lamb after the poem's fifth stanza. That allegory does impose 
such a set of expectations seems clear, and in that sense alone I 
would claim for it the title of genre. ) 
If we attempt to read allegory without an awareness of its constant 
potential for discrete meanings we shall be denying its most 
distinctive characteristic. Ve may avoid the dangers of treating 
allegory as a glorified crossword puzzle, but we shall also be 
depriving ourselves of the real pleasure to be gained from the sense 
of having 'discovered' meaning. In allegorical texts the fact that 
there is a more than negligible period between reading and enlighten- 
ment may, from one point of view, be seen as a flaw in the work's 
'unity', but so far from vitiating its integrity it is the precon- 
dition for a distinctively allegorical kind of pleasure, that of the 
sudden recognition of meaning where it had previously seemed 
inaccessible. As Rosemond Tuve puts it: 
Indirection is formally and by definition a trait of the-- 
figure of allegory, hence, the common praises of the power of 
such a continued metaphor to illumine matters dazzingly, as 
the enigmatic enclosed meaning explodes in a firework of 
suddenly grasped metaphysical meanings. ' 
1, Tuve, p, 246, 
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I would contend that the task of the critic lies not in estab- 
lishing whether a distinction between senses exists but in character- 
ising its nature, and describing how the awareness of it affects our 
reading. Where the metaphor of 'levels' of meaning offends it is 
because the image it conjures up - of two parallel, unmeeting planes - 
is so grossly insufficient to the task of describing a reader's 
experience of a complex allegory like The Faerie Queene. Yet this 
image (or one equivalent to it) continues to haunt discussion of 
allegory; not because it gives a subtle representation of the reading 
experience - admittedly it does not - but because it describes one of 
the principles underlying that experience - the mechanism of analogy. 
The image of 'levels' does not describe the reading experience; it is 
part of the experience, felt by readers of allegory rather as the 
tonic may be felt by a listener to a piece of tonal music - as a 
constant but intermittently realised potential, a norm in which the 
heart of the work resides. Perhaps only an inept allegorist would 
wish to maintain without deviation the strict division of senses 
envisaged by Hazlitt, but the principle of such a division is present 
no less in a felt departure from it than in its maintenance. The 
hypothesis adopted in this thesis will be that an approach to The 
Faerie Queene which takes account of a real or potential distinction 
between literal and allegorical levels puts Spenser's complex poem in 
a clearer perspective than one which ignores it, without necessarily 
creating the sort of destructive dichotomy against which Hamilton and 
the others reacted. 
In the following section we shall trace some of the motives behind 
allegorical writing in Spenser's time, and see how the primarily ana- 
- 14 - 
logical basis of its method combined with other approaches, to reflect 
the concerns of allegorical writers. 
2. Allegory's Ends and Means: a Context for Spenser 
Francis Bacon, for whom questions of allegory (or 'poesy para- 
bolical") exercised some fascination, was struck by an apparent 
contradiction in the purposes for which it was used: 
Parables have been used in two ways, and (which is strange) 
for contrary purposes. For they serve to disguise and veil 
the meaning, and they serve also to clear and throw-light upon 
it. 2 
This paradoxical tendency of allegory to be both a revealer and a 
concealer of meaning marks the confluence of two ancient views of its 
purpose: what Mark Caldwell has called the 'rhetorical' and 
'exegetical' traditions. 3 Illustrative images have always formed part 
of the rhetoricians' armoury, and allegorla, being no more than an 
extended metaphor, can be used for explanatory purposes. Allegory as 
a tool of rhetoric is by definition intended to persuade, and a pre- 
condition of its efficacy is that it should be comprehensible. To 
this purpose Quintilian enjoined orators not to use obscure or 
riddling images. Significantly he stopped short of extending this 
1, Sir Francis Bacon, The Advance-tent of Learning-(1605), in The ANvancesent of 
Learning and New Atlantis, prei, by Thomas Case (0, U, P ,, 1906), pp. 1-254 (p, 98). 
2, Sir Francis Bacon, Of the gisdos of the Ancients (1609), in John M, Robertson, 
ed,, The Philosophical Yorks of Francis Bacon (London: George Routledge and Sons, 
Ltd., 1905), pp, 815-858 (p, 823), Compare ANvanceaent, p, 98, 
3, Mark Caldwell, 'Allegory: The Renaissance Mode', ELY, 44 (1977), 580-600. 
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rule to poets, recognising that the aims of poetry and oratory were 
not necessarily identical (Institutio Oratoria VIII vi 52). Even so, 
Sidney's account of poetry's operation and purpose can be located 
squarely within this rhetorical tradition: in his view poetry seeks to 
persuade men to virtue, and thence to virtuous action, the 'ending end 
of all earthly learning'. ' Such a conception of poetry is easily 
married to the techniques of epideictic rhetoric, and it is noticeable 
that in the section of his Defence in which Sidney reviews the state 
of contemporary style, he turns not to any poetic models but to Cicero 
and Demosthenes -a 'slip' to which "he himself brings elaborate 
attention, with the excuse that oratory and poetry 'have such an 
affinity in the wordish consideration, that I think this digression 
will make my meaning receive the fuller understanding'. 2 
Sidney chooses to demonstrate 'the strange effects of... poetical 
invention" with two examples of allegorla - the tale told to the 
Roman plebs by xenenius Agrippa, and Nathan's parable to King David. ' 
These, however, are stock examples, and in general Sidney considers 
the persuasive power of allegory to be limited, deprecating its 
overuse in the contemporary fad of Euphuism: 
For the force of a similitude not being to prove anything thý, a = 
contrary disputer), but. only tb explain' to a willing hearer, 
when. that is done, the rest is a most tedious prattling, 
rather over-swaying the memory from the purpose whereto they 
1, Sidney, Defence, p. 29. 
2, ibid,, p. 72, 
3, ibid,, p, 41, 
4, ibid., pp. 41-42, 
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were applied, than any whit informing the judgement, already 
either satisfied, or by similitudes not to be satisfied. ' 
In addition to the rhetorical tradition, however, the Elizabethans 
were heirs to a long history of sophisticated exegesis, of both 
Biblical and mythological texts. In the field of Scriptural inter- 
pretation, where one might imagine that reverence for the text would 
inhibit the devout exegete from foisting upon it readings that were 
too 'far-fetched', Caldwell points out that the same reverence could 
lead to exactly the opposite effect: 
Because it [allegorical exegesis] reached its greatest import- 
ance as a way of interpreting scripture, the inexhaustible 
mine of God's truth, it followed that a right-thinking reader 
might find meanings without limit in each passage, and no one 
could exhaust all its hidden senses. 2 
To this Scriptural superabundance can be added a secular equivalent 
in Sir John Harington's claim to be able to 'pike out' an 'infinite' 
number of allegories from classical myths. 3 Rosemond Tuve has 
insisted that the exegetical readings of Scripture were never intended 
actually to undermine its literal sense, however they may have 
supplemented it, ' but this can hardly be claimed for the exegesis 
(using similar methods) of pagan myths. Here, as Jean Seznec has 
demonstrated, the wholesale replacement of the original sense was the 
1, ibid., p, 71, 
2. Caldwell, p, 33, 
3, Harington, Preface to Orlando furioso, p, 5, 
4, This is a point Tuve stresses repeatedly, See, for instance, Tuve, p, 48 & n 
p, 414 n, 
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raison d'etre of exegetical interpretation. ' To provide these tales 
of libidinous, non-Christian gods with an underlying moral meaning was 
a means of ensuring their survival in the face of Church disapproval. 
In the Renaissance these same myths were held to conceal in 
allegorical form much of the learning of the ancient world, placed 
there by the wise as a means of preserving knowledge from the 
corruption that would inevitably follow its popular dissemination. 
Where rhetoric's aim of persuasion implies a need for lucidity, it was 
precisely the ability of analogy to veil meaning that appealed to the 
exegete, for the knowledge so concealed was of an arcane variety, to 
be shielded from the eyes of the vulgar. 
Poetry's supposed function as a means of safeguarding ancient 
wisdom became one of its stock defences against the charge of frivo- 
iity: 
... the men of greatest learning and highest wit in the 
auncient times did of purpose conceale these deepe mysteries 
of learning and, as it were, cover them with the vaile of 
fables and verse for sundrie causes; one cause was that they 
might not be rashly abused by prophane wits in whom science is 
corrupted like good wine in a bad vessell... 2 
This is Harington, but similar words can be found in Chapman* and 
even (rather more lightheartedly) in the conclusion to Sidney's 
1. Jean Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods; The Mythological tradition and its 
place in Renaissance Humanism and Art, trans, Barbara F, Sessions (Princeton: 
Princeton U, P  1953), See especially Book 1, Chapter 3, 
2, Harington, loc, cit. 
3, See George Chapman, A Free and Offenceles lvstification of Androoeda Liberata, in 
Phyllis Brooks Bartlett, ed,, The Poems of 6eorge Chapman (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1962), pp. 327-331 (p. 327). 
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Defence. ' As late as 1632 Henry Reynolds was able to revive this 
principle in his Xyt. homystes, an attack on contemporary poetic 
practice which was largely based on the accusation that poetry's true 
function as a medium of secret knowledge had been forgotten. 2 
Faced with two incompatible traditions - the rhetorical and the 
exegetical - both sheltering under the title of allegory, Caldwell 
attempts to reconcile them (at the risk of some damage to his own 
terminology) by suggesting that in Renaissance allegory the primary 
purpose is always rhetorical, and that the lip-service commonly paid 
to the necessity of keeping veiled secrets from the vulgar is, despite 
appearances, a way of revealing meaning by making an appeal to the 
reader's vanity, stimulating his desire to be one of the cognoscenti. 3 
This is plausible - although one suspects that it is rather too kind 
to some of the more obscurantist allegorists, whose own vanities may 
have been the main beneficiaries of their impenetrability - but 
Caldwell offers no evidence for the assertion. In most Elizabethan 
texts the contradiction is simply not acknowledged. This is easier to 
understand when we remember that many of the major treatises on 
poetics during this period were written with the aim of defence rather 
than of a priori analysis, -' and that their structure was consequently 
dictated by the desire to answer a series of specific charges rather 
than to build a coherent description of poetry as such. The 
1, Sidney, Defence, p. 75, 
2, Henry Reynolds, Hythosystes 116311, introd, Arthur F, Kinney (Menston: Scolar 
Press, 1972), 
3, Caldwell, pp, 582-83, 
4. Sidney and Harington are the most pertinent examples, But see also Thomas Lodge, 
9 Defence of Poetry, in Smith, I, 61-68, 
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contrasting abilities of poetry to make men wise and to keep wisdom 
hidden from the multitude belonged in different categories of defence, 
and could therefore be kept from coming into direct conflict. 
Harington provides a useful study in this respect. He character- 
ises poetry by resorting to two popular metaphors, apparently 
equivalent but in fact belonging to very different traditions. The 
first is the comparison of poetry with a fruit or tree, whose pith is 
hidden by an outer rind. According to this analysis poetry contains 
several (at least two) meanings: a literal meaning on the surface of 
the text (the rind or bark), and a veiled meaning beneath (the pith or 
marrow). As the terms of the analogy suggest, it is the inner meaning 
which is to be preferred. The image lends itself to allegorical 
defenses of poetry, and in this spirit it was invoked by Richard 
Stanyhurst in the Dedication to his translation of Virgil (1582): 
What deepe and rare poynctes of hydden secrets Virgil hath 
sealde vp in his twelue bookes of £neis may easelye appeere 
too such reaching wyts as bend theyre endewours too thee 
vnfolding thereof, not onlye by gnibling vpon thee outward 
ryne of a supposed histories but also by groaping thee pyth 
that is shrind vp wythin thee barck and bodye of so exquisit 
and singular a discourse. For where as thee chiefe prayse of 
a wryter consisteth in thee enterlacing of pleasure wyth 
profit, cure author hath so wiselye alayed thee one wyth thee 
oother as thee shallow reader may bee delighted wyth a smooth 
tale, and the diuing searcher may bee aduantaged by sowning a 
pretiouse treatise. ' 
Stanyhurst relates the two senses to be found in the poem to two 
traditional aims of poetry, delight and instruction. But what is 
noticeable here is that dulce and utile are no longer inseparable, as 
in Horatian theory, but so widely differentiated that they actually 
Richard Stanyhurst, Dedication to the Translation of the 4eneid, in Smith, I, 
135-47 (p. 136). 
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apply to different readers. The 'shallow reader' is content to stop 
at the literal sense, leaving the allegory to wiser heads. For those 
who reach this inner marrow, the value of the text ceases to be poetic 
at all; instead it is recognised as a 'treatise' containing 'hydden 
secrets'. 
Harington accepts the rind-pith image, and further refines the 
segregation of readers. Now a middle group appears, not wise enough 
to grasp the allegorical mysteries of the poem, but able to appreciate 
its moral concerns: 
First of all for the litterall sence (as it were the barke or 
ryne) they set downe, in manner of an historie, the acts and 
notable exploits of some persons worthy memorie; then in the 
same fiction, as a second rine and somewhat more fine as it 
were nearer to the pith and marrow, they place the Morall 
sence, profitable for the active life of man, approving 
vertuous actions and condemning the contrarie. Manie times 
also under the selfesame words they comprehend some true 
understanding of Naturall Philosophie or somtimes of politike 
government and now and then of divinitie, and these same 
sences that comprehend so excellent knowledge we call the 
Allegorie... 
... another and principall cause of all is to be able with 
one kinde of meate and one dish (as I may so call it) to feed 
divers tastes. For the weaker capacities will feede 
themselves with the pleasantnes of the historie and sweetnes 
of the verse, some that have stronger stomackes will as it 
were take a further taste of the Morall sence, a third sort 
more high conceited then they will digest the Allegorie... ' 
This sort of analysis clearly owes something to the traditional 
four-fold divisions of medieval exegetical theory. 2 In particular we 
should note that Harington follows medieval practice in emphasising 
the kind of information that is contained in each sense of the poem. 
1, Harington, Preface to Orlando Furioso, pp, 5-6, 
2. In fact it is quite a late use of this theory, which had suffered a fatal blow at 
the hands of Philip Melanchthon over fifty years previously, See Brian Vickers, 
In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p, 267. 
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Stanyhurst's simple two-level model enabled him to stress the metbod- 
ologicaI differences of his two sets of readers, one content to stop 
at the literal sense, the other continually seeking out analogies. 
His language reflects this active search for hidden knowledge: 'such 
reaching wyts as bend theyre endewours too thee vnfolding thereof', 
'groaping thee pyth', 'diving searcher'. This simple opposition 
between literal and analogical is not possible within Harington's 
tripartite model: hence the poem's senses are distinguished not only 
by the way in which they are made accessible to the reader, but by the 
sort of knowledge involved - an epistemological hierarchy is super- 
imposed onto a structural or methodological one. Historical knowledge 
is identified with the literal sense - an identification Harington 
explains by claiming that poetry 'must ground of a truth'. ' Moral 
knowledge can be gleaned by generalisations from the literal sense, 
while references to such 'excellent' knowledge as politics, natural 
science and theology must be hidden by an allegorical veil. 
Harington's division of the text into several different senses may 
be traced back to medieval theory, but his equation of these senses 
with different groups of readers derives from the more recent 
tradition of poetry's occult role as a receptacle for ancient wisdom, 
and has quite different implications. 2 Where the medieval exegete 
Harington, Advertisement to the Reader, in Orlando furioso (pp, 17-18) p, 17. 
2, As all generalisations must be, this is an oversimplification, Harry Caplan has 
shown that medieval writers such as Gregory the Great (Epist, v, 53a) commented on 
-the power of Scripture to appeal to people of all abilities, But this has little 
to do with any doctrine of secret knowledge, and much to do with pleasure in the 
-inexhaustability of Scriptural meaning, See Harry Caplan, 'The Four- Senses of 
Scriptural Interpretation and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching', in of 
Eloquence, Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
U, P  1970), pp, 93-105 (p, 95). Caplan's chapter is a good general account of the by-no-means uniform history of medieval multi-level exegesis, 
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could rejoice in the awareness of his text's plenitude of meaning, 
Harington gives no hint that there can be any intercourse between the 
various strata into which, readers- are divided. Shallow readers are 
satisfied with a shallow reading, while those who are more 'high 
conceited' recognise that the literal sense is only a rind concealing 
the pith of 'excellent' knowledge which is their true object. Readers 
are thus differentiated not only according to their ability to find 
hidden meanings behind a litera but also in their desire for and 
understanding of particular sorts of information. They are not 
'diving searchers' but guests at a feast, who may or may not happen to 
have 'stronger stomackes'. In this dual emphasis on the intrinsic 
organisation of the text and on the capacities of its readers to 
appreciate recondite information, Harington makes a tentative 
association between literary and moral competence -a point to which 
we shall return in the chapters that follow. 
The passage of Harington's which we have been discussing forms his 
allegorical defense of poetry's nature. However, he is also concerned 
to provide a rhetorical justification of poetry's effects. Thus he 
cites Plutarch's recommendation of poetry as an educative tool, ' and 
then turns to another equally traditional image, that of the sugared 
pill: 
Likewise Tasso in his excellent worke of Jerusalem Liberato 
likeneth Poetrie to the Phisicke that men give unto little 
children when they are sick; his verse is this in Italian, 
speaking to God with a pretie Prosopopeia: 
1, See Harington, Preface to Orlando furioso, p. 3. Compare Plutarch, How to Study 
Poetry, 14E, 36E. 
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Sai, the 1a corre i1 mondo, ove p1u versi 
Di sue dulcezze, 11 lusingier Parnasso: 
E the '1 vero conditio in mal ii versi 
I plu schivi allettando ha persuaso 
Cosi a1'egro fanciul porgiamo asperso 
Di soavi liquor g1i Or11 del vaso 
Succhi amari ingannato in tanto ei beve 
E dal inganno suo vita receve. 
Thou knowest, the wanton worldlings ever runne 
To sweete Parnassus fruites, how otherwhile 
The truth well saw'st with pleasant verse bath wohne 
Most squeamish stomackes with the sugred stile: 
So the sicke child that potions all doth shunne 
With comfets and with sugar we begile 
And cause him take a holsome sowre receit: 
He drinkes and saves his life with such deceit. ' 
'The sugred stile' has an obvious similarity to the image of the 
rind and the pith: both involve the notion that the valuable part of 
poetry is hidden beneath a surface that is merely delightful. 
However, whereas a stratified description of poetry's structure is 
central to the rind-pith image it is only incidental to the image of 
the pill, where the whole point is that the sugar and the medicine are 
taken together. To give sugar to one person and medicine to another 
would defeat the purpose. 
Here then we have two very different views of poetry's function. 
One, represented by the rind-pith image, is content to stratify both 
the senses of a text and its readers -a static conception. The other 
implies a substantive alteration in a reader's outlook, a capacity for 
leading him from more frivolous senses to profitable ones. Far from 
setting up impassable barriers between the dulce and the utile, 
between the ignorant and the wise reader, it is intended that dulce 
Harington, op, cit,, pp, 3-4, 
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should become the very path to utile, and that the ignorant should 
become wise. Harington himself has words to this effect: 
... it [poetry] pleaseth fooles and so pleaseth them that if 
they marke it and observe it well it will in time make them 
wise, for in verse is both goodnesse and sweetnesse, Rubarb 
and Sugercandie, the pleasaunt and the profitable... ' 
This rhetorical justification does not in fact depend on the pre- 
sence of hidden knowledge recoverable by the exegete, or on allegor- 
ical analogies of any sort. It equally well fits a description of 
poetry as teaching by example - Sidney too uses the image of poetry as 
sugar-coated medicine: 
... [poetry] doth intend the winning of the mind from 
wickedness to virtue-even as the child is often brought to 
take most wholesome things by hiding them in such other as 
have a pleasant taste, which, if one should begin to tell them 
the/nature of aloes or rhabarbarum they should receive, would 
sooner take their physic at their ears than at their mouth... 
glad they will be to hear the tales of Hercules, Achilles, 
Cyrus, Aeneas; and, hearing them, must needs hear the right 
description of wisdom, valour, and justice; which, if they had 
been barely, that is to say philosophically, set out, they 
would swear they be brought to school again. 2 
Harington's Preface, though deeply indebted to Sidney in many 
respects, makes little explicit use of this vision of poetry teaching 
virtue by the portrayal of heroic exemplars, relying instead on an 
allegorical defence of poetry's moral seriousness. It is true that 
moral lessons can be drawn from the action of the narrative ('In 
Byreno that abandoned his kinde Olympia in a desolate Iland and fell 
ibid., p. 8, 
ifisi' 2, Sidney, Defence, p, 40. 
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in love with another we may note an example of ingratitude''), but 
this is merely 'somewhat more fine' than the literal sense, and it is 
those truths revealed by allegory which are most highly regarded. The 
allegory is both the pith of the poem and the pill which is coated 
with sugar -a point Harington makes explicit in the Briefe and 
Summarie Allegorie appended to his translation: 
... [the allegory is] as it were the verse kyrnell and 
principall part or as the marrow and the rest but the bone or 
unprofitable shell, or according (as I said in my Appologie, 
using Tassoes comparison) like to the pill that-is lapped in 
suger and given a child for a medicin who otherwise would not 
be drawne to take the simple drugge though it were to save his 
life. 2 
Harington's purpose in including the Briefe and Summarie Allegorie 
is to save the Orlando Furioso from-charges of frivolity. Admitting 
that the dubious morality of Ariosto's narrative provides insuffient 
scope for such a defence, Harington once again declares his preference 
for allegorical justification: 'because I know in mine owne conscience 
that all the verses in this worke be not so full weight but, if they 
shalbe tryed in so severe a ballance, some will be found many graines 
to light, I would endevour all I might to supply that defect with the 
more weightie and sober consideration of the Allegorie'. 3 
This is emphatic enough, but in the event it is also confusing. 
The first part of the Allegorie is indeed devoted to allegorical 
exegesis - in particular of Rogero's adventures. For example, the 
three ladies Rogero encounters as he leaves Alcyna's realm in the 
1, Harington, 'Morall' notes to Book 10 of Orlando furioso, 
2, Harington, Briefe and Susaarie Allegorie, in Orlando furioso, pp, 558-568 (p, 559), 
3, ibid., p, 558, 
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tenth Book are identified as 'concupyscence', 'ease' and 'the mockerie 
and lewd use of the world" - an identification, incidentally, which 
Harington does not make in his notes to that Book. As the Allegorie 
progresses, however, the proportion of allegorical interpretation 
steadily decreases, to be replaced by moral commentaries of the sort 
that Harington placed in the 'Morall' sections of his notes to the 
poem: 
In Angellyca the excellentnesse of her bewtie bred such an 
exceeding pride that disdayning the greatest and worthyest 
Princes that live in the age, she cast her seife away at last 
upon a poore serving-man for a just recompence of her to 
haughtie conceipt. 2 
But in the worthy Bradamant-is a perfect patterne of true 
honourable love to Roger-o, moved first by his value, by his 
courage, by his behaviour, by his worth, which made him worthy 
of her love. 3 
Rogero the verse Idea and perfect example of a true knight 
that will by no meanes breake his faith and his honour, that 
seekes no advantage of the inchaunted sheeld, that to be 
gratefull to Don Leon Augustus would leese both love and life, 
and finally, that in defence of his honour killeth Rodomont. 4 
So much for the moral lightness of Ariosto's fiction. The worth of 
the poem now seems to reside in the aptness of a narrative in which 
unworthy figures suffer 'just recompence', and in the characters of 
the heroes, who are-held up as examples and patterns of true virtue in 
the Sidneyan mould. What I find significant is that Harington inter- 
1, ibid  p. 561, 
2, ibid., p, 564, 
3, ibid, 
4, ibid., p. 567, 
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mingles such arguments with allegorical analogies, without showing any 
of his former awareness of the distinction between them. As with 
Sidney, it is poetry's moral power which is insisted upon, and both 
analogy and example are subordinated to that end. 
Ve saw earlier that Harington's interest in the kinds of knowledge 
conveyed in allegory's various 'senses' was at least as important as 
the structural principles by which that knowledge was lodged in the 
text. At several points in his notes to Orlando Furioso this results 
in the distinction between the 'Morall' and 'Allegorie' sections being 
blurred, as moral allegories are placed under 'Morall' (because of 
their subject matter) rather than under 'Allegorie' (because of their 
analogical nature). ' In the Briefe and Summarie Allegorie this 
process is accelerated, as the concern to demonstrate the poem's moral 
seriousness becomes pre-eminent, overriding methodological niceties. 
By the time Harington takes his leave, the meaning of the word 
'Allegorie' has undergone a subtle shift, and now seems to encompass 
any means by which fiction may promote the moral improvement of the 
reader, whether by learned analogy or by cautionary or heroic example. 
This double view of allegory, as a specific structural principle 
and as a broader category of poetry encompassing Sidneyan exemplary 
fiction, has obvious application when we consider Spenser's most 
important extant critical work - the Letter to Raleigh, published in 
1590 with the first three Books of The Faerie Queene. 2 In his opening 
1, This is the case in at least part of the Morall interpretations of Books 4,6,7, 
11 and 15, 
2. Quotations from the Letter to Raleigh and from The Faerie Queen itself are all 
taken from Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Oueene, ed, A, C, Hamilton (London and New 
York: Longman, 1977), The Letter to Raleigh can be found on pp, 737-38, 
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remarks Spenser declares his poem to be 'a continued Allegory, or 
darke conceit', and offers to 'discover' to Raleigh its 'general 
intention and meaning'. ' Immediately here the word 'meaning' strikes 
us as ambiguous. Does it refer to a static 'meaning' which can be 
dis-covered in the same way that a rind can be stripped away, to 
reveal the pith of a 'darke conceit'? Or is it simply a synonym for 
'intention' - what Spenser 'means' to do by writing his poem? The 
meaning of 'meaning' is flexible enough to accomodate both the 
exegetical and rhetorical approaches. 
Spenser's intention turns out to be that which Sidney had held 
proper to all poetry: 'to fashion a gentleman or noble person in 
vertuous and gentle discipline'. 2 Spenser spends some time (again in 
terms reminiscent of Sidney)3 defending his decision to have the 
pursuit of this end 'coloured with an historicall fiction': men who 
read the work more for the delight of the story than for 'profite of 
the ensample14 will reap the latter in spite of themselves. That word 
'coloured' does not only refer to fiction's ability to make moral 
precepts more lively; it also carries a suggestion that the story is 
only a 'colour', a pretext for the delivery of wholesome doctrine. 
Spenser is using his own version of the image of the gilded pill, but 
still presented in strictly exemplary rather than analogical terms. 
The literary precedents he cites in defence of his practice are 
heroic, patterns of virtue to be imitated: 
1, Letter to Raleigh, p, 737, 
2, ibid. 
3, Compare Sidney, Defence, pp, 31-34, 
4. Letter to Raleigh, p, 737, 
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Homere... in the Persons of Agamemnon and Vlysses hath 
ensampled a good gouernour and a vertuous man, the one in his 
Ilias, the other in his Odysseis: then Virgil, whose like 
intention was to doe in the person of Aeneas: after him 
Ariosto comprised them both in his Orlando... ' 
So far this conceit does not seem particularly dark. But Spenser 
has no hesitation in referring to such exemplary fiction as allegor- 
ical: 
To some I know this Methode will seeme displeasaunt, which had 
rather haue good discipline deliuered plainly in way of 
precepts, or sermoned at large, as they vse, then thus 
clowdily enwrapped in Allegorical deuises. 2 
If any narrative that teaches by 'ensample' may be called allegory, 
what term can be used to distinguish it from the kind of writing 
Spenser goes on to discuss, when he explains that in Belphoebe he 
intends to represent the Queen's private person; that Arthur is a 
portrait of Magnificence, and so on? This is allegory in its trad- 
itional role as a vehicle of double meanings. Arthur in some sense - 
however limited - stands for Magnificence, Belphoebe stands for 
Elizabeth. For Spenser, however, the two modes are not to be 
separated. Allegorical writing is not a matter of choosing between 
them but of combining them in a way that leads to enlightenment in the 
reader. I would argue that this is what Spenser achieves to an 
unsurpassed degree in The Faerie Queene. 
1, ibid. 
2, ibid. 
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3. Allegorical Decorum 
The same Moral may... be express'd in different Fables, all of 
which may be lively and full of Spirit, yet not all equally 
elegant; as various Dresses may be made for the same Body, yet 
not all equally becoming. 
John Hughes, An Essay on Allegorical Poetry 
It may be useful at this point to pause and review exactly what 
constitutes the distinction between the two modes of allegory we have 
outlined. At the same time there is a terminological problem to be 
solved, for if both kinds of writing may be called allegory, we need a 
less circumlocutory way of distinguishing them. 
The type of allegory dominant in the exegetical tradition (which in 
rhetoric goes by the name of allegoria) I shall call analogical 
allegory, to indicate that it is based on the systematic substitution 
of one set of terms for another. As I argued in the first part of the 
chapter, this substitution is the distinguishing mark of all allegory, 
and I know of no work (certainly up to Spenser's time) which has been 
called an allegory and yet lacks any analogical element. 
Distinct from this is the sort of writing I shall call exemplary 
allegory. Exemplary allegory is writing which is seen to exemplify 
its own meaning at the literal level. In isolation it might not be 
thought of as allegory at all, but narrative with an exemplary moral 
content. However, exemplary allegory too has some claim to doubleness 
of meaning if we read 'meaning' in the sense of 'intention', for while 
1, John Hughes, An Essay on Allegorical Poetry, rpt, in R, M, Cummings, ed,, Spenser; 
The Critical Heritage (New York; Barnes and Noble, 1971), pp, 248-76 (p. 256). 
This essay originally formed a preface to Hughes' edition of Spenser (1715), 
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it appears to do nothing but tell a pleasant story, it is secretly 
inculcating moral precepts. To use a somewhat simplistic formulation, 
then, analogical allegory is allegorical by virtue its method, 
exemplary allegory by virtue of its purpose. For our discussion, 
however, we shall say that the exemplary technique becomes allegorical 
only when it is used as part of a wider strategy including analogical 
allegory, and that on these occasions it may be identified with the 
'literal' level of the analogy. 
The parable of the Good Samaritan - though not, in these terms, 
strictly an allegory - is a fine example of exemplary fiction. Its 
meaning is self-explanatory, since it is itself a demonstration of 
that meaning. The actions of one man become (as in Sidney, or 
Harington's 'Morall' readings) the model for all. At the end of it 
Jesus is able to turn to his listeners and ask for the moral. By 
contrast the rigorous analogical allegory of the parable of the Sower 
is a conundrum which cannot be solved until the analogies on which it 
is based - between the man and God, the seed and the Gospel, and so on 
- are explained: 'And his disciples asked him, saying, What might this 
parable be? ' (Luke 8.9). ' 
In a moral allegory of any complexity both these types of allegor- 
ical writing are likely to be present. As readers of allegory, we are 
constantly exercising our judgement to decide which elements of a work 
may be read analogically, and which are 'untranslatable' into other 
terms. 
It is here that one of the properties of analogy discussed earlier 
becomes very relevant. There is nothing in the nature of an ana- 
1, All quotations are from the 1611 King James Bible, 
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logical 'mapping' between one set of terms and another that logically 
implies any sharing of attributes between particular pairs of terms. 
The sun may sensibly be compared to the nucleus of an atom, that is to 
say, without any implication that they are of comparable weight or 
temperature, or indeed that they share any other individual attribute. 
In the case of the analogy between particulars and universals, not 
even the relationships between analogous pairs of terms need be 
equivalent. When this principle is applied to the reading of 
Spenserian allegory, surprising results follow. Since the presence of 
exemplary as well as analogical writing means that not all the terms 
of the litera need be translated into their analogical equivalents, it 
is often unclear which of two very different sets of attributes and 
relations are applicable at any point: those of the literal figures, 
or those of the figures implied by the analogical mapping. 
Consider, for instance, Guyon's destruction of the Bower of Blasse 
at FQ II. xii - possibly the most celebrated of all Spenserian cruxes. 
Throughout most of Book II Guyon is rather a passive hero, manfully 
resisting temptation rather than initiating action. Hence, as 
Hamilton has pointed out, ' it is something of a coup de tbedtre when 
in the final Canto he goes on the offensive in overturning Acrasia's 
realm. Is there a change of allegorical approach here? Guyon's 
passivity throughout the majority of Book II derives from his actual 
practice of temperance, a virtue in which abstention, restraint and 
self-discipline play a large part. To this extent Guyon's actions are 
naturalistic, the dominant mode exemplary. But with the destruction 
1, Hamilton, Structure of A11egory, p, 131, 
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of the Bower the case is altered, and an important ambiguity arises. 
If we continue to read this part of the poem as fundamentally 
exemplary allegory, then Guyon's act may seem (has seemed, to many 
critics)' quite unusually intemperate and blameworthy. On the other 
hand, Acrasia is rather more than a straightforward seductress: in 
some ways she represents Intemperance itself. Once we make this 
analogical mapping, the moral implications of the episode appear quite 
different. If Acrasia 'is' Intemperance, then the patron knight of 
Temperance must surely be her unappeasable enemy: her works should no 
more be tolerated than those of Error, or Lust, or any of the more 
obviously repellent vices. From this point of view it would be giving 
in to intemperance if Guyon did not destroy the Bower. The difficulty 
for the reader is that the poem allows both interpretations. 
We may say in these more or less general terms that Guyon's career 
is conducted on at least two 'levels': on the literal level he is a 
temperate man resisting temptations to intemperance -a fact which 
encourages an exemplary interpretation; but on-the analogical level he 
is the patron of temperance, or even Temperance itself, fighting the 
vice of Intemperance. This is a crude characterisation (I shall be 
attempting some more subtle analyses in the next chapter) but I 
believe that it fairly represents the dilemma which underlies much 
critical comment on this episode. 
Socrates' philosophical problem becomes our aesthetic one. If 
Naastership's relation to Slavery -is radically different from that of 
masters to slaves, the same can certainly be said of, for example, the 
1, See Hamilton's notes to The faerie Queene, p, 168, for a representative collection 
of critical responses, 
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relations of Temperance, Intemperance and temperate and intemperate 
individuals. A temperate man may resist a temptation to intemperance, 
but the analogically allegorical expression of this might well be 
Temperance battling with Intemperance. If a character like Guyon can 
at different times (or at the same time) be read both as an individual 
and as an abstract figure, then his actions will be open to misreading 
from one side or other of the divide. As Maureen Quilligan has 
written, allegory has a 'tendency to slide tortuously back and forth 
between literal and metaphorical understandings of words, and there- 
fore to focus on the problematic tensions between them'. ' Given the 
nature of Spenserian allegory, in which both forms of allegory are 
continually present at least in potentia, this ambiguity is neces- 
sarily a constant part of our reading. 
If this is so, however, it is also true that some parts of The 
Feierte Queene strike us as more problematically ambiguous than others. 
I have been at pains to stress the fact that an analogy between two 
terms does not logically imply that they have attributes in common, 
but this does not mean that the sharing (or otherwise) of attributes 
may not have an effect on the psychological plausibility of an 
analogical allegory, or on its aesthetic acceptability. In fact, the 
value of a discussion of the logical implications of analogy lies 
largely in its provision of a foundation for more specifically 
critical questions. 
These are the questions of allegorical decorum. What makes some 
analogies seem to 'work' better than others? which 
factors encourage 
us to read allegory in one way rather than another, either as ana- 
I. Quilligan, p, 67, 
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logical, or exemplary, or both? What, in short, constitutes that 
'louely conformitie, or proportion, or conueniencie between the sence 
and the sensible' which Puttenham prized as the chief praise of a 
poet? ' The attempt to answer these questions will, in one form or 
another, occupy us for the rest of the thesis. In this section we 
shall confine ourselves to a consideration of some of the issues 
involved. 
0 
That allegory need not involve a wholesale translatio was recog- 
nised by Quintilian, who explained that most allegory was 'mixed', 
with the untranslated terms providing a gloss on the rest (Institutio 
Oratorio VIII vi 47-48). This point was taken up by the elder Henry 
Peacham: 'a comixt Aligorye, is when one word, or moe then one in the 
Aligory, haue their proper sygnifycation'. 2 Peacham's examples are of 
interest in their own right. The first is a quotation from Matthew's 
gospel (Matt 3.12), in which John the Baptist likens Christ to a 
farmer separating wheat from chaff. The second is a sentence from 
Cicero: 
Whose fan is in his hand, and he shall purge his floure, and 
gather his wheat into his Barne, but will burne the Chaffe 
with unquencheable fyre... 
Truely I alwayes thought, that Milo should abide other tempest 
and stormes, only in these waues of conscions. 3 
1, Puttenhae, p, 174, 
2, Peacham, Sig, D2r, For John Hoskins, writing some twenty years later, the 
mixing of terms in allegory is so prevalent as to be its identifying feature, 
distinguishing it from emblem, See John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style 
(c, 1599), ed, H, H, Hudson (Princeton: Princeton U, P., 1935), p, 10, 
3, Peacham, Sig, D2r. 
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The second example is perhaps the simpler. Peacham cites the 
phrase 'waues of conscious' as a 'comixt' allegory because the word 
'conscious' has its 'proper sygnifycation'. The role of 'conscions' 
as a gloss for 'waues' is made explicit by a standard lexical operator 
- 'of' - and seems to resist any subtler interaction between the two 
terms than that of simple substitution. Whatever sensuous qualities 
we associate with 'wanes', they do not seem to be called upon in this 
image: everything is subordinated to the larger framework of the 
analogy. 
In the passage from Matthew's gospel the interruption of the 
allegory by a term with its 'proper sygnifycation' is less obvious. 
The translatlo is almost complete - wheat for the blessed, chaff for 
the damned, fan for judgement, and so on. However, in the reference 
to 'fyre' the analogy merges with its true subject: both the chaff and 
the damned are to be burnt. The adjective 'unquencheable' takes this 
process one step further, since it is appropriate not to the fire a 
farmer makes of the chaff, but only to the hellfire in which the 
damned are to be punished. As with 'conscions', the word acts as a 
gloss on the subject of the allegory, but its use is unsignalled and 
oblique. The effect is that we momentarily transfer the adjective 
'unquenchable' to the literal level, an incongruity that sends us back 
to the meaning that underlies it. With 'unquencheable fyre' the 
parable drops the mask of its artifice, revealing its true sig- 
nificance not with any standard formula such as 'of', but directly, as 
if the weight and urgency of the meaning could not be so glibly hidden 
behind a veil of analogy. 
In these two examples at least we have a prima face case for 
thinking that the terms used in an analogy need not share individual 
- 37 - 
attributes with the terms to which they are analogous. In the first, 
the formula word 'of' seems to disclaim any pretension to such 
similarities, diverting our attention to the larger effect of the 
analogy. In the second, the inapplicability of the word 'unquench- 
eable' to the literal meaning actually heightens the rhetorical effect 
of the passage. 
The inclusion of incongruous elements in the litera was recognised 
both in classical and Renaissance times as a way of directing the 
reader's attention towards the fact of an underlying meaning. Bacon 
is one of several writers who comment upon this effect of allegory's 
apparent nonsensicality - what Michael Murrin has dubbed the 
'absurdity principle': ' 
But there is yet another sign, and one of no small value, that 
these fables contain a hidden and involved meaning, which is, 
that some of them are so absurd and stupid upon the face of 
the narrative taken by itself, that they may be said to give 
notice from afar and cry out there is a parable below. 2 
Perhaps the earliest use of this doctrine was in the exegetical 
practice of Dionysius the Areopagite. As Ernst Gombrich has 
explained, Dionysius believed that Scripture described divine matters 
by combining two methods - affirmation and negation - one acting as a 
corrective to the other. While use was made of 'such dignified 
concepts as Logos or Nous or... the image of Light', to describe God, 
1, Murrin, Veil of Allegory, p, 146, Murrin cites similar statments by Origen, 
Julian the Apostate and George Chapman, 
2, Bacon, Wisdom of the Ancients, p, 823, 
3, E, H, Gombrich, Symbolic leages; Studies in the art of the Renaissance (New York; 
Phaidon, 1972), p, 151. 
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there was a danger that if Scripture confined itself to these images 
then they would themselves be mistaken for the divine, instead of 
being recognised as mere analogies. 
It is to avoid this confusion that the holy authors of the 
revealed writings have deliberately used inappropriate symbols 
and similes so that we should not cling to the undignified 
literal meaning. The very monstrosities of which they talk, 
such as lions and horses in the heavenly regions, prevent us 
from accepting these images as real and stimulate our mind to 
seek a higher significance. ' 
God is described precisely by those things which he does not 
resemble, because in fact he cannot be said to be like anything. But 
this strategy must be part of a combined approach which also includes 
more 'dignified' images, capable of leading our minds in the proper 
direction once the metaphorical nature of the discourse has been 
recognised. This double requirement finds a modern parallel in James 
&ohrnberg's dictum about allegory: 'the two patterns must be 
appropriable to each other-if they are to produce a recognition of 
"intendment" or aptness. And yet they must be alien enough to produce 
an allegory. '2 
The obvious example of this technique in The Faerie Queene is the 
description of Error: 
Therewith she spewd out of her filthy maw 
A floud of poyson horrible and blacke, 
Full of great lumpes of flesh and gobbets raw, 
Which stunck so vildly, that it forst-him slacke 
His grasping hold, and from her turne him backe: 
Her vomit full of bookes and'papers was, 
With filthy frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke, 
1, ibid. 
2. Nohrnberg, pp, 101-102, 
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And creeping sought way in the weedy gras: Her filthy parbreake all the place defiled has. 
I. 1.20 
The unsettling presence of 'bookes and papers' in Error's vomit 
brings us up short, sending us back to the meaning which she embodies 
- the many ways that falsehood can be spread through the world. In 
one respect this passage differs from the Dionysian account, since the 
apparent absurdity is not really absurd at all, but a reference to the 
allegorical sense behind the litera -a mixed allegory. The detail is 
more than simply a gloss, however. The juxtaposition of elements from 
the literal and analogical levels of the allegory has an effect in its 
own right. The allegorical relevance of the following line, in which 
the frogs and toads are said to be born without eyes, becomes clearer 
in the light of these 'bookes and papers'. Although there is no 
intrinsic absurdity in their blindness which forces us to abandon the 
literal level, we are now more inclined to look for specific analogies 
in the details of the description. As with Dionysian interpretation, 
the metaphorical nature of the work as a whole is emphasised by the 
obvious impropriety of specific parts. More than this, by including 
the 'bookes and papers' in the narrative, Spenser ensures that the 
literal sense does not suffer a complete 'disintegration before the 
triumphant progress of the interpretation'. ' On the contrary, the 
interpretation becomes a part of the literal sense, and produces an 
electrifying moment in which we seem to inhabit two allegorical worlds 
simultaneously. The use of such effects seems to me to constitute one 
of the best replies to the objection that analogical allegory involves 
1. Caldwell, p. 588, 
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a disjunction of the faculties. It is rather that the faculties unite 
the levels of the analogy. 
Mixed allegory and the absurdity principle are both rhetorical 
tools at the command of analogical allegory. They suggest that a lack 
of similarity in the terms of an analogy, so far from spoiling the 
allegory, can actually enhance it by making the reader more aware of 
the presence of meaning in a text, and at the same time helping to 
unfold that meaning. Exemplary allegory, by contrast, depends on the 
ability of particular examples to open a perspective onto universals, 
and this is an exercise in which opacity is not a virtue: the Sidneyan 
poet shows 'all virtues, vices, and passions so in their natural seats 
laid to the view, that we seem not to hear of them, but clearly to see 
through them'. ' A marked disparity in the attributes of the par- 
ticular and universal senses here can easily work to the poet's dis- 
advantage. A good example is C. S. Lewis' comment on a passage from 
Prudentius' Psychomachia. )fens Humilis has just defeated Superbia on 
the battlefield: 
The moment has now come when Humility must triumph and yet 
remain humble. The unhappy poet, torn between the epic 
formula and the allegorical meaning, can only explain that she 
triumphs modestly: 
Uplifts-her face 
With moderated cheer, and civil looks 
Tempering her joy. 
Os quoque parse Erigit - nothing could suggest more vividly 
the smirk of a persevering governess who has finally succeeded 
in getting a small boy into trouble with his father. 2 
1, Sidney, Defence, p, 33, 
2, C, S, Lewis, The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1936), p, 70. 
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Prudentius' figures are of course personifications, and he attempts 
to combine in them both the meanings we associate with that word: the 
giving of human form to a particular quality, and the exemplification 
of that quality. Here, unfortunately, these meanings are incom- 
patible. Although Lewis says that the poet is 'torn between the epic 
formula and the allegorical meaning', this is not quite accurate. 
Prudentius' allegorical meaning is that Humility is stronger than (and 
therefore superior to) Pride, a meaning which is perfectly compatible 
with the epic setting. The difficulty with this passage, and the 
reason it fizzles into unsatisfactory compromise, has more to do with 
decorum. As Lewis himself comments, 'Fighting is an activity that is 
not proper to most virtues. " It is expected, in other words, that 
Humility will behave like the Forms described by Socrates, and exem- 
plify the quality of which she is the essence. Prudentius has real- 
ised this, and attempted to make Humility humble, with the dire 
results described by Lewis. In this case, the logical independence of 
attributes in the terms of an analogy is not a sufficient aesthetic 
justification for so total an apposition between the litera and the 
meaning to which it refers. 
Not all personifications are so dependent on this exemplary role, 
however. We may contrast the Prudentian passage with the opening of 
Daniel's masque, The Vision of the Twelve Goddesses: 
The Might, represented in a black vesture set with stars, 
comes and wakens her son, Somnus (sleeping in bis cave), with 
this speech. 
1. ibid, P, 69, 
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Awake dark Sleep, rouse thee from out of this cave,... ' 
This oxymoronic invocation seems to invite challenge, and yet, at 
the same time that it draws attention to the artificiality of its 
allegorical environment, it fulfils a genuine dramatic function, 
acting as an intensive: if Sleep must be awoken, one feels, the matter 
is urgent indeed. Daniel does not follow up this advantage, however. 
Somnus leaps to do his mother's bidding with a most unsleepy alacrity, 
and although he soon returns to his slumbers this seems to be as much 
a badge of identification as a part of his 'character', no more 
internalised than Vesta's lamp or Diana's quiver. Daniel is 
uncomfortable enough at the contradiction implied in Somnus' behaviour 
to feel compelled to justify it with an appeal to authority: 
Vhich figures when they are thus presented in human bodies, as 
all virtues, vices, passions, knowledges and whatsoever 
abstracts else in imagination are, which we would make 
visible, we produce them using human actions, and even sleep 
itself (which might seem improperly to exercise waking 
motions) hath often been shewed us in that manner, with speech 
and gesture. As for example: 
Excussit tandem sibs se; cubitoque levatus 
Quid veniat (cognovit enim) sciatur. 
Intanto sopravenne, e g1i occhi chiuse 
Ai Signori, ed ai sergenti il pigro Sonno. 
And in another place: 
I1 Sonno viene, e sparso il corpo stanco 
Col ramo intriso net liquir di Lethe. 2 
To describe the waking of Somnus is for Daniel simply to take 
advantage of a convention which allows such seeming inconsistencies. 
1, Samuel Daniel, The Vision of the Twelve Goddesses (1604), ed, Joan Rees, in R 
Book of Masques; In Honour of Allardyce Nicoll (C, U, P,, 1967), pp. 17-42 (p, 31), 
2, ibid., p. 28, 
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The watchers of his masque must be sensitive to the genre's true 
focus, and approach the action with an eye to what Somnus represents, 
not what he does - if they do not meddle with the literal sense, the 
literal sense will not meddle with them. Yet this solution seems to 
be just as reductive as Hazlitt's. 
When Archimago's sprite is sent to wake Morpheus in the first canto 
of The Faerie Queene, the figure he finds is a much more thoroughgoing 
exemplar of the state he represents than Daniel's Somnus: 
The messenger approching to him spake, 
But his wast wordes returnd to him in vain: 
So sound he slept, that nought mought him awake, 
Then rudely he him thrust, and pusht with paine, 
Whereat he gan to stretch: but he againe 
Shooke him so hard, that forced him to speake. 
As one then in a dreame, whose dryer braine 
Is tost with troubled sights and fancies weake, 
He mumbled soft, but would not all his silence breaks. 
The Sprite then gan more boldly him to wake, 
And threatned vnto him the dreaded name 
Of Hecate: whereat he gan to quake, 
And lifting vp his lumpish heavy head, with blame 
Halfe angry asked him, for what he came,... 
I. 1.42.1-43.5 
Morpheus wakes, but sleepily. Humility triumphs, but modestly. If 
we ask why this passage succeeds where Prudentius 
fails, it cannot be 
on the grounds that one figure exemplifies 
the quality it represents 
while the other does not. Rather, 
it is that Prudentius shies away 
from the contradiction implied in the allegorical situation, where 
Spenser embraces it. To wake Morpheus - in Faerie, 
this is not just a 
verbal contradiction but an inversion of 
the natural order. How can 
it be achieved except by invoking 'the 
dreaded name/ Of Hecate`? The 
exemplary logic of the situation 
is not simply ignored, as in Daniel, 
but incorporated into the poem's world. Indeed, 
the violation of the 
- 44 - 
logic helps to define that world: the vivid sense of Morpheus' 
sleepiness is achieved by showing with what difficulty he is changed 
from his state. 
The relationship of the analogical and exemplary modes of allegory 
in Spenser is not always harmonious, but he excels in the ability to 
turn the tensions inherent in his chosen form to poetic advantage. 
The figure of Morpheus is one focus for these tensions - yet the scene 
is described in such a way as to assimilate the struggle between the 
two modes of allegory into the structure of the narrative. Again, 
Guyon's action in destroying the Bower of Blasse is open to contra- 
dictory interpretations; but in the end this interpretative rivalry 
becomes a vehicle of meaning in its own right, communicating a genuine 
ambivalence about the legitimacy of sensual pleasure. If exemplary 
and analogical allegory can never sit easily together, this is clearly 
not a reason for artistic despair, but an opportunity to find new and 
original ways of expression - an opportunity Spenser well knows how to 
take. 
4. Interlude: The Possibility of interpretation 
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or 
number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then 
to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and 
illusion. 
Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (XIII, iii)' 
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed, Charles W, Hendel (New 
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 173, 
- 45 - 
Until now we have been considering the different motives and 
methods that cohabit, however uneasily, in a complex allegory like The 
Faerie Queene. Since our subject has been the relationship between 
the literal sense and the referent to which it is analogous, it has 
been convenient to assume that we can know with reasonable confidence 
what that referent is. This would always be a dangerous assumption, 
but at a time when the possibility (or otherwise) of extra-linguistic 
reference of any kind is a live critical issue, it is a matter which 
cannot be left unaddressed. In this section, then, we shall consider 
a more fundamental question than any so far discussed. How secure can 
we ever be in making a statement of the form 'Image A represents Idea 
B'? Can such a statement ever be proved - to take up Hume's challenge 
- either by abstract or by experimental reasoning? 
The root of the problem lies in the nature of analogy itself. 
Analogical allegory involves a leap of faith, for an analogy can only 
be perceived, not deduced. While the poet can provide clues to his 
intention, these will inevitably be ambiguous, and their identi- 
fication a question-begging procedure, for what seems of fundamental 
significance to one reader may appear peripheral to another. Even 
when a character is given an apparently straightforward allegorical 
name - for instance 'Despair' - this does not necessarily solve our 
interpretational difficulties. In the case of FQ I. ix, for instance, 
it gives no indication of whether Despair is despair in a general 
abstract sense, or a personification of Redcross' spiritual state, or 
simply a man given to despair; still less does it indicate which of 
his words and actions are to be read as having particular allegorical 
significance. The reader is left to choose from many interpretational 
paths, and must seek methods to guide his choice as best he may. 
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For a critic like Hamilton, the ambiguity inherent in analogical 
reading vitiates the whole method, since there seem to be no sure 
grounds for preferring one interpretation to another. To prove his 
point, he attempts a reductio ad absurdum of the analogical method: 
Vhy not allow Book I to be an allegory of modern Russian 
Communism? The Red Cross Knight stands for the working class 
armed with the Marxist faith: naturally his colour is red, and 
his cross refers to the crossed hammer and sickle. Una is 
clearly the spirit of Communism. The opening battle against 
Error refers to the Revolution. That monster's books and 
papers which she spews at the knight refer to the flood of 
Trotskyite writings, and her death marks the first triumph of 
the oppressed peasant class (the knight is Georgos, one 
brought up in ploughman's state). The scattered brood who 
feed upon Error's body represents the landed kulaks who used 
the time of distress to get rich; and the account of their 
swollen bellies 'with fulnesse burst, / And bowels gushing 
forth' shows what rightly happened to them. ' 
We can take it that this interpretation is not intended seriously, 
but how do we know? In this case there is external evidence: the 
writer tells us it is a joke, and there are obvious anachronisms. 
These useful pointers, however, are seldom available to the would-be 
interpreter. True, the Marxist version is also highly selective in 
its use of the text, but the body of 'conspicuous irrelevance' (to use 
Harry Berger's phrase)2 in allegory means that no reading can hope to 
interpret every facet of the text analogically. How can one justify 
one's own particular brand of selectivity? 
Hamilton uses this reading to bolster his case against analogical 
allegory. What it demonstrates, however, is not that analogical 
interpretation is necessarily invalid, but that to be successful it 
1, Hamilton, Structure of Allegory, p, 9, 
2, Berger, 911egorical Temper, pp, 120-60, 
- 47 - 
must do more than fulfil the basic criterion of isomorphic con- 
sistency; it must also be psychologically plausible to the reader. 
Commonly, a reading is proposed, and it will 'work' insofar as it will 
fit those aspects of the text to which it addresses itself, but it 
will nevertheless feel 'far-fetched' or 'strained', or, as Rosemond 
Tuve would say, 'imposed'. ' If we look for the cause of this 
phenomenon in the text alone we shall end either by distrusting all 
such interpretations, or by declaring that they are all equally valid, 
for in terms of structure there is no certain method of choosing 
between them. 
This is not a new realisation. Boccaccio had stated the problem in 
his defense of poetry: 2 
Who in our day can penetrate the hearts of the Ancients? Who 
can bring to light-and life again minds long since removed in 
death? Who can elicit their meaning? A divine task that- 
not human! The Ancients departed the way of all flesh, 
leaving behind them their literature and their famous names 
for posterity to interpret according to their own judgement. 
But as many minds, so many opinions. 3 
Boccaccio proceeded to interpret the myths anyway -a combination 
of scepticism and faith which was strangely echoed over two hundred 
years later by Francis Bacon, in his preface to Of the Wisdom of the 
Ancients. The main body of this work consists of a collection of 
well-known myths, each of which is interpreted by Bacon to reveal 
1, 'Imposed Allegory' is the title of a chapter in A! legorical Imagery, 
2, This occupies the fourteenth and fifteenth books of his encyclopaedic 6enealogia 
deorua gentiliua (c, 1340-1370), 
3, Boccaccio on Poetry, trans, Charles 6, Osgood (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1930, 
rpt, 1956), p, 11, cited Ronald Levao, Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions, 
Cusanus, Sidney, Shakespeare (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: California U, P,, 
1985), p, 112, 
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certain moral and scientific points supposedly enshrined therein. 
Bacon does not, however, take the legitimacy of interpretation for 
granted: empiricist that he is, he actively considers the possibility 
that the concealed moral meanings traditionally adduced as the reason 
for the myths' composition might have been later additions: 
I know very well what pliant stuff fable is made of, how 
freely it will follow any way you please to draw it, and how 
easily with a little dexterity and discourse of wit meanings 
which it was never meant to bear may be plausibly put upon 
it. ' 
In the introduction to the Wisdom Bacon agonizes over this question 
at some length, but in the end he decides that at least some of the 
myths simply must have been composed with the conscious intention of 
illustrating a particular truth, so evident is that intention to the 
reader, and it is these interpretations which he means to include in 
his work: 
I find a conformity and connection with the -thing signified, 
so close and so evident, that one cannot help believing such a 
signification to have been designed and meditated from the 
first, and purposely shadowed out. -2 
However, turning to the main content of the Wisdom one finds that 
the interpretations often fall far short of inducing the quietem in 
cognitione promised by Bacon's words. The legend of Perseus, for 
instance, is an allegory on the 'art and judicious conduct of war'; 3 
while the figure of Cupid represents nothing more or less than the 
i, Bacon, 4'isdos, p, 822, Compare Advancement, p, 99, 
2. Bacon, loc, cit, 
3, ibid  p, 832, 
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atom of classical materialism. ' The words Jean Seznec applied to 
Boccaccio seem equally suited to Bacon: 'we find him rejecting this or 
that fable because of its improbability, and in the next breath 
accepting some no less absurd fabrication'. 2 It is inconceivable to 
me that the 'inventor' of these myths (if it is sensible to talk of 
such a person) could have written them with the intention of 
illustrating just these points, but in 1609 a person as consciously 
sceptical and intellectually rigorous as Francis Bacon found it not 
only plausible, but so 'evident' that it was impossible not to believe 
it. If there is such a discrepancy between the ways these myths can 
be read - the ways, in fact, that they can be allegorized - then it 
seems to imply a gap between the perceptions of readers in different 
ages that is well nigh unbridgeable. We can achieve an intellectual 
understanding of this sort of mythological interpretation, but how can 
it ever be imbued for us with the imaginative potency that it has for 
Bacon? 
The proper area of consideration here is the selective nature of 
the reader's credulity. William James, in his essay, 'The Will to 
Believe' (1896), 3 makes the observation that at certain times, and for 
certain people, particular beliefs are either psychologically 'live' 
or 'dead' (the metaphor being an electrical one), and that in the 
1, ibid  pp, 839-41, 
2, Seznec, p, 222, Nor is this bemusement purely a modern phenomenon, John Hughes, 
writing barely a hundred years after Bacon, found his readings similarly 
implausible: 'his Interpretations are often far fetch'd, and so such at random, 
that the Reader can have no Assurance of their Truth', See An Essay on 
Allegorical Poetry, p, 257, 
3, William James, The VI!! to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, with 
introd, by Edward H, Madden (Cambridge, Mass, and London, Harvard U, P  1979), 
pp, 13-33 (pp, 14-17). 
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latter case it is a virtual psychological impossibility to believe 
them. He uses religious belief as an example of this: 
If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no 
electric connection with your nature- it refuses to 
scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it 
is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not 
one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the 
mind's possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness 
and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, 
but relations to the individual thinker. ' 
This notion of 'live' and 'dead' options of belief seems to 
describe very well the different reactions of readers to proposed 
allegorical interpretations, for the determination of what a 
particular reader finds credible and natural will be affected by any 
number of cultural and personal factors, all of which go to define his 
aesthetic sensibility. Inevitably, too, any divergence in taste will 
increase with the changes in cultural context which mark the passage 
of time. Hence, many interpretations which now appear extremely 
implausible were respected and influential in the Renaissance. One 
need only read poetic annotations such as Harington's, or the 
mythological handbooks of Boccaccio, Conti or Bacon, and it will not 
be hard to find allegorical interpretations which startle by their 
very failure to provoke a responding inner 'chime' of belief. 
In the end it is an old philosophical question, which is no more 
soluble in literary criticism than elsewhere: different people are 
convinced by different sorts of argument, not because they are less 
able to think clearly in their own terms but because those terms 
differ - they argue from different premises. Though analogical 
ibid., p, 14, 
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allegory is my subject here, similar reasoning applies to any 
interpretation of the 'meaning' of a text: analogical allegory merely 
crystallizes the problem by making such interpretation the formal 
basis of its method. As long as the same set of phenomena can be 
interpreted in different ways it would seem that our eventual 
conclusion must be that of Paul de Man: 'The necessary immanence of 
the reading in relation to the text is a burden from which there is no 
escape. " Or, to express a similar thought in more familiar words - 
there's no arguing about tastes. 
One apparent way out of this impasse is to deny the text's ability 
to refer to anything outside itself - thus obviating the need to show 
that one's chosen referent has a privileged status. The most 
important work of Spenserian criticism to treat the poem in this light 
is Jonathan Goldberg's Endlese Vorke: Spenser and the Structures of 
Discourse. 2 Goldberg rejects the 'empirical commonplaces'3 that lure 
readers into forcing the premature closure of a text, and borrows 
instead the Derridean notion of freeplay and the Barthesian notion of 
the writerly text, to describe a poem that never finally resolves 
itself into definitive meaning. For Goldberg The Faerie Queene is 
constantly undermining its own statements, revising itself, deferring 
closure: and as the title of his book implies, this is a process which 
can never be completed. In the course of 174 pages that are by turns 
ingenious and disingenuous, Goldberg comes to the only conclusion that 
i, Paul de Man, Blindness J Insight; Essays to the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (London: Methuen & Co., 1971, rev. 1983), p, 110, 
2. Jonathan Goldberg, Endlesse Worke; Spenser and the Structures of Discourse 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins U, P,, 1981), 
3, Ibid., p. 10, 
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is possible, if one starts from these premises: that the text is 
' unreadable'' - at least in the way that a New Critic would want to 
read it. 
I shall return to this line of argument. But first let us recon- 
sider our original problem, for it may seem that we have given up 
Hume's challenge too easily. Perhaps the meaning of a text cannot be 
recovered by abstract reasoning, but we have yet to prove that 
experimental reasoning is equally inapplicable. Stanley Fish's essay, 
'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics', which forms the 
final chapter of his Self-Consuming Artifacts, 2 is a manifesto for 
just such an experimental approach. I shall consider his case in some 
detail, since its strengths and weaknesses seem to me to be those 
which must attend any attempt of this sort. 
Fish's main argument in this essay is with critics who treat the 
text as an isolatable and static object, when in fact the reader 
experiences it as a piece of kinetic art, with sentences constantly 
disappearing and being replaced, with expectations being manipulated 
and modified and surprised, as in a piece of music. The meaning of a 
text, for Fish, resides in the whole experience of its reading. He 
shows how the syntax of a text can lead its reader into projecting 
forward a sentence which may never actually materialize, and insists 
that the fact of this disappointed projection is just as much a part 
of the text's meaning as its actual 'content'. For Fish, the object- 
ivity of the text in itself is an illusion. 
1. ibid., p. 88, 
2, Stanley E, Fish, $W-Consuming Artifacts; The Experience of Seventeenth-Century 
Literature (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: California U, P,, 1972), pp. 383-427. 
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A criticism that regards "the poem itself as an object of 
specifically critical judgement"... transforms a temporal 
experience into a spatial one; it steps back and in a single 
glance takes in a whole (sentence, page, work) which the 
reader knows (if at all) only bit by bit, moment by moment... 
It is "objective" in exactly the wrong way, because it deter- 
minedly ignores what is objectively true about the activity of 
reading. Analysis in terms of doings and happenings is on the 
other hand truly objective because it recognizes the fluidity, 
"the movingness, " of the meaning experience and because it 
directs us to where the action is-the active and activating 
consciousness of the reader. ' 
This analysis is certainly attractive, but, as Fish himself is well 
aware, its practical application raises just the interpretational 
problems we have been discussing. The difficulty lies in the 
inability of the critic to predict the state of 'the active and 
activating consciousness of the reader'. The critic, after all, only 
has access to his own consciousness, a woefully thin experimental base 
from which to extrapolate a general and predictable response. Fish's 
answer is to propose an ideal 'informed reader', whose sensitivity, 
intelligence and shared cultural and linguistic knowledge would be 
such that the critic could make reasonable assumptions about the 
progress of his or her reading experience. If this notion were valid 
it would go a long way to solve our original problem of evaluating 
allegorical interpretation, for candidate interpretations could be 
measured against the response of the informed reader. It is worth 
quoting the passage at length: 
All of which returns us to the original question. Who is 
the reader? Obviously, my reader is a construct, an ideal or 
idealized reader; somewhat like Wardhaugh's "mature reader" or 
Xilton's "fit" reader, or to use a term of my own, the reader 
is the informed reader. The informed reader is someone who 
1, ibid., p, 401, 
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1. is a competent speaker of the language out of which the 
text is built up. 
2. is in full possession of "the semantic knowledge that a 
mature... listener brings to his task of comprehension. " 
This includes the knowledge (that is, the experience, both 
as a producer and comprehender) of lexical sets, 
collocation probabilities, idioms, professional and other 
dialects, etc. 
3. has literary competence. 
That is, he is sufficiently experienced as a reader to have 
internalized the properties of literary discourses, including 
everything from the most local of devices (figures of speech, 
etc. ) to whole genres. In this theory, 'then, the concerns of 
other schools of criticism-- questions of genre, conventions, 
intellectual background, etc. -become redefined in terms of 
potential and probable response, the significance and value a 
reader can be expected to attach to the idea "epic, " or to the 
use of archaic language, or to anything. 
The reader, of whose responses I speak, then, is this 
informed reader, neither an abstraction, nor an actual living 
reader, but a hybrid- a real reader (me) who does everything 
within his power to make himself informed. That is, I can 
with some justification project my responses into those of 
"the" reader because they have been modified by the 
constraints placed on me by the assumptions and operations of 
the method: (1) the conscious attempt to become the informed 
reader by making my mind the repository of the (potential) 
responses a given text might call out and (2) the attendant 
suppressing, insofar as that is possible, of what is personal 
and idiosyncratic and 1970ish in my response. In short, the 
informed reader is to some extent processed by the method that 
uses him as a control. Each of us, if we are sufficiently 
responsible and self-conscious, can, in the course of 
employing the method become the informed reader and therefore 
be a more reliable reporter of his experience. 
(Of course, it would be easy for someone to point out that 
I have not answered the charge of solipsism, but merely 
presented a rationale for a solipsistic procedure; but such an 
objection would have force only if a better made of procedure 
were available. The one usually offered is to regard the work 
as a thing in itself, as an object; but as I have argued 
above, this is a false and dangerously self-validating object- 
ivity. I suppose that what I am saying is that I would rather 
have acknowledged and controlled subjectivity than an 
objectivity which is finally an illusion. )' 
Several objections can be made to this. First, there is something 
circular in Fish's 'conscious attempt to become the informed reader by 
1, ibid., pp. 406-407, 
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making' his 'mind the repository of the (potential) responses a given 
text might call out'. Logically there would seem to be an infinite 
number of these potential responses, and the reader's mind could 
hardly be supposed to encompass them all an an equal basis. If. on 
the other hand, some responses are to be promoted at the expense of 
others (as more 'probable'? ) then on what foundation of knowledge is 
this to be done? An informed reader might be able to make such a 
judgement in the light of his informed status, but as neophytes trying 
to become informed readers, our grounds for rejection are not clear. 
Hence it seems that to become informed readers we must be something 
like informed readers already. Fish goes some way to admitting this 
when he says that 'the informed reader is to some extent processed by 
the method that uses him as a control'. But to admit the problem is 
not to solve it. 
The second suggested strategy by which we might become informed 
readers is also open to question. There are, as I am sure Fish would 
agree, bound to be immense practical problems in suppressing 'what is 
personal and idiosyncratic' in one's response, not only because such 
idiosyncracies tend to be rather resilient but because of the 
difficulty of identifying them with any certainty in the first place. 
More fundamentally, however, the process is self-defeating. Nothing 
is more '1970ish' in Fish's theory than this attempt to suppress his 
own contemporary and personal traits: in trying to turn himself into a 
chameleon of response he demonstrates the gulf which lies between 
himself and the informed readers of other ages, whose readings are not 
so self-consciously anonymous. Yet it is these very readers whose 
response he hopes to emulate - 'The critic has the responsibility of 
becoming not one but a number of informed readers, each of whom will 
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be identified by a matrix of political, cultural, and literary 
determinants. " In the end, the informed reader can only Imitate the 
response of these other readers at one remove - were he to become 
them, he would not be an informed reader in Fish's 1970 sense: and an 
(inevitably imperfect) imitation of a previous reading seems a poor 
substitute for a reading of one's own. 
Fish's account of his 'informed reader', moreover, is not 
consistent. Ye are told, first, that he is 'a construct, an ideal or 
idealized reader', and later that he is not 'an actual living reader'. 
Just four words after this, however, the informed reader is 'a real 
reader (me) who does everything within his power to make himself 
informed'. If a concerted attempt to inform oneself is enough to earn 
one the title of 'informed', why the earlier denial of the informed 
reader's corporeal existence? Is it that none of us can ever put in 
enough effort to merit this epithet? Is it a goal to which we can but 
aspire? Apparently not, for 'Each of us, if we are sufficiently 
responsible and self-conscious, can... become the informed reader and 
therefore be a more reliable reporter of his experience. ' This last 
statement is particularly confusing, for having been assured that we 
can become the informed reader we are promptly relegated to being 
merely 'more reliable' reporters of his reading experience, which 
again seems to drive a wedge between his responses and ours. 
The informed reader, far from being a 'hybrid', seems to be no more 
than a semantic smudge. Fish's claim to 'an acknowledged... subject- 
ivity' is vitiated by his account of this f igure, who is, on the one 
hand, an objective 'ideal' towards which we strive, and on the other 
1, ibid., p. 407, 
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'a real reader (me)'. It is a case of objectivity by association. 
Far from keeping his own subjectivity before us, Fish tends to let his 
attitude of 'acknowledged... subjectivity' slide, via an implication 
that he is as objective as one practically can be, to a tacit assump- 
tion of objectivity. 
Finally, I confess I do not underptand Fish's answer to anticipated 
criticism. Why is the force of any objection lessened by the absence 
of 'a better mode of procedure'? In his assumption that of two flawed 
ways of practising literary criticism the least objectionable must be 
embraced, Fish does not consider the possibility (which surely cannot 
be ignored) that the whole literary critical enterprise may fall into 
Hume's category of 'sophistry and illusion', and that 'a better mode 
of procedure' would therefore be to give it up. 
I hasten to add that we are not heading for such a depressing 
conclusion. Nor do I have any objection to readers attempting to make 
themselves informed - quite the contrary. However, I do not believe 
it is feasible to use the notion of 'the informed reader' as a tech- 
nical tool of critical theory. The only unambiguous sense in which it 
might be used is to describe an ideal figure, rather like God - all- 
knowing, all-feeling, all-wise. The responses of such a character may 
be an interesting subject for speculation, but can hardly be inferred 
directly from the those of 'a real reader (me)'. 
What the critic is left with, then, is his own response, and no 
guarantee that this will resemble the response of anyone else. If one 
insists on basing literary criticism on scientific principles, with 
their methodological requirement of repeatable experiment, this 
becomes an insurmountable obstacle. Fish- errs in precisely. this, 
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borrowing from empirical science the concept of a 'control' (the 
informed reader) against which his experimental results (the reading 
experience) can be measured. But no such control exists, for it could 
only be brought into existence by taking as objective the experimental 
results whose objectivity its own existence is necessary to prove. 
I think it must be admitted that the nature of analogy is such that 
no proposed isomorphism between a text and its interpretation can ever 
be proved correct or incorrect. In the absence of such extra-literary 
factors as explicit authorial comment, I do not think that it is even 
possible to demonstrate in any formal way - either a priori or by 
quasi-scientific experiment - that one interpretation is more 
'probable' than another. 
However, before accepting Goldberg's position, I would make the 
observation that this scepticism with regard to the possibility of 
objective interpretation, though it may be intellectually compelling, 
simply cannot be maintained as a matter of psychological fact. Pred- 
ication is ingrained both in our language and in our mental habits: we 
can hardly articulate a thought without implying some belief or set of 
beliefs about things perceived as external to us. Ve cannot avoid 
that instinctive leap from stimulus to perception which is the essence 
of interpretation. Hume himself cheerfully confessed that he was 
unable to put scepticism into practice: 
Most fortunately it happens that, since reason is incapable of 
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that 
purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and 
delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which 
obliterates all these chimaeras. I dine, I play a game of 
backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when 
after three of four hours' amusement I would return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and 
ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into 
them any further. 
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Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily 
determined to live, and talk, and act, like other people in 
the common affairs of life. ' 
James too commented, and confirmed in the very utterance: 'The 
greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection: when 
left to their instincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes., 2 The 
same applies to the interpretation of texts - even deconstructionists 
of my acquaintance, I notice, speak in their unguarded moments as if 
texts do in fact mean things. May we say that, for all its 
philosophical credentials, the idea that the meanings of texts cannot 
be recovered simply is not 'live', in the Jamesian sense? 
This may seem a trivial point. After all, a delusion is none the 
less delusory for being habitual, and we have already decided that 
there can be no objective basis for preferring one interpretation of a 
text over another. But are we correct in assuming that this is the 
proper goal of our reading in the first place? I mention the psycho- 
logical difficulty of maintaining scepticism not to cast doubt on the 
validity of the sceptical argument, but to show how far removed it is 
from the way that people habitually react to their surroundings. If 
(as I believe) Fish is right to insist on the primacy of the 
experience of reading in literary criticism, I cannot see why the 
critic should be deterred from something which is central to that 
experience - the perception of meaning - by an argument which is 
extremely remote from it. 
1, David Hume, R Treatise of Huffan Nature, ed, L. A. Selby-Rigge, 2nd edition ed, 
P, H, Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 269, 
2, James, p, 21, 
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I have insisted that literary criticism cannot be conducted in the 
manner of experimental science. However, its method might well be 
compared with that of a scientific theorist. A theoretical physicist 
aims to devise 'models' of reality, images that account for experi- 
mentally observed phenomena. Thus an electron may be thought of 
either as a wave or as a particle: each model accounts for some of its 
observed properties. Such models are not evaluated in terms of their 
correspondence to reality, since that reality is inaccessible, but 
rather by the number of phenomena for which they will account, and at 
what expense in terms of complexity. Whatever the degree of iso- 
morphism between, say, the particle model of an electron and the 
properties exhibited by real electrons, the model remains nothing more 
than a mental construct. Its purpose is psychological rather than 
strictly scientific: it allows people to 'see' things the way the 
theorist does; it provides a mental architecture in terms of which the 
subject can be thought of and discussed. The development of such a 
model is entirely a matter of perception - it may not involve the 
empirical discovery of a single fact - and yet it may also represent 
as great an advance as the detection of a new planet. 
The literary critic faced with the task of textual exegesis is, I 
would contend, in an similar position. When we read a text we do what 
in our natures we cannot help but do - we try to make sense of it. 
And the sense that we make is a model of the text, bearing much the 
same relation to it as the physicist's notion of a wave or a particle 
does to an electron. I believe that, just as the poet creates the 
taste by which he is enjoyed, interpreters (whether of allegories or 
subatomic particles) create the terms by which they are understood. 
Effective criticism opens new perspectives on our own reading, so that 
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experiences which had previously been confused or unarticulated seem 
to 'fall into place'. In the light of such criticism we are better 
able to speak the language of our own experience, for it provides the 
mental structures which allow its contemplation and discussion. 
Literary criticism is not after all a science but a humanity. What 
counts in it is not the experimental production of facts about the 
objective meaning of texts, but the production of models which enrich 
one's own and others' reading. I prefer C. S. Lewis' bluff and openly 
unscientific rule of thumb for the evaluation of criticism - any 
significacio which does not seem natural... after a second reading of 
the poem, is erroneous" - to many more sophisticated schemas which 
maintain a false aura of scientific method. It is not that seeming 
'natural' is simply the best we can hope to do in the search for an 
evaluative method which might lead us to objective meaning; it is 
rather that this is the way we will evaluate readings, by virtue of 
being what we are, and that as critics rather than philosophers we are 
concerned with nothing else. 
In this thesis I present my own reading of a text - The Faerie 
Queene. It is a reading in which the distinction between analogical 
and exemplary allegory is given a more prominent place than is usually 
accorded it, and I hope to show that such a reading can place many 
aspects of the poem in a perspective that is both intellectually and 
emotionally satisfying. I have no illusions that I can use the power 
of brute logic to force my reader to agree that this is the case, 
however, any more than a poet can force a reader to be moved by a 
poem. At 'all times it will be true that my reading is provisional, a 
Lewis, Allegory of Love, p, 333, 
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description of my experience rather than of the poem itself. However, 
this will not be emphasised in the chapters that follow, since such an 
emphasis belongs to literary theory (of which this section is the only 
extended example in the thesis) rather than to literary criticism as 
such, and would if anything be likely to impede the truthful 
presentation of my reading. Thus, although in one sense it would be 
more accurate - though inelegant - if I prefaced every observation 
with some such phrase as 'It is my perception that... ', it would be a 
misleading account of my experience of The Faerie Queene, in which a 
sense of conscious scepticism is not constantly maintained. 
No writer an literature, and especially on allegory, can afford to 
ignore the question of the validity of interpretation - it is an issue 
which threatens to undermine any other conclusions that might be drawn 
about a work. Nevertheless, having shown why I think the threat is an 
empty one, I do not intend to pay this particular spectre very much 
further heed. This discussion forms an interlude rather than a 
substantive part of the argument of the thesis, and in literary 
critical as in other matters I would rather imitate Britomart, and 
push my way past such 'false charmes' (FQ III. xii. 29.9), than share 
Italbecco's fate, lying in 
... continuall feare 
Of that rockes fall, which euer and anon 
Threates with huge ruine him to fall vpon, 
That he dare neuer sleepe, but that one eye 
Still ope he keepes for that occasion... 
III. x. 58.3-7 
In what follows, therefore, I will concentrate less on these meta- 
critical reflections, and more on the experience of reading The Faerie 
Queene. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ALLEGORICAL ENVIRONMENT. 
1. Time and Place in Faerie 
One of the observations made in the Introduction was that, in a 
mixed allegory, there is always a formal ambiguity as to the priority 
of the literal and analogical senses of a text. Any figure, any 
action, any word can be read either literally, or as representing 
something else. These are not equal and random possibilities, 
however. Part of reading a text is the attempt to make sense of it, 
and to that extent, sensitive as we may be (from our generic 
expectation of allegory's operation) to the possibility of analogical 
significance, our 'default' reading is a literal reading. The impulse 
towards assimilation and integration of new information is too 
instinctive and immediate for this not to be the case. To encourage 
an analogical reading it is usually necessary to disturb or fragment 
the literal sense, and there are various strategies by which this can 
be done: from the use of conventional operators, such as the word 'of' 
in the phrase 'waues of conscions', to the application of the 
absurdity principle, for instance in the description of Error vomiting 
books and papers. 
In some cases the choice between literal and analogical readings 
remains unclear. We have already touched on the example of Guyon's 
actions in the Bower of Blasse: the unexpected vehemence of Spenser's 
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comment ('And of the fairest late, now made the fowlest place' (FQ 
II. xii. 83.9)) arouses a suspicion of some intended analogical 
significance, and yet there is nothing in the destruction of the Bower 
that strikes us as simply absurd, nothing that prevents a literal 
reading. Possible rationalisations contend with the desire to 
allegorise: we wonder about Spenser's attitude to sensual pleasure and 
to art, and the extent to which we are intended to approve Guyon's 
action as temperate. ' Our confusion of method ('Is the episode ana- 
logical or exemplary? ') reflects and becomes the medium of a moral 
confusion. 
One of the distinctive experiences of reading allegory is an aware- 
ness of the difference between meanings that seem to be simultaneously 
implied by the text. In this chapter I will examine several passages 
in The Faerie Queene which play upon this structural ambiguity, and 
which in doing so present real complexities of thought and experience. 
In such allegory it is not necessary to reject one sense in favour of 
another: their incompatibility is itself a form of meaning. Yet this 
meaning can be hard to recover: the impulse to construct a unified 
interpretation can lead us to ignore, or leave unarticulated, our own 
1, Another possibility is that there is an analogy, but that it is topical rather 
than moral, Spenser's words in A veae of the present state of Irelande (c, 1596, 
pub, 1633) on Lord Grey's equally destructive overseas adventure could stand as a 
commentary on Guyon's critical fate: ',., all that was formerlye done with longe 
labour and greate toile was,., in a momente vndone, and that good Lord blotted 
with the name of a bloddye man, whom whoe that well knewe, knewe to be moste 
gentle affable Lovinge and temperate, But that the necessitye of that present 
state of thinges forced him to that violence and allmoste Changed his verye 
naturall disposition,,, ' See The 4'orks of Edsund Spenser, A Variorum Edition, 
ed, E, A, 6reenlaw, F, M, Padelford, C, G, Osgood et al (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
U, P  1932-49), The Prose Works (1949), pp. 
39-231 (p. 160). For more on the 
analogy between Acrasia's isle and Ireland, see Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance 
Self-fashioning; fron More to Shakespeare (Chicago and London: Chicago U, P,, 
1980), pp. 184-88, 
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doubts and confusions. Therefore what is platitudinously true of any 
literary text is vitally true of allegory - that we must establish a 
habit of reading that does not summarily dismiss aspects of the text 
which do not accord with our expectations. 
Let us consider the poem's fictional setting - the land of Faerie 
itself. Is Faerie a consistent allegorical environment, whose nature 
can be known and predicted? What, to begin with, is its relationship 
to England? In one sense, of course, Faerie represents England, in a 
relationship of analogy. Cleopolis is Westminster or London, Belge is 
the Low Countries, Irena Ireland, and so on. This network of analogy 
forms the foundation of the historical allegory: the understanding of 
Arthur's and Artegall's exploits towards the end of Book V, for 
instance, depends on just such an isomorphic association. Here, 
Faerie is an idealised locale - idealised in the sense that the 
complex political issues of late sixteenth-century Europe are dis- 
tilled into the morally simpler chivalric terms of knights, monsters 
and captive maidens; idealised also in that Spenser's historical 
account merges fact with a prophetic (or propagandist) vision of what 
Elizabeth's foreign policy will and should be. 
In other places, however, it is England that is presented as the 
ideal: 
So mought thy Redcrosse knight with happy hand 
victorious be in that faire ilands right: 
Which thou doest vaile in Type of Faery land 
Elyzas blessed field, that Albion hight. ' 
1, Edmund Spenser, The (aerie Queene, ed, A, C, Hamilton (London and New York: 
Longman, 1977), p, 739. 
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This is the commendatory verse of Hobynoll (Gabriel Harvey). The 
punning association of England with the Elysian fields suggests that 
England is the blessed state of which Faerie is only a 'Type'. In the 
Proem to Book II Spenser makes the same point to Elizabeth, advancing 
a novel motive for the allegorisation of her realm: 
And thou, 0 fairest Princesse vnder sky, 
In this faire mirrhour malst behold thy face, 
And thine owne realmes in lond of Faery, 
And in this antique image thy great auncestry. 
The which 0 pardon me thus to enfold 
In couert vele, and wrap in shadowes light, 
That feeble eyes your glory may behold, 
Which else could not endure those beames bright... 
II Proem 4.6-5.4 
England under Elizabeth is too glorious to be described directly: 
it must be hidden under the more everyday fiction of Faerie. Here the 
redefinition of Faerie's status is a nonce device, a means of turning 
an elaborate compliment. This fluidity of conception is typical of 
Spenser's account. A few stanzas earlier he has suggested that Faerie 
may not be a fiction at all, but a real country, which simply has yet 
to be discovered: 
Who euer heard of th'Indian Peru? 
Or who in venturous vessell measured 
The Amazons huge riuer now found trew? 
Or fruitfullest Virginia who did euer vew? 
Yet all these were, when no man did them know... 
II Proem 2.6-3.1 
This Faerie does not represent England, it is simply a country far 
distant from it. Again, Faerie is at the mercy of Spenser's immediate 
rhetorical purpose, which in this case is to prove that his poem does 
not consist of idle fancies. 
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From yet another point of view Faerie seems to be a kingdom which, 
though certainly exotic, is nevertheless coeval with Britain, access- 
ible to the British knights - Arthur, Redcross, Britomart, Artegall - 
who appear in the poem's narrative. The presence of these figures 
forces the poem to deal with Britain not just as the referent of an 
analogy with Faerie, but as a geographical entity on the literal 
level, a circumstance which throws up several problems -of_-historical 
and geographical consistency. For -instance, when Arthur and Guyon 
read the British and Elfin histories in Alma's castle (FQ Mx), the 
presence of British history In propria persona means that Faerie 
cannot easily assume its habitual role as a metaphor for Britain: 
hence the ' Antiquitie of Faerie' (FQ II. ix. 60.2) is left without a 
clear function, reduced to just five stanzas (although Spenser dis- 
ingenuously claims that he has been forced to abbreviate it (FQ II. x. 
70.3-4,74.5-6)) where Arthur's chronicle occupies over sixty. ' 
Again, if Arthur 'before he was king'2 is a suitor to the Faerie 
Queen, how can we square this with what we know about his historical 
role as king of Britain and husband to Guinevere? As Tuve has noted, 
' Ve must... be so skilfully kept (in The Faerie Queene) in the short 
pre-Guinevere epoch, that we can be betrayed into forgetting her 
importance and her absence. 13 Spenser partly circumvents the 
1, The elfin chronicle is not altogether without historical allusion: its final two 
stanzas (fQ II, x, 75-76) clearly refer to Henry VII, Henry VIII, Prince Arthur 
(the Tudor version) and Elizabeth -a period of history not covered by the 
British chronicle, which ceases with the accesion of Arthur, The identity of the 
monarchs prior to Elficleos (Henry VII) remains in dispute, however, and I an 
inclined to believe that they are without precise historical reference, 
2, See the Letter to Raleigh, The (aerie 4ueene, pp, 737-38, (p. 737), 
3, Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery, some mediaeval books and their posterity 
(Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1966), p, 345n, 
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historical difficulty by using Artegall (the etymology of whose name 
suggests his equivalence to Arthur) to supply Arthur's place in 
Merlin's account of British history (FQ IIl. iii. 27-29). Artegall and 
Britomart must return to Britain, after all: they are to provide the 
same service for Elizabeth as Ariosto's Rogero and Bradamant did for 
the Este family - that of illustrious ancestorship. ' 
The identification of Artegall and Arthur is never more. than 
equivocal: Spenser complicates the issue by making Artegall the son of 
Gorlois, whom Geoffrey of Monmouth identifies as Uther's predecessor 
as the husband of Igrayne -a relationship which would only make him 
Arthur's half-brother. 2 Nevertheless, in Merlin's account it is 
Artegall who is destined to drive back the 'forrein Paynims' and 
eventually to be murdered by treachery, and his son who is to take 
from Constantius (Arthur's successor in Geoffrey) 'the crowne, that 
was his father's right'. These indications of Artegall's Arthurian 
role are suggestive, if somewhat oblique. The necessity for vagueness 
derives from the incompatible destinies assigned to Arthur - British 
king, and consort of the Faerie Queen; a difficulty which in its turn 
stems from treating Faerie both as a metaphor and as a geographical 
location. 
Also relevant here is the account of the arrival of the British 
knights in Faerie. Only Britomart undertakes the journey from Britain 
of her own volition: like a Sidneyan reader, she is inspired to seek 
out Faerie by a vision (FQ 111.11.21-26) - 'which seen' she 'cannot 
1, Compare Orlando furioso, 3,20-62, 
2, See Geoffrey of honeouth, Historia Regum Britanniae, VIII xix, 
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but love'. ' Arthur, Redcross and Artegall are all brought to Faerie 
as babies, and grow up in ignorance of their true birth (FQ I. ix. 3, 
I. x. 65-66, IIl. iii. 26). Contemplation tells Redcross how he was 
abducted from Britain: 
From thence a Faerie thee vnweeting reft, 
There, as thou slepst in tender swadling band, 
And her base Elfin brood there for thee left. 
Such men do Chaungelings call, so chaunged by Faeries theft. 
I. x. 65.6-9 
To introduce the changeling legend is to give yet another char- 
acterisation of Faerie. Changeling babies are traditionally un- 
pleasant, unmanageable creatures, ugly and wrinkled like old men: the 
legends connected with them are of a strain in which fairies appear as 
a malicious race whose offspring can fairly be described as 'base 
Elfin brood' - yet this description can hardly be applied to Guyon or 
Calidore, still less to the Faerie Queen herself. David Norbrook has 
written that 'before Spenser gave her a courtly apotheosis, the Fairy 
Queen of folklore was not a dignified and transcendent figure but a 
mischievous, black-faced trickster'. 2 This was certainly one current 
tradition - but then as now many different sorts of creature were 
gathered under the general title of fairy, and it is not true to say 
that there were no more dignified examples available to Spenser, from 
the courtly Daoine Sidhe downwards. 3 What is noticeable about the 
1, Sir Philip Sidney, A Defence of Poetry, ed, J, A, Van Dorsten (O, U, P,, 1966), 
p, 41, 
2, David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance (London, Boston, 
Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p, 115. 
3, See Katharine Briggs, R Dictionary of Fairies (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 
pp, 69-72 (for changeling traditions), pp, 90-91 (for the chivalric habits of the 
Daoine Sidhe), p, 120 (for Spenser's 'slightly out of date' heroic fairies), 
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phrase 'base Elfin brood' is that Spenser seems to have changed his 
conception of Faerie for local puposes. In using the changeling motif 
he temporarily draws on less heroic fairy traditions, and draws too 
upon the unflattering language which is associated with them. 
Faerie's capacity for manifold interpretation is the reader's 
inheritance and burden. Faerie is not a uniform backdrop to the 
narrative - it has an active role in forming our sense of the poem's 
meaning. Its shifting ontological status reflects the different 
strategies and motives of the allegory, controlling that uneasy 
relationship between literal and analogical senses in which the poem's 
power to find new modes of expression resides. Faerie is not a place 
that can be consistently characterised, because its character is not 
consistent, as Michael Murrin has said: 
Ve must not look to the meaning of fairyland but to a rhetor- 
ical set of relationships, namely those between ourselves and 
the poem. ' 
So far we have confined our discussion of Faerie to its relation- 
ship with Britain, and the shifting combination of literal and 
metaphorical guises in which this relationship manifests itself. I 
now hope to show that the rhetorical flexibility evident in Spenser's 
treatment of this topic also extends to the poem's moral allegory, and 
in particular to the interpretation of time and place in Faerie. 
Michael Murrin, The Allegorical Epic; Essays in Its Rise and Decline (Chicago and 
London; Chicago U, P,, 1980), p, 146, 
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Critical commentary on The Faerie Queene habitually endows time 
with moral significance. The Faerie universe is such that sequences 
of events between which there is no apparent connection may be read as 
having a causal relationship, simply because of their temporal 
proximity. Logical and temporal priority merge in this environment: 
every 'then' is a potential 'therefore': 
... what appears as a temporal sequence in the image conceals 
another relation, usually causality, in the theme. ' 
In the allegory of The Faerie Queene, narrative sequence 
always implies cause and effect, and it is most important, 
therefore, to follow the details of the story. -2 
This is a conventional principle of allegorical interpretation. It 
was invoked in the last chapter to explain why Archimago might make 
his appearance so soon after the defeat of Error. Similar reasoning 
may lead us to suppose, for instance, that there is a causal connec- 
tion between Redcross' dalliance with Duessa and the appearance of 
Orgoglio (FQ I. vii). Isabel MacCaffrey finds the same logic in 
Redcross' reaction to the parade of Deadly Sins in Lucifera's house: 
His response can hardly be called an epiphany; it is rather a 
fit of the sulks, as Spenser suggests in having the Knight 
encounter, immediately afterward, Sansjoy. 3' 
1,6raeee Hough, A Preface to We Faerie Queene' (London; Gerald Duckworth, 1962), 
p, 135, 
2, Maurice Evans, Spenser's Anatomy of Heroism; a commentary on the 'Faerie Quaane'-- 
(C, U, P  1970), p, 
62, 
3, Isabel G, MacCaffrey, Spenser's Allegory; The Anatoey of loagination (Princeton: 
Princeton U, P, ", 1976), -p, 87. 
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Such cases can certainly be made. But it is going a good deal 
further than this to say that 'narrative sequence always implies cause 
and effect' (my italics). The assumption implicit in such a statement 
is that Spenser's conception of his allegorical environment is con- 
sistent, and consistently carried through - an assumption which, in 
another context, we have already found cause to doubt. In fact, to 
suggest that all narrative sequences conceal a causal connection 
belies our experience. Consider this passage, which comes just after 
Redcross has killed the Dragon: 
Then on her head they set a girland greene, 
And crowned her twixt earnest and twixt game; 
Who in her selfe-resemblance well beseene, 
Did seeme such, as she was, a goodly maiden Queene. 
And after, all the raskall many ran, 
Heaped together in rude rablement, 
To see the face of that victorious man: 
Whom all admired, as from heauen sent... 
I. xi i. 8.6-9.4 
Are we to suppose that there is a causal connection between Una's 
being crowned and the appearance of the rabble who press to see 
Redcross? The suggestion seems absurd: but if some sequences of 
events imply a causal connection while others do not, how shall we 
distinguish them where the evidence is equivocal? What indeed 
constitutes evidence in such a case? If we expect to be able to 
answer these questions by reference to a monolithic concept of 'Time 
in Faerie' we shall be disappointed. 
Walter Ong has suggested that allegorical time is merely a device 
to allow the depiction in narrative form of static relations which 
would otherwise be more suited to diagrammatic representation: 
All real or dramatic actions take place in time, real or 
imagined respectively. A characteristic of the allegorical 
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tableau is that there is no human time element at work in it 
as a whole. Although it may involve figures depicted in 
action... it remains basically a diagram felt as committed to 
space in such a way as to be free of time... An epic here (in 
The Faerie Queene) has become a kind of panorama. ' 
This analysis suggests a purely analogical view of allegory, in 
which to describe, say, the battle of Redcross and the Dragon (FQ 
I. xi) is simply to make a series of statements about the relationship 
between Holiness and Unholiness, a relationship which is eternal, 
static - and hence non-dramatic. Against this I would argue, with 
Catherine Rodgers, that the 'temporal dimension identified with the, 
sequence of fictional events is an inescapable presence in the Faerle 
Queene'. 2 To treat the episode entirely diagrammatically is to ignore 
Redcross' heroic, exemplary role, which can only be acted out in time, 
and the empathetic response that his actions provoke from the reader, 
moved to Sidneyan admiration. What we must acknowledge is that 
Spenserian allegory is a mixed mode in which both analogical and 
exemplary allegory play a part. Redcross' battle with the Dragon does 
imply that Holiness is, will be and always has been stronger than 
Unholiness. At the same time it is a piece of narrative fiction, in 
which a knight shows courage against a deadly enemy. 
Still, we should not dismiss Ong's point too lightly. I think that 
an awareness of the presence of analogical allegory in The Faerie 
Queene does alter our sense of the poem's dramatic effect. The dis- 
1, Walter J, Ong, 'From Allegory to Diagram in the Renaissance Mind', The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 17 (1959), 423-40, pp, 430 and 440, cited in 
Catherine Rodgers, Time in the Narrative of The Faerie pueene, Salzburg Studies 
in English Literature 5 (Salzburg: Institut Für Englische Sprache und Literatur, 
1973), p. I, 
2, Rodgers, p, 2, 
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tinguishing feature of a dramatic narrative is that more than one 
action is felt to be possible at any point -a feature that requires a 
'temporal dimension', since there must be moment before the chosen 
action when alternatives appear possible, and a moment after, when the 
action enters the past and becomes fixed. If the characters in The 
Faerie Queene express the static relationships of an underlying set of 
referents, then even if they also have an exemplary role the extent to 
which their actions can be felt as dramatic might appear to be 
limited. 
I think that this would be the wrong conclusion, however. It is 
true that a retrospective understanding of the analogical significance 
of an action may make us aware of an underlying pattern which 'was 
always there', and to which the action had in some sense to conform. 
But this is not to say that the narrative is undramatic: rather, it is 
to suggest that allegory belongs to that class of literature, by no 
means uninfluential in Western thought, which plays upon the central 
contradiction between the apparent experience of free will and the 
belief that all our actions are predetermined. This literature is 
more traditionally associated with stories of prophecy - Oedipus, 
Macbeth, Sidney's Basilius, and Spenser's Marinell are well-known 
examples. In these stories, a prophecy is made about the protagonist, 
the consequences of which he attempts to avoid, only to find that in 
avoiding his fate he fulfils it. The power of the motif lies in the 
combination of the protagonist's apparent free will with the discovery 
that all his decisions are transcended, and in some sense taken into 
account, by the terms of the prophecy. In drawing a parallel between 
these prophetic stories and allegory, I mean to suggest that the 
questions which they habitually raise, about the nature of will, 
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choice and character, are also raised by allegory: not by the device 
of prophecy but by time's dual nature as a diagrammatic, predetermined 
patterning of eternal verities, and as a medium of action, change and 
choice. 
If we turn from allegorical time to allegorical place, I think that 
a similar argument can be made. Here again there is a pervasive 
convention for allegorical interpretation - the association of par- 
ticular locations with moral states. Hamilton's notes frequently make 
this sort of connection: the fact that Archimago's hermitage is 'Downe 
in a dale' (FQ I. i. 34.2), for instance, can be contrasted with the 
location of the true hermitage of Contemplation, which is situated on 
a hill (FQ I. x. 46). ' Such a generalised form of moral geography may 
not be wholly convincing, but it becomes more so when the physical 
surroundings literalise well-known Scriptural language, as is the case 
with the 'broad high way' (FQ I. iv. 2.8) that leads to Lucifera's 
palace (see Matt-7.13). The Bower of Blasse (a locus that comes 
complete with its own Genius (FQ II. xii. 46-48)) takes this process 
still further: merely to be there seems to be a metaphorical way of 
saying that one has fallen into the sin of concupiscence. Thus when 
Cymochles asks Phaedria who she is, her answer shows that, although he 
has apparently left the Bower, his spiritual location is unchanged: 
'Vaine man (said she) that wouldest be reckoned/ A straunger in thy 
home' (FQ II. vi. 9.5-6). 
That some identification of place and moral state is intended here 
I find hard to doubt. However, this is not to say that the identifi- 
cation is always applicable, any more than the principle of assoc- 
I, See The (aerie Queene, 1,1,34,1-9n, 
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iating temporal sequence and causality. I know of no reader who has 
felt that the Palmer becomes guilty of wantonness by entering the 
Bower of Blasse, for example (FQ II. xii). Nor - to take a non-Spen- 
serian example - does Mr. Greatheart commit sin when, in the second 
part of The Pilgrim's Progress, he leaves the road to the Celestial 
City in order to slay Giant Despair: ' the analogy of the road with 
Christ - the Way - is subordinated to the fact that the pilgrims' 
enemy is killed, and that Greatheart exemplifies his eponymous virtue. 
If we feel any discomfort about the incident it is because it recalls 
perhaps too precisely Christian's and Hopeful's fate at the same point 
in Part I, when the analogical association of Christ and the road was 
indeed intended. 2 A more equivocal example is Guyon's journey through 
Mammon's domain. Perhaps he commits sin by accompanying Mammon - but 
we are also aware that Spenser is fulfilling the epic convention of a 
hero's journey to the underworld, 3 and this knowledge tends to 
diminish the potency of the moral association. The extent to which it 
does so is a matter about which I, for one, find it hard to come to a 
settled conclusion. 
As with time, so with place. In some cases it seems natural to 
associate a location with a particular moral state; in others such an 
interpretation fails to persuade. And, as before, we must conclude 
that the allegorical environment is defined not by immutable laws but, 
1, John Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress, ed, J, B, Wharey, second edition rev, R, 
Sharrock (0, U, P,, 1960), pp, 281-82, 
2, ibid., pp. 111-12, 
3, Compare Odyssey 11,4eneid 6, Orlando furioso 34, 
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as Murrin says, by a set of rhetorical relationships - relationships 
that are not always logically compatible. 
Even in rhetorical terms, however, the assignment of moral values 
to geographical settings remains problematical, confusing our emp- 
athetic faculties. For what are we to say of'the knight who ventures 
-in these places? 
To hold that he sins by being in a particular 
location is to maintain an uncomfortable combination of analogical and 
exemplary interpretations: a schematic association of place and moral 
state on the one hand, and on the other a naturalistic conception of 
character in which statements such as 'Cymochles has sinned' still 
make sense. If we were to insist on a thoroughgoing analogical 
reading, with not only places but 'characters' being treated simply as 
counters, semantically equivalent to their analogical referents, then 
a statement like this would be a category mistake, equivalent to 
claiming that 'Concupiscence has sinned' rather than 'Concupiscence is 
a sin'. on the other hand, the presence of allegorical pointers like 
the name the Idle lake' (FQ II. vi. 10.2) makes it difficult to be 
satisfied with an entirely literal reading. The unresolved conflict 
between exemplary and analogical interpretations leads to a situation 
that is ambiguous and morally confusing. Location and character both 
lay claim to the same semantic territory, and we are left with no sure 
means of arbitration. 
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2. Case Study: Guyon and Phaedria 
Let them deliver history to us rather as they receive it than 
according to their beliefs. 
Montaigne, The Art of Conversation' 
Let us summarise the incident of Guyon's stay with Phaedria at FQ 
II. vi. 
While on their way to defeat the enchantress Acrasia. Guyon and his 
companion the Palmer find their path blocked by the Idle Lake. Guyon 
calls a nearby ferrywoman, Phaedria, who promptly takes him aboard her 
boat, but who then refuses to admit the Palmer. Guyon attempts to 
persuade her to allow the Palmer on board, both with words and money, 
but in vain. The boat starts away from the shore unexpectedly, and 
Guyon is unable to rejoin the Palmer on land: 
Guyon was loath to leaue his guide behind, 
Yet being entred, might not backe retyre; 
For the flit barke, obaying to her mind, 
Forth launched quickly, as she did desire, 
Ne gaue him leaue to bid that aged sire 
Adieu... 
II. vi. 20.1-6 
In the boat, he at first he makes polite conversation with his 
hostess, but 
... when he saw her toy, and gibe, and geare, 
And passe the bonds of modest merimake, 
Her dalliance he despisd, and follies did forsake. 
II. vi. 21.7-9 
1, Michel de Montaigne, The Art of Conversation, in Essays, trans, with introd, J, M, 
Cohen (Harnondsvorth: Penguin, 1958), pp. 285-311 (p. 311). 
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They arrive at an island, which Guyon immediately recognises is not 
his intended destination. He asks Phaedria to take him where he wants 
to go, but she claims that she cannot, since her boat is at the mercy 
of the winds and waves. Reluctantly, he disembarks. The island is 
very beautiful, and Phaedria tries to distract him, but again 
... he was wise, and warte of her will, And euer held his hand vpon his hart: 
Yet would not seeme so rude, and thewed ill, 
As to despise so courteous seeming part, 
That gentle Ladie did to him impart, 
But fairely tempring fond desire subdewd, 
And euer her desired to depart. 
I I. vi. 26.1-7 
Now Cymochles, whom Phaedria has earlier laid asleep, awakes. He 
abuses and then attacks Guyon. They fight, each wounding the other, 
until Phaedria intercedes and persuades them to stop. Again, Guyon 
asks her to ferry him away, and this time she consents. 
If this sort of paraphrase may be admitted as a fair representation 
of the episode, we will conclude that Guyon has behaved irreproach- 
ably, and that short of physically threatening Phaedria it would have 
been hard to avoid his separation from the Palmer or to cut short his 
stay on the island. He fights, moreover, in self-defence. 
It is possible to see the incident in a very different light, 
however. Now, the Palmer represents Reason, and for Guyon to part 
from him is in effect to part from the way of reason and be cast 
adrift in a sea of idleness, a frittering away of time an a lake where 
no particular direction is followed. To be on the Idle Lake, or 
Phaedria's Wandering Island, is to indulge the concupiscent side of 
one's nature. The fact that Cymochles manages to wound Gyyon 
indicates that he is at fault. Even his own words condemn him: 
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He wist himself amisse, and angry said; 
Ah Dame, perdie ye haue not doen me right, 
Thus to mislead me, whiles I you obaid; 
Me little needed from my right way to haue straid. 
II. vi. 22.6-9 
Phrases like 'anrisse', 'I you obaid', and 'from my right way to 
haue straid' put the fact of Guyon's losing his path into an unmis- 
takably moral context. 
Critics, seeking for a unified reading, have tended to deal with 
these contradictions by choosing one interpretation, and sticking with 
it. Prominent among the literalists are Kathleen Williams, Rosemary 
Freeman, Peter Bayley, and more recently Elizabeth Heale: 
To Guyon, of course, Phaedria is no real danger. She is so 
silly, and her views are so frankly and frivolously wrong- 
headed, that she merely embarrasses a mind as naturally 
serious as his. He is ill at ease and bored on the Idle Lake 
where everything is weightless and meaningless, and he does 
not need the palmer's help to get away with obvious relief 
(shared, it has been pointed out, by poor Phaedria, who finds 
him equally dull). He has moved now, it is true, into places 
where the palmer must be left behind, but we are not made to 
feel that this is altogether a fault in him. Rather, we feel 
that if temperance is to be worth anything it must know about 
things that the palmer would have hurried away from. A man is 
sometimes compelled to be idle, and a temperance sustained 
only by constant busyness is on no very secure foundation. ' 
... he [Guyon] has absorbed 
the principles of the Palmer so 
completely that he speaks like him and is in no danger from 
Phaedria or from Mammon. He is well equipped to deal with the 
temptations that he comes into contact with and acts calmly as 
the mouthpiece of Temperance rather than as the victim of the 
tempter. 2 
1, Kathleen Williams, Spenser's (aerie dueene; The Eorid of Blass (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp, 54-55. 
2. Rosemary Freeman, 'The (aerie Queene'; A Companion for Readers (London: Chatto L 
Windus, 1970), p, 130. 
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She [Phaedria] is a charming, loose, immodest girl whom he [Guyon] quickly find tedious in her shallowness and empty mirth. ' 
Guyon by no means acts irrationally or intemperately: both 
Phaedria and Mammon make an effort to seduce the knight, but 
neither is able to move hin. -2 
These readings may have the virtue of consistency, but it is bought 
at the reductive price of ignoring the episode's analogical elements: 
the suggestions of guilt in Guyon's language, the moral implications 
of his presence on the Idle Lake and his separation from the Palmer. 
Williams, it is true, sees the need to justify the separation: there 
is a tacit recognition of the Palmer's allegorical significance in her 
admission that Guyon 'has moved... into places where the palmer must 
be left behind'; but this hint is swiftly neutralised by re- 
interpreting the Palmer, not as Reason but as a black-clad fuddy- 
duddy: 'if temperance is to be worth anything it must know about 
things that the palmer would have hurried away from'. 
Against this we may set two more analogically-minded interpret- 
ations - those of J. B. Hankins and Pauline Parker: 
The virtue of temperance is reinforced and counselled by 
prudence in the person of the Palmer; but for a time the two 
are separated when Phaedria refuses to ferry the Palmer across 
Idle Lake in her little boat. Externally, this may mean that 
a man imprudently exposes himself to the temptations of 
'immodest mirth' (Phaedria) by attending a 'wild' party, where 
he is led into 'loose desire'. He resists the temptation, as 
the internal clash between Guyon and Cymochles would suggest; 
1, Peter Bayley, Edmund Spenser, Prince of Poets (London: Hutchinson Univ, Library, 
1971), p, 172, 
2, Elizabeth Heale, 'The (aerie Queene'; a reader's guide (C, U, P,, 1987), p, 60. 
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but he abandoned prudence (Palmer) by attending the party in the first place. ' 
Guyon enters the trap innocently enough; he lingers, however, too long, and though escaping serious fault, Cymochles is able to wound him... Spenser knows well enough that this is a conflict not to be won outright. In the same way Pyrochles could not really be killed by Furor, though he might learn by bitter experience what it means to burn with fury. 2 
Again, I do not think these passages represent Spenserian scholar- 
ship's finest hour. If the literal readings were reductive, Hankins' 
'wild party' analysis seems no less so, and deserves Hamilton's 
strictures on criticism which turns 'all to quickly to allegorical 
levels of meaning' in a way that 'shortcircuits the poem'. 3 Pauline 
Parker mixes literal and analogical interpretation, without any 
indication of the difference between them: in his separation from the 
Palmer Guyon is acting 'innocently', but in being wounded by Cymochles 
he demonstrates his guilt. Worse than this, she distorts the nar- 
rative facts of the episode when she comments that Guyon 'lingers... 
too long' on the island - as if he had any choice in the matter. In 
fact it is explicitly stated that he 'euer... desired to depart'. 
Parker is not alone in altering the narrative to suit her inter- 
pretation. The most blatant misreading of the episode is not by a 
modern critic but by John Hughes, who states that it is Guyon (rather 
1, John Erskine Hankins, Source and Meaning in Spenser's Allegory, A Study of 'The 
(aerie Queene'(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p, 129, 
2, M, Pauline Parker, The Allegory of 'The (aerie Queene' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1960), p, 128, 
3, A, C, Hamilton, The Structure of Allegory in 'The (aerie Queene' (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), pp, 12-13. 
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than Cymochles) whom Phaedria sends to sleep. ' In recent years Graeme 
Hough - though recognising Phaedria's 'dotty charm'2 - has written 
that Guyon 'deserts his Palmer and is briefly distracted by her 
wiles', 3 an act which constitutes 'a brief holiday from the strict 
path of temperance'. 4 But whatever else may be said of Guyon's 
separation from the Palmer, it cannot properly be glossed as desertion 
- the boat leaves the shore before he has a chance to disembark. And 
Spenser goes out of his way to say that Guyon is not distracted by 
Phaedria. 
Perhaps the most sternly analogical view of the episode is taken by 
Maurice Evans. Evans recognises that Guyon is less culpable than 
Cymochles; he nevertheless blames him, first for a 'compromise' with 
Phaedria which consists in his being polite to her, and then for 
allowing her intercession to stop him fighting Cymochles. 'The proper 
course would have been' to show Phaedria 'the virtuous and merciless 
wrath which Arthur shows against Cymochles in Canto VIII'; or, if this 
is too severe, 'the contempt which the Palmer himself pours on 
Phaedria when they meet her on the way to the Bower of Blasse'. In 
1, John Hughes, An Essay on Allegorical Poetry (1715), in R, M, Cummings, ed,, 
Spenser, The Critical Heritage (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), pp. 246-76 
(p. 267), There seems to be something in this passage that makes it particularly 
hard to remember, Even Paul Alpers, normally- such a sensitive close reader, 
confuses Cymochles with Pyrochles in his comments, See Paul Alpers, The Poetry 
of We faerie Oueene " (Pr inceton: Princeton U, P P. 1967), p, 157, 
2, Hough, p, 159, 
3, ibid., p, 156, 
4, ibid., P. M. 
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sparing Cymochles, moreover, 'Guyon has taken on something of 
Cymochles' wavering nature and is in part defiled'. ' 
I have no doubt that, insofar as Cymochles and Phaedria represent 
anything, they represent forms of vice. If one ignores any exemplary 
element in the episode, and treats these figures as equivalent to 
their analogical referents, then Evans' conclusion is unexceptionable: 
vice is certainly not to be tolerated by virtue. But in practice this 
is not how we read the poem. The literal circumstances of the episode 
have their own character, and impose relations, even moral relations, 
which are not necessarily those of the analogical allegory. The fact 
remains that Guyon is a knight, and Phaedria is a damsel who, though a 
nuisance, has not (in literal terms) done any more than delay his 
journey. In a narrative which draws so heavily on the imagery of 
chivalric romance, with all its emphasis on the duty of courtesy to 
women, it is surely doubtful whether a display of 'merciless wrath' 
against Phaedria would be an appropriate response for the patron and 
exemplar of temperance. 
As for Evans' comments on the fight with Cymochles, similar objec- 
tions apply. There may be truth in his view, but to present it as the 
whole truth is to distort the poem. What Spenser tells us is that 
Guyon fights Cymochles partly in self-defence and partly because his 
insults have annoyed him: 
Sir Guyon grudging not so much his might, 
As those vnknightly raylings, which he spoke, 
With wrathfull fire his courage kindled bright, 
1, Maurice Evans, 'The Fall of Guyon', ELM, 28 (1961), 215-24, rpt, in Harry Berger 
Jr, ed  Spenser; .4 
Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N, J,: 
Prentice Hall, Inc,, 1968), pp. 88-96 (p, 89), 
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Thereof deuising shortly to be wroke, 
And doubling all his powres, redoubled euery stroke. 
I I. vi. 30.5-9 
There is nothing here to suggest a recognition of Cymochles' 
allegorical significance - nothing to deflect us from a literal 
reading. If anything, the emphasis is an Guyon's lack of control in 
allowing words to make him 'wrathfull' - especially if this passage 
is contrasted with his reaction to Atin's insults, ten stanzas later: 
With that he [Atin] stiffely shooke his steelehead dart: 
But sober Guyon, hearing him so raile, 
Though somewhat moued in his mightie hart, 
Yet with strong reason maistred passion fraile, 
And passed fairely forth. 
I I. vi. 40.1-5 
This suggests that, so far from being sinful for sparing Cymochles, 
Guyon may have sinned in fighting him at all. The reason they cease 
to fight is addressed by the poem, but only in such a way as further 
to confuse the issue: 
They though full bent 
To proue extremities of bloudie fight, 
Yet at her speach their rages San relent, 
And calme the sea of their tempestuous spight, 
Such powre haue pleasing words: such is the might 
Of courteous clemencie in gentle hart. 
I I. vi. 36.1-6 
Does Guyon stop fighting because Phaedria flatters him, or because 
of his 'courteous clemencie'? Do both play a part? It may be that 
'pleasing words' have more sway with Cymochles, and 'courteous 
clemencie' with Guyon. It may be that 'courteous clemencie' is the 
poet's sardonically high-minded interpretation of an act, the true 
motives of which he has revealed in all their baseness - like 
Ariosto's famous comment on the expedient pact between Rinaldo and 
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Ferrau: 'Oh gran bontA de' cavallieri antiqui! " All these rational- 
isations are possible - but I do not see that we have any warrant for 
choosing one to the exclusion of the rest: rather we must admit our 
moral uncertainty. 
This uncertainty is fostered by the organisation of the Canto. The 
Argument begins by emphasising the analogical aspect of Guyon's assoc- 
cation with Phaedria: 
Guyon is of immodest Nerth 
Led into loose desire... 
I I. vi. Arg. 1-2 
The anglicisation of Phaedria's name (Greek for 'glittering' or 
'cheerful') reveals her allegorical significance, 2 while the import- 
ance of spatial metaphor to the Canto's action is indicated by an 
idiom of physical displacement: Guyon is 'Led into loose desire'. 
The first stanza reverses this, however, and links Guyon to his 
exemplary role, insisting that he is able to (and indeed does) resist 
the temptation to loose desire: 
A harder lesson, to learne Continence 
In ioyous pleasure, then in grieuous paine: 
For sweetnesse doth allure the weaker sence 
So strongly, that vneathes it can refraine 
From that, which feeble nature covets fain; 
But griefe and wrath, that be her enemies, 
And foes of life, she better can restraine; 
Yet vertue vauntes in both their victories, 
And Guyon in them all shews goodly maisteries. 
II. vi. 1 
1, Orlando Furioso 1,22,1, Spenser's version of this phrase - '0 goodly vsage of 
those antique times' (FQ I1I, 1,13,1) - appears in a less ironic context, after 
the reconciliation of Guyon and Britomart, 
2, Compare the identification of Archimago as Hypucrisie (Fl I, i, Arg, 3), Una as 
Truth (FF I, iii, Arg, 1) and Malengin as Buyle (fQ V, ix, Arg, l), 
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From this ambiguous beginning the narrative proceeds with the story 
of Phaedria's seduction of Cymochles - an incident not mentioned in 
the Argument, although it occupies seventeen of the Canto's fifty-one 
stanzas. Guyon's and Cymochles' dealings with Phaedria mirror each 
other: in the fourth stanza Cymochles calls to Phaedria from the shore 
and is taken aboard her boat while Atin (his companion) is excluded; 
in the fifth stanza the boat abruptly leaves the shore; and in the 
sixth stanza we hear how Phaedria entertains her passenger with flirt- 
atious talk. This pattern is repeated exactly in stanzas nineteen to 
twenty-one with Guyon, the Palmer taking Atin's place as the rejected 
party. 
Such a close echo might imply either moral equivalence, or moral 
contrast. Here, paradoxically, it seems to do both. 
Bearing in mind Spenser's comments, on the relative difficulty of 
overcoming 'ioyous pleasure' compared to 'griefe and wrath' we may 
notice an allegorical implication in Cymochles' exchange of Atin for 
Phaedria - he has exchanged one form of intemperance for another, more 
insidious form. Certainly Phaedria presents a distinctly 'ioyous' 
picture, while Atin is already well established as a provoker of 
wrath, having introduced himself in FQ II. iv as servant to Pyrochles: 
His am I Atin, his in wrong and right, 
That matter make for him to worke vpon, 
And stirre him vp to strife and cruell fight. 
II. iv. 42.5-7 
In this case our tentative allegorical assumption tends to be 
confirmed, rather than subverted, by the narrative. Once with 
Phaedria Cymochles quickly forgets his vengeful purpose and succumbs 
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to the pleasures of her island. The narrative reinforces our inclina- 
tion to draw moral conclusions from Cymochles' location and company - 
an inclination that is consequently more strongly established when we 
read Guyon's story. 
If Guyon and Cymochles are placed in similar situations, however, 
their reactions are very different. The structural parallel emphas- 
ises this difference, the narrative comments on Guyon's behaviour 
recalling the equivalent but contrasting points in Cymochles' story. 
Here, for example, is Cymochles' initial response to Phaedria's flirt- 
atious chatter: 
Her light behauiour, and loose dalliaunce 
Gaue wondrous great contentment to the knight, 
That of his way he had no souenaunce, 
Nor any care of vow'd reuenge, and cruell fight, 
But to weake wench did yeeld his martiall might. 
It, vi. 8.1-5 
We have already seen that Guyon's reaction is very different: 
... when he saw her toy, and gibe, and geare, 
And passe the bonds of modest merimake, 
Her dalliance he despisd, and follies did forsake. 
II. vi. 21.7-9 
Against the comment that Cymochles 'of his way... had no souenance' 
we may set the fact that 
... when Guyon of that land had sight, 
He wist himself anrisse... 
II. vi. 22.5-6 
Cymochles is quickly subdued by the charms of the island: 
Carelesse the man scone woxe, and his weake wit 
Was ouercome of thing, that did him please... 
II I. vi. 13.7-8 
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But Guyon, as we have seen, is never seriously tempted (see FQ I I. vi. 
26.1-7, quoted above). 
The equivalence of Guyon and Cymochles is implied only by a 
structural equivalence in the accidents of plot. Whether one draws a 
moral conclusion from this will depend on how far those accidents - 
meeting certain characters, being separated from others, moving from 
one place to another - are open to moral interpretation. But this is 
not a question the Canto allows us to decide satisfactorily, since the 
literal actions of the two knights alternately confirm and undermine 
such interpretation. 
Here we may compare Guyon's experience with that of another knight 
in another morally significant locus - Redcross at the palace of 
Lucifera. 
Despite his initial defeat of Error, Redcross becomes prone to 
interpretative error in the first part of Book I, failing to 
understand the true nature of Archimago (FQ I. D. the false Una (FQ 
I. i) and Duessa (FQ I. ii). He, like us, must learn to 'read' the 
allegory, to see the true significance of things. ' Fradubio begins 
his education in the deceit of outward appearance, warning of Duessa's 
'forged beauty' (FQ 1.11.36.1), and pointing out his own and his 
love's deceptive manifestation as a 'seeming tree' (FQ 1.11.35.5). At 
the beginning of FQ I. iv Spenser highlights the point by advising 
young knights to 'Beware of fraud' (FQ I. iv. 1.3): but in Duessa's 
1, On the importance of the word 'read' In The Faerle- Queene,, see Maureen Quilligan, 
The Language of Allegory (Ithaca and London: Cornell U, P,, 1979), pp, 254-60, and 
A, Leigh Deneef, Spenser and the Motives of Metaphor (Durham, N, C,: Duke U, P,, 
1982), pp, 142-56, Quilligan's discussion is marred by her own misreading of the 
word lcue (FQ 1,1,6,6) as Love (Quilligan, p, 255), a mistake which invalidates 
most of her comments on that stanza, Ironically, it also bolsters her wider case 
about the importance of learning to read the poem, 
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company Redcross continues to judge by appearances. To him, the 
palace of Lucifera 'seemd to bee' 'a goodly building, brauely 
garnished, / The house of a mightie Prince' (FQ I. iv. 2.6-7). But the 
privileged reader, who knows that Redcross has already trodden the 
'broad high way' in approaching the palace (FQ I. iv. 2.8), is told that 
it is built upon sand, using bricks without mortar, and looks 'brauely 
garnished' only because it is 'painted cunningly' (FQ I. iv. 5.9) and 
covered with 'golden foile' (FQ I. iv. 4.4). A literal reading might 
excuse Redcross on the grounds that he cannot be expected to know 
this, but the themes of the book - the distinction between truth and 
duplicity, the uncertainty of human virtue - are such as to undermine 
reliance on the literal, and lend a definite moral edge to his lack of 
interpretative skill. The hermit Contemplation exemplifies the 
contrast between natural and spiritual sight: 
Great grace that old man to him giuen had; 
For God he often saw from heauens hight, 
All were his earthly eyen both blunt and bad, 
And through great age had lost their kindly sight, 
Yet wondrous quick and persant was his spright, 
As Eagles eye, that can behold the Sunne... 
I. x. 47.1-6 
It is perhaps inevitable that this distinction between outward 
appearance and inner truth should become associated with the contrast 
between literal and allegorical meaning - Una's veil and the veil of 
allegory have much in common. 
In the palace, Redcross is introduced to Lucifera and witnesses the 
vanity of her courtiers, but he continues to act as if they were 
merely exemplars of vice rather than incarnations of it: 
Yet the stout Faerie mangst the middest crowd 
Thought all their glorie vain in knightly vew, 
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And that great Princesse too exceeding prowd, 
That to strange knight no better countenance allowd. 
I. 1v. 15.6-9 
To be 'mongst the middest crowd' in such an environment is enough 
to cast doubt on one's own moral status, and for the reader the phrase 
tinges Redcross' thoughts with a self-important pride which might not 
otherwise have been detected; but Redcross' reading is determinedly 
literal, and remains so even after the parade of the Seven Deadly 
Sins: 
But that good knight would not so nigh repaire, 
Him seife estraunging from their ioyaunce vaine, 
Whose fellowship seemd far vnfit for warlike swaine. 
I. iv. 37.7-9 
Redcross' reaction seems inadequate, but it is so only because his 
ability to interpret what he sees is inadequate. The reader, apprised 
of the significance of what Redcross witnesses in ignorance, finds it 
hard to maintain his literal 'reading' as an active psychological 
possibility. 
In the description of the banquet this process is accelerated: 
That night they pas in ioy and iollity, 
Feasting and courting both in bowre and hall; 
For Steward was excessiue Gluttonie, 
That of his plenty poured forth to all; 
Which doen, the Chamberlain Slowth did to rest them call. 
I. iv. 43.5-9 
The ministrations of Gluttonie and Slowth cannot lightly be 
dismissed, and the normal moral associations of the literal action are 
suffocated by them. It is vain to point out that in most chivalric 
romance a great banquet would be seen as an admirable occasion; vain 
too to suggest that going to bed at night is not really a slothful 
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action. Redcross is tainted. As we anticipated in our discussion of 
Harington's allegorical theory, the distinction between interpretative 
and moral competence has become blurred. 
Redcross is finally alerted to Lucifera's true nature not by any 
realisation of her analogical significance but by his dwarf's dis- 
covery of the palace dungeons, where 'huge numbers lay/ Of caytiue 
wretched thrals' (FQ I. v. 45.8-9): 
A ruefull sight, as could be seene with eie; 
Of whom he learned had in secret wise 
The hidden cause of their captiuitie, 
How mortgaging their laues to Couetise, 
Through wastfull Pride, and wanton Riotise, 
They were by law of that proud Tyrannesse 
Prouokt with Wrath, and Enuies false surmise, 
Condemned to that Dongeon mercilesse, 
Where they should laue in woe, and die in wretchednesse. 
I. v. 46 
The captives include famous sinners from Biblical and classical 
times, as well as 'endlesse routs' (FQ I. v. 51.1) of nameless victims, 
Whose case when as the carefull Dwarfe had tould, 
And made ensample of their mournefull sight 
Vnto his naister, he no lenger would 
There dwell in perill of like painefull plight, 
But early rose, and ... tooke his flight... 
I. v. 52.1-7 
'So much more profitable and gratious is doctrine by ensample, then 
by rule. " Redcross is like one of Harington's middling readers, 
1. See the Letter to Raleigh, p, 737, The use of 'ensanples' to perform an educative 
function is a recurring theme in The (aerie Queen, -, The ensample may be either a 
warning or a worthy object of emulation, Examples from the first category 
include, as well as Lucifera's prisoners, Redcross (fQ I, iv, 1,9, I, viii, 44,7), 
Pilate (fQ Il, vii, 60,4), the wretches on the Rocke of Reproch (fQ Il, xii, 9,2), 
Marinell's victims (fQ III, iv, 14,7), Hellenore (fQ III, ix, 2,1), Blandamour (fQ 
IV, i, 36,6), the Souldan (Fe V, viii, 44,9), Turpin (fQ Vl, vii, 27, S) and Mirabella 
(fQ VI, viii, 2,7), Examples from the second are the kings of Faerie (fQ II, x, 
74,8), the Saxon Angela (fQ III, i11,56,8), Belphoebe (fQ III, v, 54,1-9), Amoret 
(fQ III, vi, 52,4) and Calidore (fQ VI, iii, 2,4), 
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unable to pierce the rind of the fiction as far as the allegory, but 
able to perceive the moral element and apply its lessons to his own 
life. The episode ends with an affirmation of the polysemous nature 
of movement in Faerie: emotionally, the dwarf's story moves Redcross 
to fear for his life, mortal and eternal; physically, it moves him out 
of the palace; and morally, it moves him away from the moral danger 
implied by his presence in the house of Lucifera. 
Contrast the situation at FQ II. vi. Guyon, like Redcross, 
interprets his surroundings in a doggedly literal manner. Throughout, 
he judges Phaedria by her behaviour, rather than by what she may or 
may not represent. He thinks her rather vulgar, is angry with her for 
bringing him to the wrong place, kicks his heels on her island, 
maintains a strained civility, is irritated by the whole adventure. 
His disapproval of her looseness is reported in similar terms to 
Redcross' disapproval of Lucifera's court. In this case, however, the 
analogical aspects of the Canto are not sufficiently dominant to 
destroy the literal interpretation for the reader: we have already 
seen how Spenser maintains both literal and analogical senses in an 
uneasy equilibrium. If anything, it is Guyon's literal understanding 
which threatens to disintegrate the allegory, as Phaedria, unable to 
tempt him, is forced to ferry him to the other side of the lake. The 
movement involved here lacks any obvious analogical reference - it is 
no part of Phaedria's function to give knights lifts where they really 
mean to go. But the contradiction between Guyon's behaviour and his 
environment is a constant irritant, and 'She well pleased was thence 
to amoue him farre' (FQ II. vi. 37.9). 
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Both Guyon's adventures in the Palmer's absence - the other being 
his tour of the cave of Mammon (FQ II. vii) - have been marked by 
critical disagreement as to the morality of his actions. ' This is not 
surprising, since in Book II it is the Palmer, Guyon's spiritual 
mentor, who also provides him with interpretative guidance: a 
combination of roles which again tends to undermine the distinction 
between exegetical and moral accomplishment. One incident during the 
voyage to the Bower of Blasse provides a striking instance of this. 
Guyon sees a damsel calling to him for aid: 
Which Guyon hearing, streight his Palmer bad, 
To stere the boate towards that dolefull Mayd, 
That he might know, and ease her sorrow sad: 
Who him auizing better, to him sayd; 
Faire Sir, be not displeasd, if disobayd: 
For ill it were to hearken to her cry; 
For she is inly nothing ill apayd, 
But onely womanish fine forgery, 
Your stubborne hart t'affect with fraile infirmity. 
II. xii. 28 
The damsel's deceit is not discernible from her literal appearance; 
but to go to her aid would place Guyon in her power, and in some sense 
put him in a morally invidious position. B. Nellist's comment an this 
problem is instructive: 
[The maid] appeals to the knight's basic chivalrous instincts 
but in the process weakens the heroic virtue of per- 
severance... As the Palmer shows, even had the maid not been 
part of the witchcraft, it would still have been wrong to 
succour individual need in preference to the eradication of 
universal ills. 2 
1, See Roger G. Swearingen, 'Guyon's Faint', $"P, 74 (1977), 165-85, p, 165n for a 
summary of this debate for the Mammon episode, 
2, B, Nellist, 'The Allegory of Guyon's Voyage: An Interpretation', ECH, 30 (1963), 
89-106, rpt, in A, C, Hamilton, ed,, Essential Articles for the Study of Edound 
Spenser (Hamden, Conn,: Archon Books, 1972), pp, 238-52 (pp, 248-49). 
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This is the sort of distortion of the narrative which we came 
across in some of the criticism of FQ II. vi. Of course the Palmer 
says nothing at all about what the correct course of action would have 
been had the maid's distress been genuine. It is not a question one 
can ask, when the terms of the allegory are such as to identify moral 
and interpretative skill - if one is virtuous enough to resist the 
deceiving damsel, one is also virtuous enough to recognise her for 
what she is. This is one of the ways in which Faerie differs from our 
world, and the urge to find a rationalisation to bridge the gap is 
very strong, as Nellist's unconscious alteration of the poem shows. 
But it is a gap that the text will never finally allow us to close, 
for it lies between two ways of reading - the analogical and the 
exemplary - that cannot be harmonised. Spenser does not labour to 
make his two modes compatible, but to control the logical and 
rhetorical effects that flow from the fact that they are not. That is 
the art of allegorical decorum. 
3. Allegory and Ambivalence 
I have suggested that Spenserian allegory uses two modes of 
expression - the exemplary and the analogical - that are ultimately 
hostile to each other. In this section we consider how this double 
nature may be used to combine incompatible perspectives on a subject 
into a single sequence of narrative actions, so as to reflect or 
create a sense of ambivalence. We shall focus on two passages: 
Scudamour's entry into the Temple of Venus at FQ IV. x, and the truancy 
of Calidore amongst the shepherds at FQ VI. ix-x. 
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At the end of FQ IV. ix Scudamour, who has just been reunited to his 
love Amoret after many anguished Cantos, is entreated by the assembled 
company to tell, in the words of Sir Claribell, 'All that aduenture, 
which ye did assay/ For that faire Ladies loue' (FQ IV. ix. 40.7-8). He 
agrees to the request, and the ensuing narrative accounts for all but 
one line of Canto x. 
Given the circumstances of the tale's telling, and its position at 
the end of the Scudamour-Amoret story, we might expect one of its 
features to be a satisfactory conclusiveness. Scudamour's air is 
celebratory; his quest has been achieved, and the story of the Temple 
of Venus is introduced as if it were no more than a diverting inter- 
lude - after all, whatever dangers Scudamour faced they were clearly 
not of an order to prevent his present happiness. The tale seems to 
be insulated against too great an impact on the structure of assump- 
tions and understandings built up in the rest of the poem. 
Yet FQ IV. x has in fact had a disruptive effect. The strange 
content of the story, in which Scudamour boasts of kidnapping the 
woman he professes to adore, ignoring her pleas, and violating the 
Temple of the goddess of love, has led some critics to find in it a 
retrospective clue to the state of affairs at the end of Book III. 
There we discovered Scudamour languishing outside Busyrane's house, 
while Amoret was sadistically tortured within. It has been suggested 
that this lamentable situation was connected with a fear of male love 
on Amoret's part - the enchanter played on her apprehension by 
presenting her with a cruel and debased vision in which love led 
inevitably to reproach, repentance and death (FQ III. xii. 24-25). 
Might not Scudamour's behaviour in FQ IV. x provide at least a partial 
explanation of Busyrane's power over Amoret? The excessive violence, 
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the capture by force - are these not Just the things to effect 'a 
horrified withdrawal" from Scudamour? According to Hamilton, for 
instance, 'his act is a rape through which Amoret is bound'. 2 
I shall not discuss the Busyrane episode in detail here, 3 but this 
critical reaction does indicate how unsympathetic a view of 
Scudamour's actions it is possible to take, if one treats his story 
primarily as a literal account of his courtship. However, I would 
argue that a literal reading is simply not sufficient for this Canto, 
and that in fact a full understanding requires the appreciation, not 
only of the literal and analogical senses of Scudamour's story, but 
specifically of the tensions between them. 
First, though, it must be conceded that Scudamour's actions are 
inconsistent, prima facie, with the repeated condemnation in The 
Faerie Queene of attempts to 'force' love from other people. This 
sort of 'maisterie' is seen as incompatible with true love, as 
Britomart declares in Book III: 
He may loue be compeld by maisterie; 
For soon as maisterie comes, sweet loue anone 
Taketh his nimble wings, and soone away is gone. 
III. i. 25.7-9 
And in Book IV Arthur makes a similar point about the freedom of 
choice that should be accorded ladies: 
Thomas P, Roche Jr, 'The Challenge to Chastity: Britomart at the house of 
Buysrane', FHLA, 76 (1961), 340-44, p. 343, 
2, Hamilton, Structure of Allegory, p. 154, See also A, Kent Hieatt, 'Scudanour's 
Practice of 'Maistrye' upon Amoret', PMLA, 77 (1962), 509-10, 
3, For a more detailed consideration, see pp, 200-10 below, 
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... the world this franchise euer yeelded, That of their loues choise they might freedom clame, 
And in that right should by all knights be shielded. 
IV. ix. 37.6-8 
Against these assertions Scudamour certainly seems to have 
offended: 'Sweete is the loue that comes alone with willingness' (FQ 
IV. V. 25.9). Yet the organization of the Temple of Venus is such that 
it is hard to see Scudamour's role in any terms but those of physical 
force. The couplet inscribed on the pillar from which the Cupid 
shield hangs makes it clear that the winning of Amoret is a challenge: 
'Whose euer be the shield, faire Amoret be his' (FQ IV. x. 8.9). If 
Scudamour is an invader he has not come uninvited. The castle is 
equipped with twenty knights ready to contest his claim in fight, a 
practice reminiscent of other castle customs in romance literature, 
here especially Malecasta's at the beginning of Book III. It is true 
that Scudamour, unlike Redcross, is a willing contender for the lady 
of the castle's love, but in both cases it is implied that physical 
prowess is a sufficient qualification. 
Again, it becomes clear that the only way to enter the Temple is to 
make a lot of noise at the entrance, to thrust your way past Delay, to 
wave your sword at Daunger. Scudamour's behaviour seems demanded by 
circumstances; and his attitude to Amoret is an extension of that 
behaviour: 'Folly seemed to leave the thing undone, / Which with so 
strong attempt I had begonne' (FQ IV. x. 53.4-5). As Roche comments, 
'Scudamour's keckheit is... absolutely requisite for his task. " 
Nothing in the Temple has suggested that persuasion is the right way 
1. Thomas P, Roche Jr, The Kindly flaue; a study of the 'Faerie Queene' III and IV 
(Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1964), p, 129n, 
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to go about things, or that the lady should be allowed free choice, as 
Britomart and Arthur have it. On the contrary, the inscription spec- 
ifically offers her as a prize. 
And really the reason for this is not hard to find. The allegor- 
ical mode of this story is vastly different from that in which 
Arthur's and Britomart's statements were made. Far from being a 
rapist's charter it is - in one sense -a careful demonstration of 
exactly the sort of earnest service and sincere persuasion which 
Britomart and Arthur would approve. 
The metaphor of love as a siege, war or hunt is one of the most 
common in love poetry from Ovid onwards. ' When Artegall woos 
Britomart, for example, he lays 'Continuall siege vnto her gentle 
hart' until he brings her 'vnto a bay' (FQ IV. vi. 40-41). A similar 
image underlies Amoretti 14: 
Retourne agayne, my forces late dismayd, 
unto the siege by you abandon'd quite: 
great shame it is to leave like one afrayd 
so fayre a piece for one repulse so light. 
Gaynst such strong castles needeth greater might 
then those small forts which ye were wont belay; 
such haughty mynds enur'd to hardy fight 
disdayne to yield unto the first assay. 
Bring therefore all the forces that ye may, 
and lay incessant battery to her heart, 
playnts, prayers, vowes, ruth, sorrows and dismay; 
those engins can the proudest love convert. 
And if these fayle, fall downe and dy before her; 
so dying live, and living do adore her. 2 
No one reading this would think Spenser advocated wheeling in siege 
engines to threaten his mistress. Yet, perhaps because of its very 
1, See, for example, Ars A. atoria I 45-50, III 1-7, 
2, The text used for all Spenser's poems (other than The Faerie Queene) is J, C, 
Smith and E, de Selincourt, ed,, Poetical Yorks (0, U, P,, 1912). 
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familiarity, critics have tended to underestimate the force of the 
fact that FQ IV. x is a dramatisation of this commonplace image. In 
this analogy, the Temple and its environs are Amoret, and Scudamour's 
penetration of it is the story of her falling in love. In order to 
reach the Temple Scudamour has to fight his way past such stalwarts of 
courtly love poetry as Doubt, Delay and Daunger, all traditional 
obstacles which a lover may find obstructing his suit. Doubt here is 
a very different creature from his hesitant namesake in the Mask of 
Cupid. This is doubt as a device, a tool of coyness, a defensive 
weapon in the Lady's armoury by which she can ward off her lover, or 
test his ardour and persistence. His Janus face signifies her 
caprice, her ability to have it both ways; the 'mistrustful eyes' (FQ 
III. xii. 10.5) of the earlier Doubt were by contrast more appropriate 
to the lover, placed in real doubtful fear by such a performance. 
Daunger, or disdain, has a similar role - it is a barrier erected by 
the beloved, either to discourage or to prove the lover. To the 
extent that the lover, like Scudamour, must face out his Lady's 
hauteur he is indeed in conflict with her expressed wishes, but there 
is an assumption, implicit in the pillar inscription, that the 
obstacle is put in place only to be overcome. Daunger, like Doubt 
before and Womanhood afterwards, is pacified by the sight of the Cupid 
shield which is Scudamour's earnest of true love. 
The castle's inhabitants belong to a pantheon of psychological 
personifications whose significance is conventional and well estab- 
lished, a fact which makes it impossible to ignore the analogical 
meaning of Scudamour's exploits, whereby he represents himself as a 
faithful lover courting his mistress. This interpretation is rein- 
forced by our previous knowledge of the Scudamour-Amoret story, in 
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which their love for each other is never doubted. In FQ III. xi, for 
instance, it is made clear that Amoret is resisting Busyrane out of 
fidelity to Scudamour -a strange way for the victim of a rape to feel 
about her attacker: 
... the sharp steele doth riue her hart in tway, 
All for she Scudamare will not denay. 
III I. xi. 11.4-5 
Even more revealing are the stanzas devoted to the story of 
Amoret's education at the end of FQ III. vi, the Canto which describes 
the Garden of Adonis. Here we are told that, while in the Garden, 
Amoret is committed to the care of Psyche, who is to train her 'in 
true feminitee' (FQ III. vi. 51.5). With Psyche she is 'lessoned/ In 
all the lore of loue, and goodly womanhead' (FQ III. vi. 51.8-9), and on 
attaining an appropriate age she is brought by Venus 'into the worides 
vew' to act out her name as 
th'ensample of true loue alone, 
And Lodestarre of all chaste affectione, 
To all faire Ladies... 
III. vi. 52,4-6 
So Amoret comes to the Faery court, where her 'goodly haueour' (FQ 
III. vi. 52.8) is much admired; and indeed many fall in love with her, 
but: 
She to none of them her loue did cast, 
Save to the noble knight, Sir Scudamore, 
To whom her louing hart she linked fast 
In faithfull loue, t'abide for euermore... 
III. vi. 53.1-4 
J. V. Bennet points-. out that this story does not agree with the 
history recounted by Scudamour, and suggests that Spenser's plans 
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underwent some modification between the composition of the two 
passages, ' This may well be so; but if we accept the metaphorical 
nature of Scudamour's account the two versions are hardly incom- 
patible. To say that the Garden of Adonis and the Temple of Venus are 
different 'places' suggests just the sort of emphasis on geographical 
consistency which, as we have seen, Faerie does not encourage. The 
Temple of Venus can be said to exist 'within' the Garden of Adonis, 
insofar as Amoret exists within it. In FQ III. vi, for instance, we 
learn that Amoret is taught 'goodly womanhead': in FQ IV. x we find her 
sitting in the midst of a group of virtues, the chief of whom is 
indeed Womanhood - this is not a change of meaning, merely of 
allegorical mode. The 'lore of loue' in this context concerns not so 
much the biological-cum-mystical learning with which the main part of 
FQ III. vi has been concerned as the sort of 'goodly haueour' commended 
in the Faery court, and specifically that 'haueour' deemed 'goodly' 
when courtship is in question. The fruits of this learning are amply 
demonstrated in the copy-book Petrarchan obstacles which Scudamour 
meets: Amoret has learned her lesson well. 
The identification of Amoret with the castle and Temple, and of its 
inhabitants with her attitudes to a potential lover, is further 
supported by Scudamour's stress on the unique beauty of the building 
(FQ IV. x. 5, 15.7). Already in The Faerie Queene we have had one 
example of a castle laid out on human lines, if with rather more 
emphasis on physical structure. The heart in Alma's castle was a 
'goodly Parlour' (FQ II. ix. 37.1) filled with affections such as 
1. Josephine Waters Bennet, The Evolution of 'The (aerie pueene' (Chicago: Chicago 
U. P., 1942, rpt, New York: Burt Franklin, 1960), p. 174, 
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Shamefastnesse and Prays-desire - 'a louely beuy of faire Ladies' (FQ 
II. ix. 34.2). In the Temple of Venus the heart is portrayed as 'the 
inmost Temple' (FQ IV. x. 37.1), and again there is 'a beule of fayre 
damzels' (FQ IV. x. 48.8), this time virtues appropriate to woman. 
But it is at this point that the analogical allegory we have been 
using so far begins to break down spectacularly, for here in the heart 
of the Temple which in some way represents Amoret we find - Amoret. 
What part of Amoret can Amoret possibly signify? The ontological 
paradox which Amoret embodies is the Canto's crux - the ground for 
which two interpretative systems contend. ' Amoret's name identifies 
her with' love, the ultimate object of Scudamour's quest: one could 
therefore follow the analogy of the Canto through and say that her 
kidnap is no more than a dramatisation of the phrase 'He captured her 
heart'. On the other hand, the appearance of Amoret in person cuts 
her loose from the framework of courtly imagery which the rest of the 
Canto has constructed, and creates (as in our discussion of 
allegorical geography) a semantic rivalry. When Scudamour first sees 
dmoret, she is described only in terms of her virginal beauty - 
attributes which might appropriately be applied to the love of a young 
maiden; but as he brings her out of the emblematic company of her 
tutor virtues the imaginative possibility of seeing her in their 
semantically limited terms becomes -ever more tenuous. His act 
projects her into the narrative, and she acquires a more sophisticated 
set of characteristics as a result, manifesting in her own person the 
i 
Contrast the more complete translatia of the Rosan de la Rose, Here the object 
of the lover's desires is not a lady but a flower, 
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attributes which elsewhere in the Canto appear as independent 
entities. Adept at the arts of Delay and Doubt, she leaves the 
figures who bear those names in a supporting role, backing up her 
efforts in a manner which borders on the tautologous. 
She often prayd, and often me besought, 
Sometime with tender teares to let her goe, 
Sometime with witching smyles: but yet for nought, 
That euer she to me could say or doe, 
Could she her wished freedome fro me wooe; 
But forth I led her through the Temple gate, 
By which I hardly past with much adoe: 
But that same Ladie which me friended late 
In entrance, did me also friend in my retrate. 
No lesse did Daunger threaten me with dread, - 
When as he saw me, maugre all his powre, 
That glorious spoyle of beautie with me lead... 
IV. x. 57.1-58.3 
If , the absurdity principle has an inverse (the sanity principle? ) 
this passage demonstrates its action. The conventional array of 
psychological abstractions encountered by Scudamour has made it 
impossible to read the Canto in an entirely literal manner; but having 
been encouraged, this elaborate courtly system is suddenly cut adrift 
by Amoret's appearance, returning us to a literal reading. In fact, 
neither a literal nor an analogical interpretation is adequate. Each 
implies the other: each is inescapable. 
This pattern of interdependence can be traced on a smaller scale in 
Spenser's metaphorical effects. When Scudamour takes Amoret's hand - -" 
a crucial moment, since it is at this point that she effectively 
leaves the emblematic environment in which she is discovered - we are 
told that 
... I which all that while 
The pledge of faith, her hand engaged held, 
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Like warte Hynd within the weedie soyle, 
For no entreatie would forgoe so glorious spoyle. 
Iv. x. 55.6-9 
What do these lines imply? In the first place, Scudamour refers to 
Amoret's 'engaged' hand as 'The pledge of faith', a phrase which would 
normally suggest that they had shaken hands to settle some mutual 
agreement, and that the faith referred to was Amoret's - in other 
words, that Amoret had given her hand of her own volition as a test- 
imony of her fidelity. Yet we know that in literal terms Scudamour 
has taken Amoret's hand against her will, and it seems likely that it 
is this action, rather than the hand itself, which is the pledge of 
his faith -a sign of his determination to see the quest through. 
The next image is equally confusing. The meaning of line 9 is 
clear enough - Scudamour compares himself to a hunter who will not 
give up his 'spoyle' - that is, Amoret. But in that case what is the 
proper reference of the previous line? Does it look forward to line 
9, or back to line 7? If the former, it seems strange that Scudamour 
likens himself not to a lion or some appropriately predatory beast, 
but a 'warte Hynd within the weedie soyle', in other words a hunted 
animal at bay. What the hind is unwilling to forgo is not 
'spoyle' 
but the refuge which prevents it from becoming 'spoyle' itself. 
Scudamour and the hind have stubborness in common, but otherwise their 
positions are reversed. The alternative 
is to suppose that it is 
Amoret's hand rather than Scudamour which is 'like warte Hynd'. This 
has at least the advantage that the hunted Amoret is identified with 
the hunted animal, but presents an anomaly in that the hind has no 
desire to leave the 'weedie soyle', whereas Scudamour's grasp is in no 
sense a last refuge for Amoret, but rather capture itself. 
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This image is not 'ambiguous', in the sense that it is amenable to 
two independent, self-consistent interpretations. There are two ways 
of approaching the lines, but in each there is a contradiction which 
leads back to the values and associations inherent in the other. 
Hence we are led to understand that Scudamour is both hunter and 
hunted, and more importantly that Amoret is both willing and unwilling 
to be caught, an opposition which corresponds to the distinction 
between the analogical and literal readings of the Canto. The result 
is a sense of ambivalence concerning the moral status of Scudamour's 
enterprise, which superimposes a story of kidnap onto a highly visible 
framework of imagery conventionally associated with courtship. 
I would suggest that this fact is not merely fortuitous: it is 
consistent with the way that Spenser treats courtship generally. The 
subject can be approached by way of a comparison between the lovers 
and the friends who people the demi-paradise around the Temple. The 
two classes are carefully distinguished - again we should note the 
unobtrusive association of moral and physical distance: 
But farre away from these, another sort 
Of louers lincked in true harts consent; 
Which loued not as these, for like intent, 
But on chast vertue grounded their desire, 
Farre from all fraud, or fayned blandishment... 
IV. x. 26.3-7 
The friends' love is Platonic Con chast vertue grounded'), the 
lovers' sexual. The main difference in the description of the groups, 
however, lies in the contrast between the anonymity of the 'thousand 
payres of lauers' (FQ IV. x. 25.6) and the fame of the named pairs of 
friends. The lovers, it appears, are self-centred, interested only in 
each other: 'Ne euer ought but of their true loues talkt' (FQ IV. x. 
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25.8). Their self-sufficiency is like that of the hermaphroditic 
Venus, who 'begets and eke conceiues, ne needeth other none', (FQ IV. x. 
41.9); and indeed the hermaphrodite was one Renaissance symbol for the 
married couple. ' For the romantic lover the pains of love are 
associated with the frustration of attempts to break down the 
beloved's resistance, and the bliss is the bliss of success in those 
attempts - both stages are different forms of relationship between the 
two, keeping the process internal and inward-looking. In the friends' 
case, however, love is an inspiration to 'braue thoughts and noble 
deedes' (FQ IV. x. 26.9) - an altogether more outgoing consequence, and 
representative of the sort of active virtue which Spenser, like 
Sidney, approved. For friends the pain is not so much in the 
establishment of friendship as in the endurance through danger of a 
friendship already formed - in being 'trustie tryed' (FQ IV. x. 27.2). 
The important point here is that the pattern of suffering which is 
demanded by virtue in Platonic love is analogous to the suffering 
imposed by romantic love in itself, though the effects of the two as 
they appear to the outside world are-very different. That is why it 
is possible for Scudamour to present his courtship allegorically in 
the heroic terms of a chivalric quest, and why at the same time it is 
a questionable policy. For whereas the friend undertakes dangers 
unequivocally for his friend's sake, the lover (like Scudamour), in 
trying to persuade his mistress, to break down her defences, is in 
some sense attacking her. In all courtship there is an element of 
hostility, or even of deceit, insofar as each participant undertakes 
to play certain roles, to act out a ritual with such stock characters 
I. See Roche, Kindly flare, pp. 134-36, 
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as Daunger, Delay and Doubt. '. Friendship is to be preferred because 
it lacks this element of internal hostility and is unencumbered with 
such rituals. It is the friends rather than the lovers whose love is 
said to be 'Farre from all fraud, or fayned blandishment'. 
Scudamour's relationship with Amoret outside FQ IV. x is in one 
sense a story like that of David and Jonathan or another pair of 
friends, of true love holding out despite unpropitious circumstances; 
yet it is also an exploration of problems like jealousy or Lust which 
can infect love and make it less than true. The similar dichotomy 
between the literal and analogical senses of FQ IV. x, whereby 
Scudamour both woos Amoret and captures her by force, suggests the 
complexity of the motives which lie behind romantic love -" a 
recognition that in all romantic relationships there are elements of 
hostility, and that these are not abolished simply because they are 
embodied in conventions. 
The Temple of Venus is Janus-faced in more than Doubt's physical 
appearance. It is a detailed exposition of the sort of dual view 
taken of the beloved by the lover, whereby she becomes both an object 
of veneration and, to use a central term in Book IV, 'spoyle'. 2 Much 
of Books III and IV have been devoted to detailing the disasters which 
can befall love when the second perspective becomes dominant, but 
Spenser shows that something of it is inevitable because of the way 
1, Compare Britomart's 'womanish art' (f4 IV, vi, 40,7) in hiding her love, which 
involves 'fayning choler' with Artegall (fQ IV, vi, 27.2), and her 'faind gainesay' 
to Redcross (fQ III, ii, 15,8), Florimell 'masked' her love, 'For feare she should 
of lightnesse be detected' (fQ IV, xii, 35.7-8), while Amoret too knows how to 
combine 'tender teares' and 'witching smyles' (fQ IV, x, 57,2-3), 
2, The term is used in this Canto (fQ IV, x, 55,9,58,3), but women are similarly 
valued elsewhere in Book IV, either as spoil (fQ IV, ii, 24,9, vi, 11,5), wageý(PQ 
IV, iii, 4,8), prize (fQ IV, iv, 8,6) or meed (fQ IV, vi, 28,4). 
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that courtship is carried on, by a process that lends itself easily to 
the terms and attitudes of military conquest. 
FQ IV. x reflects a real ambivalence in human love, presenting an 
unstable synthesis of views which inhibits easy summary. If we turn 
to Book VI, and its titular virtue of courtesy, we shall again find a 
case in which rival definitions compete: the court and the country are 
both sources of a courteous ethic, and one of the features of the Book 
is the recurring tension between the two. 
The Book begins unambiguously, with an argument from etymology: "" 
Of Court it seemes, men Courtesie doe call, 
For that it there most vseth to abound; 
And well beseemeth that in Princes hall 
That vertue should be plentifully found, 
Which of all goodly manners is the ground, 
And roote of ciuill conuersation. 
Right so in Faery court it did redound, 
Where curteous Knights and Ladies most did won 
Of all on earth, and made a matchlesse paragon. 
VI. i. 1 
As the Book progresses, the characteristic concerns of courtly 
courtesy emerge: an emphasis on rank, obligation, the maintenance of 
proper social relations. Spenser insists on the importance of 
breeding as a prerequisite to courtly virtue: 
True is, that whilome that good Poet sayd, 
The gentle minde by gentle deeds is knowne. 
For a man by nothing is so well bewrayd 
As by his manners, in which plaine is showne 
Of what degree and what race he is growne. 
For seldome seene, a trotting Stalion get 
An ambling Colt, that is his proper owne: 
So seldome seene, that one in basenesse set 
Doth noble courage shew, with curteous manners met. 
But euermore contrary hath bene tryde, 
That gentle bloud will gentle manners breed... 
VI. ii1.1.1-2.2 
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0 what an easie thing is to descry 
The gentle bloud, how euer it be wrapt 
In sad misfortunes foule deformity... 
VI. v. 1.1-3 
This emphasis on natural order is reflected in Calidore's chivalric 
quest for the Blatant Beast -a creature who bites 'without regard of 
person or of time' (FQ VI. xii. 40.9) - and in the resolution of several 
of the Book's subplots. In Book VI apparently low-born characters who 
display nobility - Tristram, the Saluage Man, Pastorella - have a 
habit of turning out to be of noble blood after all. 
But the Book also develops a critique of these doctrines. Vhen the 
youth Tristram, as yet unknighted, kills an evil knight, Calidore at 
first upbraids him for breaking the law of arms in attacking one of 
higher rank (FQ VI. ii. 7.3-5); but acquits him when it becomes apparent 
that the quarrel arose through Tristram's defence of a lady, and 
suggests that the defence of women is a natural principle overriding 
the demands of the chivalric code: 
For knights and all men this by nature haue, 
Towards all womenkind them kindly to behaue. 
VI. ii. 14.8-9 
Similarly, when Priscilla refuses to carry her wounded lover on the 
grounds of her rank - 'him to beare, she thought it thing too base' 
(FQ VI. ii. 47.5) - Calidore rebukes her fastidiousness. ' Moreover, the 
presence of characters like Crudor, Briana, Turpine and -Blandina, --who 
are nobly born but disgrace. their. - breeding, tends to undermine the 
connection between virtue and nobility of birth. 
), Compare Turpine's similar objection to bearing Serena (FQ VI. iii, 39,7-9), 
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An alternative approach is provided by the shepherd Meliboe, who 
recommends a stoic indifference to fortune, and relies on his inner 
resources for happiness: 
For wisdome is most riches; fooles therefore 
They are, which fortunes doe by vowes deuise, 
Sith each vnto himselfe his life may fortunize. 
VI. 1x. 30.7-9 
Superficially, Meliboe's speech is perfectly compatible with the 
courtly view, especially in its emphasis on contentment with one's 
lot. Calidore too finds self-control a necessary concomitant of 
courtesy, as he says to Crudor: 
For nothing is more blamefull to a knight, 
That court'sie doth as well as armes professe, 
How euer strong and fortunate in fight, 
Then the reproch of pride and cruelnesse. 
In vaine he seeketh others to suppresse,. 
Who hath hot learnd him seife first to subdew: 
All flesh is frayle and full of ficklenesse, 
Subiect to fortunes chance, still chaunging new;, 
What haps to day to me, to morrow may to you. 
VI. 1.41 
Nevertheless, Meliboe's emphasis on the ability of the individual 
to 'fortunize' his own life distinguishes his philosophy from the 
hierarchical and social concerns of courtly courtesy, and in par-, 
ticular from the militant, even proselytic, ideals of chivalry. One 
way in which this difference manifests itself is in his attitude to 
the chivalric desire for glory. Meliboe is content to live in obscur- 
ity with his sheep, but for practitioners of. the active life fame is a 
constant spur: Arthur himself is associated in the house of Alma with 
a figure called Prays-Desire (FQ II. ix. 36-39), while Calidore 
eventually leaves the shepherds' world to prevent 'the losse of so 
much loos and fame, / As. through the world thereby should glorifie his 
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name' (FQ VI. xii. 12.8-9). Chivalric practice renders the world its 
due: this heroism is not performed entirely through a stoical sense of 
what is right. When Calidore binds the Beast and leads it through 
Faerie in triumph, we are told that the people 'much admyr'd the 
Beast, but more admyr'd the Knight' (FQ VI. xii. 37.9); a spectacle 
Harry Berger has gone so far as to compare to a 'ticker-tape parade'. ' 
But the virtue of courtesy is not so easily reconciled with a thirst 
for praise. Calidore's lack of a companion to witness his heroic 
actions is repeatedly stressed, first to Artegall: 
But where ye ended haue, now I begin 
To tread an endlesse trace, withouten guyde, 
. Or good direction, how to enter in, 
Or how to issue forth in wales vntryde, 
In perils strange, in labours long and wide, 
In which although good Fortune me befall, 
Yet shall it not by none be testifyde. 
VI. 1.6.1-7 
And later to Tristram: 
... I am bound by vow, which I profest To my dread Soueraine, when I it assayd, 
That in atchieuement of her high behest, 
I should no creature ioyne vnto mine ayde... 
VI. ii. 37.5-8 
Calidore's insistence that his deeds shall 'by none be testifyde' 
recalls the injunction of the Sermon on the Mount: 'Take heed that ye 
do not your alms before men, to be seen of them' (Matt 6.1); yet it 
seems inconsistent with his own actions. 
1, Harry Berger Jr, 'A Secret Discipline: The faerie ¢ueane, Book VI', in William 
Nelson, ed  fare and Convention in the 
Poetry of Ednund Spenser; Selected papers 
from the English Institute (New York and London: Columbia U, P,, 1961), pp, 35-75 
(p, 43). 
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In practice the courtly and pastoral ways of life do conflict, and 
this is reflected in the view of the court taken by Meliboe. As a 
youth, Meliboe travelled to 'roiall court' (FQ VI. ix. 24.6), only to 
find a world of envious ambition, where courtesy was merely a stepping 
stone to advancement: 'There I beheld such vainnesse, as I neuer 
thought' (FQ VI. ix. 24.9). Is this vain place the same Faerie court 
praised at the beginning of Book VI? The question is not raised by 
Spenser, but the two views of court life are hard to reconcile. 
Meliboe's disillusion recalls that of Colin Clout in Colin Clovts Come 
Home Againe (1591), a poem which divides into two jarring parts: the 
first a panegyric in praise of various individuals at court; the 
second a bitter condemnation of court life in general. ' Book VI too 
maintains a double view of the court, as the fount both of courtesy 
and of envious vanity. 
In sketching the principal points of difference between two rival 
conceptions of courtesy, I have tried to give some sense of the 
ambivalence on the subject prevalent in Book VI, an ambivalence which 
prevents a stable conception of the moral grounds of courteous action. 
From the point of view of the pastoral life, all worldly action 
appears as a vain chasing after shadows; while pastoral withdrawal 
itself can be regarded as a truancy from responsibility. In the world 
of the Blatant Beast, no action is free from blame. 
These contradictions come to a head in FQ VI. ix-x. In this part of 
the Book Calidore leaves his quest for the Blatant Beast in order to 
pursue the love of Pastorella among the shepherds. Insofar as the 
, 
Compare also Prothalamion 11,6-8, and Mother Hvbbards Tale, 11,892-914, 
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hunt for the Beast represents the attempt to overcome the arch-enemy 
of courtesy, this must be seen as a more or less culpable abandonment 
of the Book's main moral purpose. And yet C. S. Lewis wrote that it 
was, so far from being a truancy, the allegorical 'core' of the Book, ' 
and others have followed him in seeing the pastoral episode as an 
essential part of Spenser's definition of courtesy. Where the quest 
to defeat and bind the Beast presented only a limitingly antagonistic 
framework in which to discover that virtue's meaning, the example of 
the shepherds allows for what Humphrey Tonkin calls 'the positive 
element'2 -a vision of how the courteous life might be lived. 
Spenser himself claims that the Cantos are relevant to his purpose: 
Like as a ship, that through the Ocean wyde 
Directs her course vnto one certaine cost, 
Is met of many a counter winde and tyde, 
Vith which her winged speed is let and crost, 
And she her self in stormie surges tost; 
Yet making many a borde, and many a bay, 
Still winneth way, ne hath her compasse lost: 
Right so it fares with me in this long way, 
Whose course is often stayd, yet neuer is astray. 
For all that hetherto hath long delayd 
This gentle knight, from sewing his first quest, 
Though out of course, yet hath not bene mis-sayd... 
VI. xii. 1.1-2.3 
A partial reconciliation of these views of the pastoral Cantos - as 
both a truancy and an essential part of the Book's purpose - might be 
achieved through a recognition that the quest for the Blatant Beast 
and Calidore's stay with the shepherds are examples of different sorts 
1, C, S, Lewis, The Allegory of Lave, A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1936), p, 350, 
2, Humphrey Tonkin, Spenser's Courteous Pastoral, Book Six of The 'Faerie Queene' 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p, 122. 
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of allegorical action. In a Book which is less obviously a 'continued 
Allegory' than any of its predecessors, the Blatant Beast is one of 
the few analogically based figures. The binding of the Beast is the 
ultimate triumph of courtesy not because the Beast is literally 
discourteous, despite the railing of its 'hundred tongues' (FQ V. xii. 
41.7), but because of the slander and envy which its literal back- 
biting represents. The way of life outlined by Meliboe, by contrast, 
is a recipe for exemplary courtesy, in which the absence of envy is a 
literal fact: 
Therefore I do not any one enuy, 
Nor am enuyde of any one therefore... 
VI. ix. 21.1-2 
In this sense we might suggest, as we did earlier when comparing 
the accounts of Amoret's early life in the Garden of Adonis and the 
Temple of Venus, that the apparent conflict is in reality only a 
change of allegorical mode, in this case from analogical to exemplary 
allegory. Such a transition can I think be observed in the passage in 
which Calidore first comes upon the shepherds at the beginning of FQ 
Vl. ix. He appears to them 'yet sweating' (FQ VI. ix. 5.7 from his 
pursuit of the Beast, and has paused only to ask directions: 
They answer'd him, that no such beast they saw, 
Nor any wicked feend, that mote offend 
Their happie flockes, nor daunger to them draw: 
But if that such there were (as none they kend) 
They prayd high God him farre from them to send. 
Then one of them him seeing so to sweat, 
After his rusticke wise, that well he weend, 
Offred him drinke, to quench his thirstie heat, 
And if he hungry were, him offred eke to eat. 
VI. ix. 6 
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This stanza juxtaposes the two worlds of pastoral and chivalry, and 
suggests their mutual ignorance. The distinction between Calidore's 
request, which was made 'courteously' (FQ Vl. ix. 5.8), and the 
'rusticke' manner of the response, is reflected in the antithesis 
between the phrases 'as none they kend' and 'that well he weend'. The 
shepherds' ignorance of the Blatant Beast accompanies an ignorance of 
the nature of a chivalric quest: they look not to knights for their 
protection but to 'high God'. On the other hand they do recognise 
sweat: not as an allegorical sign of zealous virtue but as a cue to 
offer refreshments. Their interpretation of the situation is mundane 
and literal, and as such, their offer of drink can be accepted - 
Calidore's lack of fastidiousness even allows him to see it as 
'gentle' (FQ VI. ix. 7.2) despite their rusticity. Contrast this - if a 
contrast is required - with Guyon's entry to the Bower of Blisse. 
That too was a place where 'toylsom sweat' might be 'wypt away' (FQ 
II. v. 30.9), where a man could cease from 'seeking for daunger and 
aduentures vaine' (FQ II. vi. 17.5), and in which the first two figures 
encountered by Guyon - Genius and Excess - both offered him drink. 
But the allegorical names of these figures, and the explicit authorial 
comments on their nature, made it impossible to view their offer as 
having purely literal significance, and Guyon rejected their 'idle 
curtesie' (FQ II. xii. 49.7). 
The morality of Calidore's action in entering the shepherd's world 
is not so easily assessed. Our suggestion that it represents nothing 
more than an uncomplicated transition from the analogical to the 
exemplary, from an allegory of courtesy to a demonstration of it, may 
be a useful starting point, but in practice the recalcitrant differ- 
ences between the courtly and pastoral views of courtesy remain. 
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Unlike the unremarked alteration in Amoret's story, the contradiction 
between Calidore's duty to his quest and his courtship of Pastorella 
is never allowed to disappear from view. It is most famously 
addressed at the beginning of FQ VI. x: ' 
Who now does follow the foule Blatant Beast, 
Whilest Calidore does follow that faire Mayd, 
Vnmyndfull of his vow and high beheast, 
Which by the Faery Queene was on him layd, 
That he should neuer leaue, nor be delayd 
From chacing him, till he had it attchieued? 
But now entrapt of loue, which him betrayd, 
He mindeth more, how he may be relieued 
With grace from her, whose loue his heart hath sore engrieued. 
That from henceforth he meanes no more to sew 
His former quest, so full of toile and paine; 
Another quest, another game in vew 
He hath, the guerdon of his loue to gaine; 
With whom he myndes for euer to remaine, 
And set his rest amongst the rusticke sort, 
Rather then hunt still after shadowes vaine 
Of courtly fauour, fed with light report 
Of euery blaste, and sayling alwaies in the port. 
Ne certes mote he greatly blamed be, 
From so high step to stoupe vnto so low, 
For who had tasted once (as oft did he) 
The happy peace, which there doth ouerflow, 
And proud the perfect pleasures, which doe grow 
Amongst poore hyndes, in hils, in woods, in dales, 
Would neuer more delight in painted show 
Of such false blasse, as there is set for stales, 
T'entrap vnwary fooles in their eternal bales. 
VI. 1-3 
J. C. Maxwell, in his 1952 article an The Truancy of Calidore', 2 
was one of the first to recognise that the pastoral Cantos are 
'equivocal - both a truancy and an exemplification of the central 
virtue of the book'. 3 In his comments on these stanzas he points out 
1, Though compare FQ VI, ix, 12,3 and FQ VI, xit, 12, 
2, J, C, Maxwell, 'The Truancy of Calidore', ELH, 19 (1952), 143-49, 
3, ibid., p. 146, 
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that Spenser's argument. follows a logical pattern: 'Calidore abandoned 
his quest in order to woo a country love, with the intention of 
settling down in the country and abandoning the vain delights of the 
court. In leaving his quest he was to blame, but there were excuses 
for him since country life is in itself preferable to life at court. " 
But as Maxwell goes on to explain, the way the stanzas unfold leads us 
to make certain associations which are absent from this paraphrase. 
There seems on the one hand to be an opposition between the life of 
retirement and the quest; and at the same time another opposition 
between the life of retirement and the vain court, with the effect 
that the quest and the vanities of court life are implicitly 
identified. By the time we read that Calidore 'set his rest amongst 
the rusticke sort, / Rather than hunt still after shadowes vaine/ Of 
courtly fauour' we tend to associate the 'shadowes vaine' with the 
quest for the Blatant Beast, as well as the fickle glory which-would 
accompany chivalric success - the use of the word 'hunt' seems 
especially conspicuous. 
The first two stanzas both inform us that Calidore's interest has 
shifted from the Blatant Beast to Pastorella. The antithetical use of 
the word 'follow' in the first and second lines of FQ Vl. x. i 
emphasises the alteration, and is paralleled by the antithetical use 
of 'quest' in the second and third lines of FQ VI. x. 2. But the terms 
of the stanzas are very different. In the first, Calidore's change of 
heart is described as an abandonment of a 'vow and high beheast', and 
even Gloriana herself is invoked, the ultimate exemplar of courtesy 
ibid., P. M. 
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and trump card of those who see its roots in the court. Calidore's 
love for Pastarella is a form of entrapment or betrayal - like 
Cymochles, he is too easily won from his martial purpose, His heart 
is 'engrieued' by her love, with a wound resembling those inflicted by 
the Blatant Beast - an analogy implicitly developed later in the 
Canto: 
But that enuenimd sting, the which of yore, 
His poysnous point deepe fixed in his hart 
Had left, now gan afresh to rancle sore, 
And to renue the rigour of his smart: 
Which to recure, no skill of Leaches art 
Mote him auaile... 
VI. x. 31.1-6' 
In the second stanza the tone is reversed. The quest for the Beast 
is now associated with 'toile and paine', and Calidore's passion for 
Pastorella is considered in relation to the 'guerdon' of her love 
rather than the difficulties of achieving it. As Maxwell observed, it 
is hard for the reader to avoid linking the quest with the courtier's 
hunt after 'shadowes vaine'; but the lines seem to go even further 
than that, for the dilatoriness of 'courtly fauour', 'sayling alwaies 
in the port', suggests that the courtly world is as vulnerable to the 
charge of truancy from any real engagement with life as the pastoral 
existence could ever be. It is a neat reversal of Calidore's dominant 
image in his discussion with Meliboe, in which it is his proposed stay 
with the shepherds which is compared with a ship's rest in port: 
Giue leaue awhyle, good father, in this shore 
To rest my barcke, which hath bene beaten late 
ý, Compare the description of the Beast's bite at fp VI, vi, S, 
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With starmes of fortune and tempestuous fate, 
In seas of troubles and of toylesome paine... 
VI. ix. 31.3-6' 
We noted earlier that the quest for the Blatant Beast provides an 
analogically based description of the Book's titular virtue, inasmuch 
as the binding of the Beast represents rather than exemplifies 
courtesy's triumph. This observation led us to speculate whether 
Calidore's stay among the shepherds, though apparently incompatible 
with the obligations of chivalric duty, might more properly be seen as 
a literal demonstration of those qualities represented by the binding 
of the Beast, revealing the apparent moral incompatibility as nothing 
more than an alteration in the method of literary exposition. Our 
knowledge of the allegorical nature of the text in which the pastoral 
Cantos appear gives the assertion that Calidore's truancy 'hath not 
bene mis-sayd' a degree of plausibility; and the manner of his entry 
into the pastoral world encourages such a reading. -:: However, authorial 
comments such as those in-the stanzas . discussed above tend 
to subvert 
this separation of moral and methodological concerns, instating 
Calidore's abandonment of his quest as the focal point of the debate 
between the courtly and pastoral views of courtesy. Unlike the alter- 
ation to the story of Amoret's education, in which a change of 
allegorical method was unobtrusively effected between two passages 
sixteen Cantos distant, Spenser emphasises the moral implications of 
Calidore's changed behaviour, drawing our attention to the contrast 
between the literal and metaphorical senses of words like 'quest', 
1, See also FQ Vl, ix, l9,3-5, 
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'follow' and 'hunt'. Chivalric duty is too insistent a presence 
throughout the Book for it to become nothing more than the analogical 
vehicle of a pastoral courtesy with whose values it is, as we have 
seen, significantly at variance. Spenser suggests the connection of 
the two ethics by hinting at the possibility of such a 'translation'; 
but his repeated questioning of its moral propriety prevents us from 
fully accepting it. As with our analysis of the Temple of Venus, we 
find in the pastoral Cantos an allegory which resists the impulse to 
use its capacity for ambiguity to effect the factitious resolution of 
real moral issues. Or rather let us say that, when there is an 
attempt to find an allegorical resolution of the conflict between 
court and pastoral, it is confined to the self-consciously fragile 
environment of the vision upon Mount Acidale. As for Acidale, however 
- 'That in another Canto shall be brought 
to end' (FQ VI. iii. 51.9). 
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I 
CHAPTER 2 
0 ICONOGRAPHY AND NARRATIVE. 
1. Analogical iconography 
In the last chapter we considered some of the ways in which time 
and place in Faerie can be made the agents of allegorical meaning. 
Temporal sequence can imply cause and effect, while physical location 
can imply a particular moral state. The moral associations of time 
and place are only intermittently applicable, however, and in numerous 
instances it is impossible to decide whether or not such an inter- 
pretation is warranted, since the evidence of the text is contra- 
dictory or equivocal. In examining Scudamour's adventure at the 
Temple of Venus and Calidore's entry to the world of the shepherds, we 
saw that this indeterminacy also applies to the interpretation of 
narrative action. In each of these passages the exemplary and ana- 
logical senses of the text were at variance, but were both maintained 
as imaginative possibilities so as to encourage an interpretational, 
and hence a moral, doubt. 
One important point about the allegorical approach to the inter- 
pretation of time, place and action is that the principles involved - 
such as the association of temporal sequence with cause and effect - 
are conventional principles, which we bring to an allegorical poem 
like The Faerie Queene because - knowing that it is in part a moral 
allegory - we expect them to be applicable. The text may encourage 
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such a reading, for instance through authorial comment, or the remarks 
of a trustworthy authority like the Palmer, or simply through a 
narrative in which the application of these principles often seems to 
be justified at the literal level - as it was in the story of 
Cymochles' exchange of Atin for Phaedria. Nevertheless, it is our 
generic expectation of allegorical significance which makes us 
sensitive to these clues, and lends them plausibility. 
In this section I want to consider another, more self-consciously 
conventional method of imparting allegorical significance to a text: 
the use of iconographical material. Like the allegorical interpret- 
ation of time, place and action, iconography forms an interpretative 
method which can act in rivalry or in concert with the literal 
narrative, and is consequently a suitable vehicle for ambiguity or for 
the witty reinforcement of the literal sense. 
First, however, it might be useful to make a distinction. Our 
subject in this thesis is the relationship between the analogical and 
literal interpretations of allegorical texts, and the ambiguities and 
empathetic confusions which can result when it is not clear which of 
these has priority. However, even when it is acknowledged that a text 
is intended to convey some analogical meaning, it is still quite 
possible to find it ambiguous, inasmuch as there may be more than one 
plausible analogy. This is the interpretational difficulty at the 
heart of all allegorical theory, which was discussed at the end of the 
Introduction. Similarly, an iconographical figure may be ambiguous 
simply because more than one meaning conventionally applies to it. 
Jane Aptekar, in her study of the symbolism of Book V of The Faeroe 
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Queene, ' finds an example of this in the lion who sits under the feet 
of Mercilla: 
An huge great Lyon lay, that mote appal 
An hardie courage, like captiued thrall, 
With a strong yron chaine and coller bound, 
That once he could not moue, nor quich at all; 
Yet did he murmure with rebellious sound, 
And softly royne, when saluage choler gan redound. 
V. ix. 33.4-9 
The 'rebellious sound' made by this lion suggests that it rep- 
resents the forces of rebellion in Mercilla's kingdom, who are justly 
restrained by her power. However, the description also recalls 
Britomart's dream at the Temple of Isis two Cantos earlier. Under 
Isis' feet there is a crocodile, which, like Mercilla's lion, has to 
be restrained by force (FQ V. vii. 15-16). In this case, however, the 
crocodile symbolises not rebellion mastered by the power of justice, 
but rather the power of justice tempered by mercy, as the priest of 
Isis explains; 
For that same Crocodile Osyrls is, 
That vnder Isis feete doth sleepe for euer: 
To shew that clemence oft in things amis, 
Restraines those sterne behests, and cruell doomes of his. 
V. vii. 22.6-9 
In the light of this, the symbol of the lion becomes harder to pin 
down. Does it represent the power of rebellion or the power of 
justice? Aptekar compares this image with an emblem of justice from 
Ripa's Iconologia. Again, there is a captive lion: 
Now this lion is ambiguous. It may represent either the good 
force which is the instrument of justice but which Justice 
Jane Aptekar, Icons of Justice; iconography and thematic imagery in the 'faerie 
Queens' Mew York: Columbia U, P,, 1969). 
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holds, like her half-drawn sword, in abeyance, or it may 
represent the evil force of domestic wrongdoers and foreign 
foes, which Justice holds, with sword ready against rebellion, 
tamed as her very throne-as, indeed, part and sign of her 
glory. ' 
This sort of iconographical ambiguity is an important branch of 
study in its own right, but it is not with this that we are primarily 
concerned in a study of allegorical decorum. Whether the lion 
represents judicial or rebellious power, the relationship between the 
analogical meaning and the literal representation of that meaning 
remains very similar -a powerful force is portrayed by a powerful 
creature. The ambiguity derives not from a doubt as to whether we 
should give priority to the literal or to the analogical sense, but 
from our inability to decide which of two analogical referents is the 
more appropriate -a question which is more likely to be resolved by 
research into iconographical history than by the sort of study we have 
undertaken here, which is concerned with the rhetorical relationship 
between analogical images and the literal sense of the text, 
especially where the literal sense is used to exemplify a quality. 
Even within this more limited ambit, it will easily be seen that 
the use of iconographically significant objects in an allegorical 
narrative is open to the same sort of interpretative doubt that we 
discovered in our discussion of place and time, and for the same 
reasons. Ernst Gombrich puts the problem well in his essay on the 
iconography of Raphael's Stanza delta Segnatura: 
In iconography not less than in life, wisdom lies in know- 
ing where to stop... 
1, ibid., pp. 64-65, See Cesare Ripa, Iconologia (Padua: 1618, first pub, Rome: 
1593), p. 207, 
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... take the personification of Causarum Cognitio on the 
ceiling of the Stanza. Care has been taken for us to know the 
meaning of the books she holds, for they are inscribed. Nor 
need we doubt that the decoration of the throne was intended 
to signify an aspect of Philosophy-the many-breasted Diana 
stands traditionally for Nature. Now Vasari also tells us in 
some detail that the colours of her garments, from the neck 
downward, are those of fire, air, earth and water, and are 
therefore symbolic. He may be right, but what of the garments 
of the other personifications? He does not tell us, but even 
if he did, we could always ask further questions. Are the 
configurations of the folds significant? Are the positions of 
the fingers? ' 
This discussion may be put into the terms of analogical and 
exemplary allegory. If we wish to portray Old Age, we may do so by 
picturing a old man leaning on a stick. The man represents Old Age by 
exemplifying it. Although his stick may have some independent icono- 
graphical significance, it is also appropriate to the literal 
situation portrayed - so that unless we bring some knowledge of the 
iconography of sticks to the painting we are relatively unlikely to 
demand any more arcane meaning. On the other hand, if we see a 
picture of a woman holding a pair of scales, then (supposing we are 
sufficiently certain of the painting's genre to be sure it is not a 
realistic portrait of a shopkeeper serving a customer) the presence of 
the scales will demand explanation -a visual manifestation of the 
absurdity principle. 2 
To understand that the woman represents justice we need one of two 
types of information. First, we may simply have learned by rote or by 
past association the declarative fact that a woman with a pair of 
1. E, H, 6ombrich, Symbolic lsages, Studies in the art of the Renaissance (New York: 
Phaidon, 1972), pp, 95-96, 
2, On the absurdity principle, see p, 38 above, and p, 135 below, 
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scales represents justice. ' If our knowledge of iconography is more 
sophisticated, however, we will see that the association between 
justice and the scales is not arbitrary, but is based on an analogy: 
as the scales weigh objects, the just man weighs causes. What appears 
to be a comparison of two terms (justice and the scales) is in fact an 
association between four terms (justice, the scales, the objects 
weighed in the scales, the causes weighed by justice) and a relation - 
the act of 'weighing'. 
This property of analogy (or the metaphor of proportion) was 
recognised by Aristotle, who described it as occuring 'when of four 
things the second stands in the same relationship to the first as the 
fourth to the third; for then one may speak of the fourth instead of 
the second, and the second instead of the fourth'. 2 As Gombrich has 
shown, the Aristotelian approval given to proportional metaphor 
influenced the iconographical doctrines of Ripa, leading him to prefer 
emblems in which the object depicted and its analogical referent were 
linked primarily by the analogical relationship, rather than by exemp- 
lification: 
Ripa is anxious to make his attributes fit this kind of 
metaphor, explaining for instance, that the column may be used 
to characterize the concept of Strength, for the column is to 
a building what strength is to man. He prefers this method to 
1, For many figures from myth or history who are habitually identified by some 
iconographical accoutrement - Jerome and his lion, Hermes and the caduceus, Peter 
and the keys of heaven - rote learning will probably be reinforced by a knowledge 
of some particular incident in the life of the person, or some role which they 
fulfil, which lends the iconographical attribute particular propriety, This sort 
of iconography is not of course 'analogical', and will not be addressed further 
here, 
2, Aristotle, Poetics, XXI 11, in T, S, Dorsch, trans, with introd,, Classical 
Literary Criticisi' (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1965), pp. 29-75 (p, 61). Compare the 
Rhetoric, III x 7, 
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6 
the simple comparison as when Magnanimity is symbolized by a lion 'because in the lion this quality is largely found'. 
Both procedures, however, are admissible because both 
define 'essential' qualities of the concept. What is inad- 
missible in his view, is to concentrate entirely on 'contin- 
gent qualities', as when Despair is represented by a man who 
has hanged himself or friendship by two people embracing each 
other. These, he implies, are illustrations of particular 
events and thus lie outside the realm of definition. True, 
within the definition such 'accidental' features are allowed 
and even welcomed. Melancholy would clearly have to show 
different physiognomic characteristics from Joy. However, it 
would be a mistake to represent Beauty simply by an image that 
is supremely beautiful, 'for this would merely be explaining 
idem per idem". He has therefore represented Beauty with her 
head in the clouds and 'similar corresponding particulars'. ' 
Ripa rejects emblems like that of the hanged man because they 
depict 'contingent' rather than 'essential' qualities. In the terms 
we have been using, we can say that the hanged man exemplifies despair 
rather than standing in an analogical relationship to it. The image 
of Old Age as an old man would presumably be rejected on the same 
grounds. However, our discussion of allegory has shown that, although 
objects which stand in an analogical relationship to each other are 
under no logical obligation to share any individual attributes, 
complex aesthetic effects can depend on the extent to which they do so 
- an observation which is the basis of allegorical decorum. 
Aristotle's examples of analogy reflect this: 'A nation without its 
youth is like a year without its spring'. 2 The skeletal basis of this 
metaphor is a proportional relation - nation is to youth as year is to 
spring - but its emotional force comes from the individual attributes 
of vitality, energy and fecundity which are shared by the spring and 
young people. Similar considerations apply in the field of icon- 
1,6ombrich, pp, 143-44, Ripa's discussion appears in the preface to his lconologla, 
2, Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric, III x 7, 
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ography. Any picture contains elements which are extraneous to its 
analogical function, and these elements raise questions of decorum: to 
depict Melancholy smiling broadly would be perverse and confusing. In 
the emblem of the column as Strength, which Ripa regards as 
'essential', the implied proportional relation - column is to building 
as strength is to man - provides the structure of the metaphor, but it 
'works' not only because the column's function in supporting the 
building is similar to the function of strength in supporting the life 
of man, but because certain individual qualities of the column - 
solidity, permanence, and so on - are also qualities very closely 
allied to strength itself. 
In the case of the column we may say that the process of interpret- 
ation, of finding the other terms of the proportional metaphor, is to 
some extent expedited by consideration of the literal attributes of 
the object with which we are presented. Confronted with a massive and 
decidedly strong-looking pillar, we are encouraged into the general 
semantic area of 'strength' whether or not we happen upon the relation 
'supports'. 
This is not the case with all analogically based iconography. 
Consider, for instance, the conventional representation of hope as an 
anchor. This comes much closer to the purely proportional metaphor 
praised by Ripa. Once it is known, the analogy is clear - the anchor 
secures the ship just as hope secures man's soul - but there is no 
attribute of the anchor per se (for instance being heavy, or made of 
metal) which indicates its connection with the quality of hope. 
An 
emblem such as this is enigmatic, and to be understood it requires a 
knowledge of iconographic convention. 
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If an object appears in a narrative context which encourages us to 
consider its iconographical significance, but the object's iconography 
is such that - like the anchor - it does not exemplify the quality to 
which it is analogous, ambiguities or tautologies may result, depend- 
ing on the object's narrative use. 
As an example we shall consider the flail carried by Talus, 
Artegall's right-hand man in Book V. The iconographical history of 
this instrument proves to be rather complex. As an attribute of Jove 
and Osiris it is a symbol of authority and dominion. In the hands of 
Osiris in particular it is also associated with judgement, since he 
holds it to judge the dead, a notion>which. accords with the Christian 
idea of God separating the wheat from the chaff at the Day of 
Judgement. ' Aptekar has shown that, when associated with Jove, 
Hercules or Mars, the flail can also become an instrument of wrath, 
righteous or otherwise. 2 The flail therefore has a multiplicity of 
associations, of authority, judgement and punishment. 
Of these, the use of the flail as a symbol of punishment is perhaps 
the most readily explicable: war and punishment are two of the 
purposes for which flails have historically been used. By contrast, 
the association of the flail with judgement is based on an analogy: an 
agricultural flail separates the corn from the husks as justice 
separates the innocent from the guilty. An emblem which symbolised 
judgement by showing a farmer threshing corn would have the 
'essential' quality praised by Ripa, where an emblem which symbolised 
An image we have 'already discussed in connection with its use by Henry Peacham: 
see Matt 3,12, Luke 3,17 and pp, 36-38 above, 
2, Aptekar, pp, 44-48, See also J, C, Cooper, An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of 
Traditional Sysbols (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd,, 1978), p, 69, 
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punishment by showing a man being flailed would display only 'con- 
tingent' qualities. These two meanings are thus associated with two 
different literal activities: separating and striking. The extent to 
which the flail is employed for either purpose might be expected to 
influence the degree to which we centre our idea of its iconographical 
meaning around the notions of, respectively, judgement or punishment. 
The third meaning of the flail - as a sign of authority - is less 
relevant to the present discussion, and may indeed derive from its 
other associations: if a person has the power to judge and to punish. 
then authority seems to be a natural concomitant: 'For powre is the 
right hand of Iustice truely hight' (FQ V. iv. 1.9). 
The flail appears in the first description of Talus, a description 
which stresses his 'resistlesse' power: 
But when she parted hence, she left her groome 
An yron man, which did on her attend 
Alwayes, to execute her stedfast dooms, 
And willed him with Artegall to wend, 
And doe what euer thing he did intend. 
His name was Talus, made of yron mould, 
Immoueable, resistlesse, without end. 
Who in his hand an yron flale did hould, 
With which he thresht out falshood, and did truth vnfould. 
Y. i. 12 
The last line of this stanza manages to combine implications of 
both punishment and judgement, by playing on two key words. The word 
'thresht' suggests both the separation of corn from husks and 
thrashing or striking, as if in punishment; ' while 'falshood' may mean 
either deliberate deceit or simple contrariness to the facts. One 
1. The modern differentiation between 'thrash' (striking in general, and especially 
in punishment) and 'thresh' (specifically the action of an agricultural flail) 
was not current in Spenser's time: 'thresh' would have been the normal word for 
all these senses, See 00 entry for 'thrash', 
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implication of the phrase 'thresht out falshood', therefore, is that 
the vice of deceit is being punished. But when the line continues, to 
reveal the balancing phrase 'and did truth vnfould', we tend to 
reinterpret 'thresht out falshood' reciprocally, as the revelation of 
untruth. The action of the flail is not now to punish but to'separate 
fact from fiction. 
The difficulty with this latter function is that it is not substan- 
tiated by any subsequent narrative action. This is not surprising, 
since the only connection between threshing and judgement is an 
analogical relationship. Though Spenser is careful to mention that 
Talus can 'reueale/ All hidden crimes' as well as 'inflict most 
grieuous punishment' (FQ V. xii. 26.5-6,9), this is never associated 
with any narrative use of the flail. After his initial description, 
Talus' actions are never again identified with threshing - although at. 
one point the effect of his flail appears to resemble that of the wind 
winnowing wheat: 
... that yron man 
With his huge flaile began to lay about, 
From whose sterne presence they diffused ran,. 
Like scattered chaffe, the which the wind away doth fan. 
V. xi. 47.6-9 
Here, even though the image of God separating the wheat from the 
chaff is evoked, the analogy with judgement is not enforced: there is 
no indication that anything other than chaff is produced by the action 
of the flail, which is used simply to punish, not to exercise discrim- 
ination. Even so, for readers who are aware of the flail's 
iconographical significance, its association with judgement cannot be 
ignored. The allusion having been made, the Baptist's apocalyptic 
image is too well known for it not to be a constant presence as we 
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read of Talus' inescapable flail, especially in a Back whose subject 
is Justice. 
The dual significance of the flail tends to blur the distinction 
between the assignment of guilt and, the punishment that follows it. 
In Book V this iconographical ambiguity is mirrored by Talus' chief 
moral limitation - his inability to show mercy. Like an embodiment of 
the old Law, Talus continues to afflict wrongdoers until they are 
totally destroyed, unless he is restrained: ' 
... when she saw the heapes, which he did make, 
Of slaughtred carkasses, her heart did quake 
For very ruth, which did it almost riue, 
That she his fury willed him to slake: 
For else he sure had left not one aliue... 
V. vii. 36.4-8 
... Artegall seeing his cruell deed, 
Commaunded him from slaughter to recoyle.. -. 
V. x1.65.6-7 
... Artegall seeing him so to rage, 
Willd him to stay, and signe of truce did make... - 
V. xii. 8.1-2 
The narrative (that is, purely punitive) use of the flail shows the 
limitations of power as a component of the virtue- of Justice. Power 
may be a prerequisite, as Spenser insists, 2 but it can be abused for 
evil, 3 and even its use in the cause of Justice must be based on 
principles other than simple knowledge of guilt or innocence. 
1, Compare the incident in The Pilgrim's Progress in which Christ restrains Moses 
from punishing Faithful: Moses 'spareth none, neither knoweth he how to shew 
mercy to those that transgress his Law', John Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress, 
ed, J, B, Wharey, second edition rev, R, Sharrock (0, U, P,, 1960), p, 71, 
2, See FQ V. iv, 1.9. 
3, See FQ V, ii. 19 and PQ V, viii, 20,4-5, 
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Mercy should intervene between judgement and punishment: and for a 
figure whose main limitation is an ignorance of mercy, an iconograph- 
ical attribute which confuses judgement and punishment is peculiarly 
fitting. The distinction between the implied analogy of the flail, 
which indicates authoritative judgement of guilt and innocence, and 
its narrative use as an instrument of unlimited punishment, which so 
far from being authoritative must be restrained by mercy, makes it an 
appropriately ambiguous symbol of Talus' power, and indicates 
Spenser's ambivalent attitude towards it. 
2. Emblematic wit 
In the Introduction to this thesis we referred to what Michael 
Murrin has called the absurdity principle - the ancient tradition that 
allegory can be recognised by the inconsistency or ridiculousness of 
its surface narrative. One way in which this principle may be, 
manifested is in the use of purely analogical iconography - that 
is, 
iconography in which an object and a quality are linked solely by an 
analogical relationship, rather than by any shared attributes or 
general semantic affinity. The scales of Justice and Hope's anchor 
are examples of this: their appearance in a narrative is likely to 
cause just the sort of dislocation of the literal sense which the 
absurdity principle describes, forcing the reader to seek other 
meanings. The exemplification of Old Age 
by an old man, by contrast, 
may not be recognised as iconographic at all in an extended narrative. 
Narrative is after all an exemplary medium. 
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In the narrative environment of The Faerie Queene iconographically 
significant objects sometimes seem to be independent of such exemplary 
vehicles as plot, appearing only when their analogical meaning becomes 
relevant, and disappearing when that relevance ceases. In this way, a 
static, emblematic sense can be given to iconographically loaded 
descriptions. 
A good example is the opening description of Una: 
A louely Ladie rode him faire beside, 
Vpon a lowly Asse more white then snow, 
Yet she much whiter, but the same did hide 
Vnder a vele, that wimpled was full low, 
And ouer all a blacke stole she did throw,. 
As one that inly mournd: so was she sad, 
And heauie sat vpon her palfrey slow: 
Seemed in heart some hidden care she had, 
And by her in a line a milke white lambe she lad. 
I. i. 4 
This strange picture, coming as it does immediately after the 
account of Redcross, with its reference to the Christian armour of 
Paul's letter to the Ephesians' and its teasing hints about the 
knight's identity, encourages us to read Una's description in an 
iconographical light, easily attaching meaning to her veil and black 
stole, the lamb whiöh follows her, and the lowly ass she rides. From 
this we gather the associations of innocence, sacrifice, humility and 
mourning that are traditional to these objects and creatures, using 
iconography as a sort of shorthand to glean Una's nature and 
situation. Even Una's sadness becomes largely a matter for inter- 
pretation: in a description such as this a reference to 'some hidden 
1. An allusion pointed out by Spenser himself in the Letter to Raleigh - see Edmund 
Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed, A, C, Hamilton (London and New York: Longman, 
1977), pp, 737-38 (p, 738), Compare Ephesians 6,11-17, 
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care' is an exegetical challenge. A empathetic boundary is drawn 
around the figure of Una, momentarily denying her any literal history 
or movement or feeling, subordinating these things to their analogical 
meaning. 
The allegorical point having been made, however, Una's iconograph- 
ical impedimenta become less relevant to the narrative. Hence, as I 
mentioned in the Introduction, the lamb is never heard of again after 
FQ 1.1.5; while the 'lowly Asse' transforms itself by the stanza's 
seventh line into a palfrey, the conventional lady's mount of medieval 
romance. 
This loss of iconographical potency finds a parallel later in the 
poem with the story of Florimell's girdle. At FQ IV. v. 16 the False 
Florimell is awarded the girdle as a prize for her beauty; but the 
virtue of the girdle is such that it can only be worn by chaste women, 
and she is unable to keep it tied about her waist. Yet in the follow- 
ing Book, when the False Florimell finally melts away, we read that 
nothing remains of her 'But th'emptie girdle, which about her wast was 
wrought' (FQ V. iii. 24.9). The visual effect overwhelms both narrative 
and iconographical consistency. 
The description of Ate at the beginning of Book IV is also relevant 
here. Having briefly introduced her to the narrative as a companion 
of Duessa, Spenser gives a long allegorical account of 
Ate's dwelling 
place, genealogy and appearance. The physical 
description stresses 
her lop-sidedness, symbolic of the disharmony she (literally) 
embodies. 
Her face most fowle and filthy was to see, 
With squinted eyes contrarie wayes intended, 
And loathly mouth, vnmeete a mouth to bee, 
That nought but gall and venim comprehended; 
And wicked wordes that God and man offended: - 
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Her lying tongue was in two parts diuided, 
And both the parts did speake, and both contended; 
And as her tongue, so was her hart discided, 
That neuer thoght one thing, but doubly stil was guided. 
Als as she double spake, so heard she double, 
With matchlesse eares deformed and distort, 
Fild with false rumors and seditious trouble, 
Bred in assemblies of the vulgar sort, 
That still are led with euery light report. 
And as her eares so eke her feet were odde, 
And much vnlike, th'one long, the other short, 
And both misplast; that when th'one forward yode, 
The other backe retired, and contrarie trode. 
IV. 1.27-a 
Much of this passage might describe a real woman, albeit a 
hideously ugly one. The filthy face, the squinting eyes, the differ- 
ent sizes of ears and feet, these are not beyond the bounds of nature. 
But Ate's divided tongue, which says contrary things at the same time, 
and even her way of walking (which, if tried literally, would result 
in her falling over) do not seem reconcilable with the way she acts 
and is treated in the narrative which follows. Certainly she is quite 
capable of speaking with one voice when slandering Britomart to 
Scudamour at FQ IV. i. 47. 
In fact the reader more or less unconsciously ignores these 
absurder (and hence more obviously metaphorical) details when Spenser 
returns to the main narrative - we recognize that this is a different, 
less stringently allegorical environment, and accordingly modify what 
was in any case a very difficult mental image to sustain. The 
intriguing point here is the extent to which that image is modified - 
for it is not rejected entirely. The general description of Ate as 
ugly is preserved in what follows: Scudamour calls 
her a 'vile hag' 
(FQ IV. i. 48.1), and at FQ IV. i. 18.7 she is distinguished from Duessa 
in not having disguised her ugliness: 'such as she was, she plaine did 
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shew'. But this image is never allowed to stabilise visually: we flit 
between two mental pictures, one of an ugly but anatomically possible 
hag, the other of an analogically based being whose physical absurd- 
ities cannot be imagined in action. Appropriately, Ate's iconographic 
description never quite harmonises with its narrative context; but the 
potential of narrative to distort and reshape an initial iconographic 
statement is clear enough. 
Iconographically significant objects can disappear, or lose their 
significance, with disconcerting ease - but they can appear from 
nowhere just as easily. The account of Occasion at FQ Il. iv is a case 
in point. Paul Alpers has written sensitively (in terms I will not 
attempt to paraphrase) of the way in which a full iconographical 
description of Occasion is given only over an extended period, so that 
the reader is forced into an awareness of the interpretative process 
involved in reading the passage, a process which culminates in 
Occasion's being explicitly named by the Palmer (FQ Il. iv. 10.9). ' 
Later in the same episode, after the Palmer has revealed Occasion's 
particular role in inspiring fury (FQ II. iv. 44.2), her resemblance to 
the Furies of classical literature (always one of the possible 
identifications competing in her initial description) is completed by 
the acquisition of 
a flaming fire brond, 
Which she in Stygian lake, ay burning bright, 
Had kindled... 
II. v. 22.6-8 
Paul Alpers, The Poetry of The Faerie Owen' (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1967), 
pp, 209-14, 
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Spenser does not find it necessary to give any account of how 
Occasion comes by this object, which she certainly was not carrying 
before - in Canto iv it is ordinary stones, not firebrands, that she 
hands to Furor (FQ II. iv. 5.5). The very presence of such conven- 
tional, iconographically-based figures as Occasion, with her highly 
meaningful forelock, creates an environment in which iconographic 
elements can be introduced without the establishment of a 'probable' 
narrative cause. Thus when Guyon finds it necessary to secure 
Occasion and Furor with 'an yron lock', 'a stake', 'an yron racke' and 
a 'hundred yron chaines' (FQ I I. iv. 12-15), the poet makes no attempt 
to suggest the source of these items - they are all miraculously ready 
to hand. ' Indeed, the effectiveness of this passage lies largely in 
the fact that the extravagance of the liberty Spenser takes with 
normal narrative practice mirrors the extravagance of the precautions 
needed to prevent Furor's release. But it is also true in general 
that where iconographical figures are prominent in a narrative, such 
narrative considerations as probability, cause and effect tend to lose 
their domination of our response. Though the specific items in 
Guyon's collection of hardware may have no individual iconographic 
significance, this does not make us any more insistent in demanding to 
know their provenance: we recognise that collectively they are 
allegorical, inasmuch as the sheer scale of the assemblage tells us 
something about how hard a passion fury is to restrain. 
A point also noted by Michael Murrin, in The Allegorical Epic: Essays in Its Rise 
and Decline (Chicago: Chicago U,?,, 1980), pp, 144-45, Also relevant here is 
Murrin's The Veil of Allegory; Soma Notes Toward a Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric 
in the English Renaissance (Chicago: Chicago U, P,, 1969), pp, 141-43, 
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One of the consequences of introducing such anomalies into the 
narrative is that they affect our ability to visualise narrative 
events. I have already mentioned this in connection with Ate: it is 
impossible to imagine her as she is described, and yet the description 
we are given inhibits us from imagining her any other way. Similarly 
with Guyon's equipment: the nature of the text is such that we simply 
do not ask ourselves where the lock and stake and chains come from, 
hence we do not visualise the moment of their acquisition. 
Iconography, with its affinity for discrete, emblematic images, 
tends to create such lacunae in our visual account of the text. In 
the Mask of Cupid, the figure of Fear is first described running away 
from the sound of his own armour, then in the next stanza (when he is 
no longer the centre of allegorical interest) he is said to be walking 
, in rancke' with Hope (FQ III. xii. 13.2). But we. do not visualise him 
suddenly stopping and resuming an orderly pace - rather, we skip from 
one image to the other without any intervening rationalisation. 
Again, consider the description of the trophies on the walls of 
Ate's cave: 
And all within the riuen walls were hung 
With ragged monuments of times forepast, 
All which the sad effects of discord sung: 
There were rent robes, and broken scepters plast, 
Altars defyl'd, and holy things defast, 
Disshiuered speares, and shields ytorne in twaine, 
Great cities ransackt, and strong castles rast, 
Nations captiued, and huge armies slaine: 
Of all which ruines there some relicks did remaine. 
IV. 1.21 
This stanza uses the figure of auxesis -a list of items, gradually 
increasing in magnitude to provide a climactic effect. The descrip- 
tion starts by implying that the objects are displayed within Ate's 
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house, and indeed the first few items - 'rent robes', 'broken scep- 
ters' and so on - can easily be imagined hung as trophies of discord. 
But once we come to 'Great cities ransackt' and 'strong castles rast', 
we no longer attempt to picture them suspended for display; rather, we 
contemplate the effects of discard in the world outside Ate's den. 
The shift from the literal setting may not even be noticed, however, 
since it is camouflaged in the orderly progression of the auxesis. 
Only in the final line are we returned to Ate's house with a bathetic 
revision of the stanza's opening statement: it is not the cities and 
armies and nations which are hung on the wall, merely relics from 
their ruin. The effect of this is not to reassure us that our visual- 
isation of the passage has been consistent, however, but by its own 
inconsistency with the opening of the stanza to alert us to the fact 
that we have been led away from the original narrative setting. 
This sort of manipulation of the visual sense gives the narrative a 
surreal, dreamlike quality. Indeed, the traditional view of dreams as 
purveyors of hidden meanings - as a sort of allegory, in fact - Bay 
well derive in part from such distortions, which by a psychological 
(as opposed to literary) application of the absurdity principle might 
be taken to indicate the presence of arcane matter. ' It is certainly 
1, It is worth noting that when Freud drew an analogy between the language of dreams 
and the system of Egyptian hieroglyphs, he not only described them in terms very 
similar to those used by Quintilian to define 'mixed allegory' (see p, 36 above), 
but found that they exhibited just the dislocations and ambiguities which we have 
claimed to be inherent in that mode: 'In both cases there are certain elements 
which are not intended to be interpreted (or read, as the case may be) but are 
only designed to serve as 'determinatives', that is to establish the meaning of 
some other element, The ambiguity of various elements of dreams finds a parallel 
in these ancient systems of writing; and so too does the omission of various 
relations, which have in both cases to be supplied from the context, ' Sigmund 
Freud, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest (1913), in The 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed, James Strachey at a! (London; 
The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1966), XIII, 163-90 
(p, 177), 
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no accident that so many allegories have been written as dream visions 
- in both dreams and allegory, the normal associations of cause and 
effect, of time and space, are only provisionally enforced. Hence the 
dreamer in Pearl can, from the same vantage point, see both the walls 
of the New Jerusalem and the expressions of the participants in a 
procession taking place within the walls -a fact by which he seems 
unbemused. ' In The Pilgrim's Progress the same principle allows a 
temporal liberty to be taken in the Interpreter's house, when 
Christian is shown two brothers, one named Passion, the other 
Patience: 
Then I saw that one came to Passion, and brought him a bag 
of treasure, and poured it down at his feet; the which he took 
up, and rejoiced therein, and withal laughed Patience to 
scorn. But I beheld but awhile, and he had lavished all away, 
and had nothing left him but rags. -' 
Coleridge commented on this passage in the margin-of his copy: 
One of the not many instances of a faulty allegory in P. Pr. - 
i. e. that it is no allegory - The beholding but awhile and 
the change into "nothing but rags", is not legitimately 
imaginable. A longer time & more Interlinks are requisite. 3 
Coleridge ignores, in the first place, a certain felicity which 
derives from this compression of time into what is presumably for 
Christian only a few minutes. Just as the exotically large amount of 
equipment needed by Guyon to tame Furor was highlighted by the 
1, See Pearl, 11,1033-44,1093-1109, 
2, Bunyan, p, 31, 
3. The Collected Forks of Sasuel Taylor Coleridge, XII, ed, G, Whalley (Princeton 
and London: Princeton U; P, and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 811-12, 
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narrative liberty necessary to procure it, so here again the nature of 
the narrative distortion is such that it reinforces the point of the 
passage - that the time spent in possession of mere worldly goods is 
all too brief. A more general - and a more obvious - objection to his 
remarks, however, is that the sort of discrepancy to which he takes 
exception, though it would certainly be out of place in some kinds of 
fiction, is quite plausible in the relation of a dream, where 
distortions of time and space are commonplace. 
I suggest that the use of analogically based iconography tends to 
disrupt normal narrative conventions, by introducing 'absurd' effects 
such as those we have described above. At the same time, the narra- 
tive context of these iconographical elements means that they too are 
unstable, appearing or disappearing, gaining or losing significance, 
according to the exigencies of the plot. Iconography continually 
pulls towards an environment which is static and emblematic, and hence 
is fundamentally antipathetic to the development of narrative. 
This opposition between narrative exposition and the construction 
of emblematic images can be used to witty effect, wrongfooting the 
reader by inserting into isolated, emblematic descriptions details 
which are inappropriately literal, and which remind us of the narra- 
tive world beyond the emblem. The description of Malengin provides a 
minor example: 
And in his hand an huge long staffe he held, 
Whose top was arm'd with many an yron hooke, 
Fit to catch hold of all that he could weld, 
Or in the compasse of his clouches tooke; 
And euer round about he cast his looke. 
Als at his backe a great wyde net he bore, 
With which he seldome fished at the brooke, 
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But vsd to fish for fooles on the dry shore, 
Of which he in fair weather wont to take great store. 
V. ix. 11 
The iconographical propriety of portraying Malengin (whom the 
Canto's Argument has identified as 'Guyle' (FQ V. ix. Arg. 1)) as an 
angler with gaff and net is easily perceived, and we read the image 
analogically, understanding his piscatory attributes through their 
analogy to his practice as a deceiver. ' The line 'Vith which he 
seldome fished at the brooks' comes unexpectedly in this context - it 
seems too earnestly concerned to provide a clarification of which we 
stand in no need. In its superfluous insistence that we should not 
imagine the net to have only literal significance the line is partly 
humorous; but by raising the possibility that we might have seen the 
net as a literal tool Spenser seems to question whether what we are 
reading is emblematic at all. Thus we are uncertain how literally to 
read the line which follows, offered as a true account of the net's 
use. Does Malengin-literally fish for fools, or will this language be 
revealed as a metaphor applicable only within the confines of the 
emblem? In fact, Malengin does use the net to catch the maiden whom 
Artegall and Arthur set as bait (FQ V. ix. 14). But the general point 
is that literal comments inside an emblematic description tend to 
destabilise it, engendering an uncertainty as to the border between 
the emblem and the surrounding fiction. 
The effect here derives from a single line, but emblematic 
description and narrative action can be involved in witty interplay 
1, Ripa has a similar figure -a shaggy man, with a net and hooks - under the title. 
'Inganno', See Aptekar, pp, 129-31, 
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over quite extensive passages - the analogical meanings shifting to 
adapt to new narrative situations, the narrative situation illus- 
trating the emblematic imagery. As an example of this, we may con- 
sider Scudamour's visit to Care's house. FQ IV. v finds Scudamour at a 
low ebb, racked with the fear that Amoret has been unfaithful to him - 
a seed of doubt sown by Ate (FQ IV. 1.47-49). He and Glauce are 
seeking shelter for the night, when they see a nearby cottage, 
belonging to a blacksmith. Although the Argument to the Canto does 
promise a visit to Care's house (FQ IV. v. Arg. 3-4), at this point the 
identity of the smith has not been explicitly revealed. As Scudamour 
and Glauce enter, the narrative is suspended for a description of the 
smith, who 
... was to weet a wretched wearish elfe, 
With hollow eyes and rawbone cheekes forspent, 
As if he had in prison long bene pent: 
Full blacke and griesly did his face appeare, 
Besmeard with smoke that nigh his eye-sight blent; 
With rugged beard, and hoarie shagged heare, 
The which he neuer wont to Gombe, or comely sheare. 
Rude was his garment, and to rags all rent, 
Ne better had he, ne for better cared: 
With blistred hands emongst the cinders brent, 
And fingers filthie, with long nayles vnpared, 
Right fit to rend the food, on which he fared. 
His name was Care; a blacksmith by his trade, 
That neither day nor night from working spared, 
But to small purpose yron wedges made; 
Those be vnquiet thoughts, that carefull minds inuade. 
IV. v. 34.3-35.9 
The identification of the smith as Care at FQ IV. v. 35.6 casts an 
explanatory light over much of the preceding description. Care 
appears as the very type of the care-worn man, who, weighed down by 
some overwhelming care, is paradoxically careless of his appearance 
and health. In this he mirrors Scudamour's own obsessive state. As 
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an emblem this description is primarily exemplary, or, in Ripa's term- 
inology, 'contingent'. ' 
In the lines after the identification of Care the emphasis of the 
account changes. The poet turns from visual description to inform- 
ation about the purpose of Care's activity; the exemplary tone is 
displaced by analogical commentary, with the stanza being completed by 
(what is a highly unusual feature in Spenserian description)2 a 
frankly interpretative authorial comment, linking the smith's products 
to 'unquiet thoughts'. This gloss confirms the analogical nature of 
the account, acting like the 'word' of an emblem. Care previously 
seemed to exemplify the state of the care-worn man, but we are now 
encouraged to alter our view of his initial description. Where we had 
thought of his unkempt appearance as deriving from his 'carefull' 
state, it now seems to be a result of his continual work at the forge, 
which leaves him no time to rest or maintain his appearance. 
But here there is an ambiguity in the terms of the analogy. Ve 
know that Care ceaselessly produces 'unquiet thoughts': but is this 
because he represents a care-worn person like Scudamour, who is in his 
jealousy similarly productive; or is it that Care is care in the 
abstract, the daemonic agent (to use Angus Fletcher's habitual term)3 
of all care, and therefore Scudamour's tormentor? The familiar 
1, It is worth pointing out, though, that Care's suitability to reflect Scudanour's 
jealousy lies partly in the fact that, as a smith, he is also a type of the god 
Vulcan, where Vulcan was cuckolded by Venus and Mars, Studamour believes that he 
too has been betrayed, and by a couple whose names - Reoret and Britoeart - 
suggest their connection with the deities of love and war. 
2. Though compare FQ IV, i, 20,9,25.5. 
3, See Angus Fletcher, 4! lagary; The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca: Cornell 
U, P., 1964), pp. 25-69, 
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problem of ontological status here becomes a problem of motivation. 
What drives Care to make these wedges - care or evil intent? This 
question touches on a fundamental issue in allegory, to be addressed 
in detail in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to notice that 
the ambiguity results from the dual emphasis in Care's description, 
first on his emaciated and unkempt appearance, and then on his ana- 
logical function. 
The poet now turns to Care's assistants: 
In which his worke he had sixe seruants prest, 
About the Andvile standing euermore, 
With huge great hammers, that did neuer rest 
From heaping stroakes, which thereon soused sore; 
All sixe strong groomes, but one then other more; 
For by degrees they all were disagreed; 
So likewise did the hammers which they bore, 
Like belles in greatnesse orderly succeed, 
That he which was the last, the first did farre exceede. 
IV. v. 36 
These lines elaborate the theme'of care, but they do not continue 
the analogy introduced in the previous stanza. The setting of that 
analogy is retained, but its terms are rearranged to produce a new set 
of relationships. In the previous stanza, for instance, the 'yron 
wedges' are worrying thoughts which invade 'carefull minds'. The 
'wedge' image suggests the way in which small worries can develop into 
larger ones. Now, however, the products of the forge are no longer 
mentioned, and it is the assistants themselves who grow in size, as if 
it were their progression which were analogous to the progress of 
care. ' This shift enables our attention to be centred on the increas- 
1, As William Nelson has pointed out, the six smiths also share a more arcane 
symbolism, alluding to the story of Pythagoras' discovery of the principles of 
musical harmony, See William Nelson, The Poetry of Spenser; a study (New York 
and London: Columbia U, P,, 1963), p, 250, 
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ing strength with which the anvil is struck, a force which in the case 
of the final (and largest) of Care's servants is more than human: 
So dreadfully he did the anduile beat, 
That seem'd to dust he shortly would it driue: 
So huge his hammer and so fierce his heat, 
That seem'd a rocke of Diamond it could riue, 
And rend a sunder quite, if he thereto list striue. 
IV. v. 37.5-9 
At this paint the analogy between the 'yron wedges' and 'unquiet 
thoughts' has become completely subordinated to a new relation, in 
which it is the action of the smiths in striking the anvil which is 
analogous to care. Just as Care's servant strikes the anvil till it 
seems that he will drive it into dust,. so worry will beat unceasingly 
in 'carefull minds', which, like Scudamour's, are 'gauld and grieu'd 
... night and 
day' <FQ IV. v. 31.8),. ' The particular propriety of this 
image for a jealous mind has been elucidated by John Steadman, who 
notes that 'martello' or 'martello d'amore' (hammer of love) was a 
contemporary Italian idiom for jealousy. 2 
When the narrative resumes, and Scudamour attempts to go to sleep, 
this analogy is literalised in the actions of the smiths: 
And if by fortune any Title nap 
Vpon his heauie eye-lids chaunst to fall, 
Eftsoones one of those villeins him did rap 
Vpon his headpeece with his yron mall; 
That he was soone awaked therewithall, 
1, Compare fQ IV, V, 35,7, Richard Hooker uses a similar metaphor for the ceaseless 
workings of the conscious mind upon the imagination: 'On this anvil it ceaseth 
not day and night to strike, by means whereof,,, the very thoughts and cog- 
itations of man's mind,,, bewray . theaselves', Richard Hooker,, The 4rorks, ed, 
Keble, Church and Paget (Oxford: 1888), II, pp, 323-24, cited D, J, Gordon, The 
Renaissance Imagination, Essays and lectures by O, J, Gordon, coil, and ed, 
Stephen Orgel (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California U, P,, 1975), p. 120, 
2, John M, Steadman, 'Spenser's House of Care: A Reinterpretation', SRen,, 7 (1960), 
207-33, p, 208, 
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And lightly started vp as one affrayd; 
Or as if one him suddenly did call. 
IV. v. 42.1-7 
By making the smiths literally hit Scudamour's head, Spenser 
provides a gloss on their previous activity. Here again, however, the 
terms of the allegorical environment have not remained static. As 
well as being analogous to the general action of 'vnquiet thoughts' 
upon 'carefull minds', the smiths' assaults reproduce a specific 
experience often undergone by worried people, who do indeed suddenly 
wake up as if someone had called them. To assign the cause of this to 
a blow from the 'mall' of one of Care's grooms is to give a witty 
explanation of a real physiological phenomenon, as well as to illus- 
trate an analogy. 
This theme is elaborated with the intervention of Care himself, who 
strikes when Scudamour finally does get to sleep: 
With that, the wicked carle the maister Smith 
A paire of redwhot yron tongs did take 
Out of the burning cinders, and therewith 
Vnder his side him nipt, that forst to wake, 
He felt his hart for very paine to quake... 
Iv. v. 44.1-5 
Care's tongs produce literally what is one of the most enduring 
metaphors associated with frustrated lovers - an aching heart. Once 
more the terms of the analogy of care have changed - and with the 
terms, the literal characteristics of Care and his assistants, who are 
now portrayed as unambiguously malicious, very different from the 
workaholics initially found by Scudamour, who 'for nought would from 
their worke refraine' (FQ IV. v. 38.5). But this inconsistency is 
hardly noticed, still less objected to, for the 'effect of the entire 
passage lies precisely in the exuberant facility with which the 
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original emblematic representation of Care is altered to accomodate 
the changing requirements of an extended narrative, by constantly 
juggling the same set of basic terms (smith, anvil, hammer, wedges,, 
tongs) in a series of subtly different relations. 
When Care pinches Scudamour the knight once again starts up, 
seeking revenge 
On him, the which his quiet slomber brake: 
Yet looking round about him none could see; 
Yet did the smart remaine, though he himselfe did flee. 
IV. v. 44.7-9 
The sudden inability to find the smith in what has until now been 
represented as an uncomfortably confined space imparts a surreal 
quality to the house of Care, suggesting that the whole edifice may 
have disappeared like one of the nightmares produced by Scudamour's 
'ydle brain' (FQ IV. v. 43.7). Certainly, although Scudamour spends the 
rest of the night in 'disquiet and hartfretting payne' (FQ IV. v. 45.1), 
the poem makes no further mention either of the house or its 
inhabitants. The ease with which this suggestion of-the house's 
metaphorical nature is made is an indication of the flexibility of 
interpretation with which we read the passage. The literal sense can 
be made the basis of a metaphor, metaphors can at any moment be 
literalised: and it is all done with an improvisational skill which is 
truly exhilarating. 
Nor is this account by any means exhaustive. Other analogies of 
care can be found in the sounds which fill the cramped house. To 
begin with, when Scudamour and Glauce approach the cottage, they hear 
'many yron hammers beating ranke, / And answering their wearie turnes 
around' (FQ IV. v. 33.7-8). In the context of Scudamour's obsessive 
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jealousy of Britomart, the weary echoing of the hammers suggests the 
way in which thoughts trace and retrace their own ground in the 
jealous mind. A little later, we find that the forge is kept alight 
by bellows which 
blew anraine, 
Like to the Northren winde, that none could heare: 
Those Pensifenesse did moue; and Sighes the bellows weare. 
IV. v. 38.7-9 
The analogy here between the action of a man working bellows and 
the action of pensiveness in producing sighs, and the earlier analogy 
between the echoing of hammer blows and the constant doubling back 
upon themselves of worried thoughts, each involves a literal con- 
sequence which is not central to the analogical relation: the pro- 
duction of loud noise. But this now becomes the ground of a further 
analogy, as the sound of the hammers and the bellows combine with the 
howling of dogs and the screeching of an owl to keep Scudamour awake, 
thus providing a literal analogue for his 'vnquiet' thoughts. 
This elevation of peripheral literal features to new analogical 
significance may be compared with the similar technique used to 
describe Fear in the Mask of Cupid: 
Next him was Feare, all arm'd from top to toe, 
Yet thought himselfe not safe enough thereby, 
But feard each shadow mouing to and fro, 
And his owne armes when glittering he did spy, 
Or clashing heard, he fast away did fly, 
As ashes pale of hew, and wingyheeld... 
II I. xii. 12.1-6 
Fear is literally fearful, and in this sense his armour has an 
obvious narrative justification: he uses it to protect himself. And 
yet in the context of the Mask of Cupid the armour also has an ana- 
- 152 - 
logical meaning: it suggests the protective measures adopted by the 
insecure lover, an outward confidence and pretence to invulnerability. 
In either case, it is the armour's protective function which is 
central to the initial emblem. However, Spenser picks on what should 
be a peripheral or 'contingent' aspect of wearing armour - the fact 
that it makes a clashing sound as one moves - to provide the ground of 
a new analogical relation. Far from affording him comfort or 
composure, the armour only adds to Fear's insecurity, for the sight 
and noise of it is enough to send him scurrying -a vicious circle of 
inhibition, bluster and embarrassment that encapsulates the intro- 
verted and obsessive state embodied in the Mask. 
The relationship between emblem and narrative becomes especially 
problematical in Spenser's large, emblematic set-pieces. In these, 
the main narrative may be suspended for an extended period, while a 
substantial body of emblematic writing intervenes, with its own 
structural organisation and its own style of concentrated iconograph- 
ical symbolism. Yet the apparent separation of these passages can be 
called into doubt by the introduction of non-emblematic features, 
confusing the reader as to how to approach the text - as an independ- 
ent body of emblematic writing, or as part of a larger narrative. 
At FQ I. iv the story of Redcross' visit to the house of Lucifera is 
interrupted by an extended iconographical tour de force with little or 
no narrative motivation - the procession of the Seven Deadly Sins. 
The six counsellors of Lucifera have not appeared before (at least in 
such abundantly corporeal form), nor will they again. Their one con- 
tribution to the narrative is to effect Lucifera's exit in her state 
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coach. Their sudden introduction seems as capricious and arbitrary as 
Lucifera's whims themselves: 
Suddein vpriseth from her stately place 
The royall Dame, and for her coche doth call... 
I. iv. 16.1-2 
It is via the description of Lucifera's coach that Spenser finds an 
opportunity to introduce his subject, but this narrow isthmus of a 
narrative cause is soon forgotten in the reading, as the poet settles 
down to a leisurely and highly stylised analysis of each Sin in turn. 
The descriptions of the Sins are organised in such a way as to seal 
them off from any forward movement in the narrative. The repetition 
of the descriptive formula lulls rather than stimulates the expect- 
ation of such movement: three stanzas are allotted for each figure, 
detailing the beast he rides, his appearance and clothes, an object he 
carries, his style of life and a disease he suffers from, and con- 
cluding with a summary dismissal. This pattern is rigidly adhered to, 
and conditions the response of the reader, who becomes in the end more 
immediately interested in which synonym for 'company' (FQ I. iv. 20.9), 
'crew' (FQ I. iv. 23.9), or 'traine' (FQ I. iv. 26.9) the poet's ingenuity 
will provide to finish his account of the present Vice than with the 
furthering of Redcross' fortunes. 
Passages such as this seem to be insulated against too great an 
involvement with narrative concerns. Each set of three stanzas forms 
a small essay on a particular vice, and is linked to the narrative of 
which it is an enclave primarily by its theme - the pulling of the 
coach being largely a formal device to enable this sort of sequential 
description. Nevertheless, at times Spenser upsets this state of 
affairs by insisting on the reality of the procession - thus, for 
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instance, he takes advantage of the fact that Envy rides directly 
behind Avarice to arrange a narrative demonstration of his vice: 
Still as he rode, he gnasht his teeth, to see 
Those heapes of gold with griple Couetyse, 
And grudged at the great felicitie 
Of proud Lucifers, and his owne companie. 
I. i v. 31.6-9 
Similarly, in the Mask of Cupid Fear displays terror of his 
neighbour Daunger, and Dissemblance laughs at scowling Suspect, who in 
turn lowers at her (FQ III. xii. 12,15). These touches surprise our 
expectation. Having been prepared for a fundamentally emblematic 
passage in which such relationships as there are between the different 
figures will be based on order or relative position, matters for 
analogical interpretation, we find in these narrative insertions an 
unpredictable, improvisational quality. 
At several points Spenser informs us of the habits and motivation 
of the Sins, matters which could not be known from their external 
appearance. Thus we learn of Lechery's success with the ladies, and 
of Wrath's occasional repentance (FQ I. iv. 24-26,34). In one way this 
sort of detail reinforces the isolated character of the description, 
cutting us off still more effectively from the narrative context of 
the Sins' procession by denying the perspective of those who are 
watching it in Lucifera's hall. However, to give the Sins a personal 
history is to force us to consider them outside the schematic setting 
of their allotted three stanzas, and hence to focus on their 
problematic ontology. 
This is a widespread effect in Spenser's emblematic descriptions. 
The description of November in the Nutabilitie Cantos is a good 
example: 
-155- 
Next was Nouember, he full grosse and fat, 
As fed with lard, and that right well might seeme; 
For, he had been a fatting hogs of late, 
That yet his browes with sweat, did reek and steem, 
And yet the season was full sharp and breem; 
In planting eeke he took no small delight: 
Whereon he rode, not easie was to deeme; 
For it a dreadfull Centaure was in sight, 
The seed of Saturne, and faire Nais, Chiron bight. 
VII. vii. 40 
The description of the months shares the highly structured nature 
of the procession of Deadly Sins. The months appear in order, each 
associated with an appropriate agricultural task, and accompanied by a 
sign of the zodiac. This stylised arrangement belongs with an emblem- 
atic mode of description: the passage seems to be abstracted from 
particular time and place. Yet Spenser insists on including 'natural- 
istic' details: November has just been fatting hogs and is still 
sweating from his labour. Where has he come from? Where are these 
hogs kept? These questions are ones we cannot help but ask, even 
though we know at the same time that they cannot be answered in the 
emblematic terms of the procession of months. The situation is 
analogous to the incident of Guyon's temptation by a wailing maiden, 
mentioned in the last chapter. ' There we were encouraged to ask the 
naturalistic question: what would have happened if Guyon had 
innocently gone to her aid? But the situation is not naturalistic, 
and because of this the question cannot be posed in this way - if 
Guyon had gone to her aid it would not have been an innocent act. In 
the description of November, as elsewhere, Spenser isolates a moment 
in which the worlds of particular action and of universal meaning may 
1, See pp, 95-96 above, 
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meet, and makes us conscious of the artificiality of such a conjunc- 
tion. 
A similar effect can be observed with regard to visualisation. I 
have said that we tend simply not to visualise narrative 'absurd- 
ities', but it is worth noting that there are occasions when the text 
forces us to do so. The procession of the months is again relevant 
here. Just as the parade of Deadly Sins had an ostensible narrative 
justification - the exit of Lucifera - so the account of the months is 
in principle part of a larger narrative. The months appear in res- 
ponse to the summons of Nature (FQ VII. vii. 27.8-9), to whom they come 
in order, 'all riding' to their 'dew places' (FQ VI I. vii. 32.2,43.9) 
on the creature whose zodiacal sign falls within their province. The 
idea of movement is therefore implicit in the narrative occasion for 
their appearance; though in practice the fiction of a moving pro- 
cession is to a large extent a device to enable the months to be 
treated one by one, as if they were passing before a stationary point. 
Problems arise, however, in that not all the signs of the zodiac are 
creatures who may by ridden. One exception - with a simple solution - 
is the sign of Virgo, who appears with August: he 'rode... not, but 
led a louely Mayd/ Forth by the lilly hand' (FQ VII. vii. 37.3-4). A 
more intractable case is January, the month associated with Aquarius: 
Then came old January, wrapped well 
In many weeds to keep the cold away; 
Yet did he quake and quiuer like to quell, 
And blowe his nayles to warme them if he nay: 
For, they were numbd with holding all the day 
An hatchet keene, with which he felled wood, 
And from the trees did lop the needlesse spray: 
Vpon an huge great Earth-pot steane he stood; 
From whose wide'mouth, there flowed forth the Romane floud. 
VII. vii. 42 
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The suggestion that all the months are moving forward to their 'dew 
places' is more difficult to sustain here, since it is hard to see how 
the 'Earth-pot steane' can move of its own accord. The fiction breaks 
down, and we are forced to realise that the real structural principle 
of the passage lies in the formal arrangement of a group of emblematic 
descriptions, rather than in the continuance of a narrative. Yet we 
are not able to avoid visualising this image, which is the focus of 
the whole stanza. Do we see the pot gliding magically over the 
ground? Trundling on a cart? Stationary? We turn uncomfortably from 
one image to another, none of them in accordance with the contra- 
dictory demands of the text. The difficulty is compounded with the 
entrance of February, who is drawn in a wagon by the two fishes of the 
sign Pisces. These fish swim forward through the 'floud' flowing from 
January's 'steane': a detail which inescapably suggests their physical 
approach, and makes the isolated image of a stationary pot that much 
harder to sustain imaginatively. For if the pot is not moving, the 
fish must surely reach it, and what will happen when they do? 
Naturalistic questions such as this are of course quite alien to 
the emblematic mode, in which each image should be treated as separate 
from those which surround it. John Bender puts the emblematic case 
well: 
The places in The Faerie Queene tend to be set-pieces composed 
of medallions whose individual shapes are determined by what 
is represented within them. Moreover, the relationship of the 
discrete scenes to one another is more rhetorical than 
spatial, and the interstices of the galaxy of scenes that con- 
stitute a "place" are undefined and virtually blank. ' 
1, John B, Bender, Spenser and Literary Piaorialism (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 
1972), p, 136. 
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This is fine, as far as it goes - but my point is that this is an 
orthodoxy from which Spenser regularly departs, and that he does so 
precisely by defining those 'interstices' between supposedly discrete 
images which Bender claims are left undefined. Hence the emblematic 
nature of set-pieces like the processions of Sins and months is under- 
mined by the introduction (at imaginatively awkward points) of 
explicit references to the spatial and narrative relations between the 
figures involved, or to the narrative occasions of the passages as a 
whole. That is why our immediate response to this sophisticated, 
artificial style of poetry is so often disconcertingly awkward, naive, 
and literal. The inappropriate questions are also the inescapable 
ones. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHARACTER, MAGIC, AND METAMORPHOSIS. 
Knights, ladies, praying in dumb orat'ries, 
He passeth by; and his weak spirit fails 
To think how they nay ache in icy hoods and mails. 
John Keats, The Eve of St. Agnes' 
1. Two Ovidian Approaches to Character 
The question of character is easy to beg. Inevitably, perhaps, 
there being no alternative language available with which to speak of 
fictional figures, critics will succumb to stylistic convenience and 
write of these literary constructs as if they were real people, 
attributing to them emotions and desires and motives as freely as they 
might to their next-door neighbour. In one sense, indeed, this is a 
perfectly reasonable practice - to avoid it would require circum- 
locutions of elaborate inelegance. But when the point at hand is the 
nature of character itself, the matter becomes complicated. 
If we think of character as an individual's distinguishing com- 
bination of traits and qualities, then we must surely picture it as 
being relatively constant, for if a particular set of traits and 
qualities is to be distinguished, enough of it must remain the same 
from one moment to the next for it to be recognisable. Any reader of 
1, John Keats, The Eve of $t, Agnes, 11,16-18, in The Coaplele Poems, ed, John 
Barnard (Hareondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p, 312. 
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allegory is likely to ask at some time how, the idea of character can 
be maintained when allegorical figures have such a marked tendency to 
act in ways that are dictated by the immediate didactic point, rather 
than making sense in terms of our previous impressions of their 
characters. In the face of such instability, on what basis does our 
confidence to make assertions about a particular figure's 'character' 
rest? As John Livingston Lowes feelingly puts it, 'Is anybody in the 
allegory at any given moment, what. he is, or what he seems? And which 
in Heaven's name, we ask, is which? " 
One possible solution has been proposed by Jan Karel Kouwenhovea, 
in his book Apparent Narrative as Thematic Xetapbor. 2 Kouwenhoven is 
impatient (rightly, in my opinion) with those critics whose reading of 
Spenser veers randomly between analogical and exemplary interpret- 
ation: such readers 'steer an impossible middle course, allegorizing 
on and off in a 
_most 
arbitrary fashion and tortuously reincorporating 
the meanings they come up with into the fiction'. 3 His remedy is a 
drastic one - to remove the element of uncertainty by denying the 
validity of exemplary interpretation altogether. Kouwenhoven is 
concerned that we should take Spenser's description of his poem as a 
'continued Allegory' quite literally - and in his view this means that 
no figures in the poem may be considered as having any exemplary sig- 
John Livingston Lowes, 'The Pilgrim's Progress', in. Essays in Appreciation 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936), pp, 59-60, cited Carolynn Van Dyke, The Fiction 
of Truth, Structures of Meaning in Narrative and Draiatic Allegory (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell U, P  1985), p, 2SS. 
2, Jan Karel Kouwenboven, Apparent Narrative as Thematic Hetaphur; The Organization 
of The faerie Queene (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1983). 
3$ ibid., P, 30. 
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nificance. They 'do not exemplify what they represent: they symbolize 
it' .' 
If this insight were supported by the text it would certainly 
simplify the study of character, and of much else in The Faerle 
Queene. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Many of the poem's 
figures stubbornly persist in appearing to exemplify the qualities for 
which they stand. What is more, the text often compounds the offence 
by explicitly referring to them as doing so. Kouwenhoven admits that 
Spenser's figures are indeed to be found 'enacting' those qualities 
which they represent: 2 however, he would draw a distinction between 
enacting a quality and exemplifying it. Vhat constitutes the dis- 
tinction, apart from the necessity of Kouwenhoven's theory, is less 
clear. His only attempt at an answer (and it is an oblique one) is 
strangely circular - the poem's figures do not exemplify anything 
because they are not 'people'. 3 
This sets the tone for the series of question-begging procedures 
with which Kouwenhoven proceeds to amplify his argument. After the 
metamorphosis of Malbecco, for instance, we learn that 'Since such a 
transformation is logically impossible, Malbecco, and therefore the 
other characters in his episode too, must be personifications all 
along' (italics mine). ' In a discussion where the main point at issue 
is the status of Spenser's poem as a 'continued Allegory', this unsub- 
1, ibid,, p, 29, 
2, ibid., p. 32, 
3, ibid, 
4, ibid, See FO III, x, 54-60, 
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stantiated 'therefore' is purely mischievous. Even if the passage 
shows that Malbecco has always been a personification, this is a far 
cry from showing that the same is true of all the figures in the 
Malbecco episode. (Where does this designation of the 'episode' as an 
atomic unit of allegorical consistency come from, by the way? ) But 
Kouwenhoven's case is far from convincing, even with regard to 
Kalbecco himself. What, after all, is to stop us thinking that 
Nalbecco has become a personification? Is that not exactly the 
reading which his physical transformation - to say nothing of his 
change of name from Malbecco to Gealosie - encourages? Kouwenhoven 
complains that 'such a transformation is logically impossible'. But 
there is nothing unusual in a narrative which relates logically 
impossible events - and as I shall argue in what follows, narratives 
involving magic find this trick easier than most. 
Let us take another example from the same discussion. In con- 
sidering the meeting of Arthur and Prays-desire in Alma's castle (FQ 
II. ix. 36-39), Kouwenhoven is adamant that the reader must interpret 
the figures consistently: 'You cannot treat Prays-desire as a person- 
ification, which she undoubtedly is, without treating Arthur likewise: 
people do not converse with symbols. " But again, we must say that 
although real people may not converse with symbols, there is nothing 
to prevent Spenser or anyone else from writing a narrative in which 
their fictional characters do exactly that. Indeed, if we look four 
stanzas on, to the point in the narrative at which Guyon meets 
Shamefastnesse, we find that this is precisely the claim made by Alma: 
1, ibid., p. 34 - and compare pp, 121-22, p, 134, 
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You shamefast are, but Shamefastnesse it self is shee. 
II. ix. 43.9 
I agree that it is sloppy criticism to alternate between analogical 
and exemplary interpretation without any indication that one knows 
that this is what one is doing, or any awareness of the reasons why 
one is doing it. But the answer is not to contort oneself into a 
position in which this alternation no longer takes place (surely a 
doomed project, even if it were desirable), but rather to examine the 
rhetorical pressures which encourage or inhibit a particular sort of 
reading at any point in the poem. I suggest that such an approach is 
not only more practically useful (since it addresses the actual 
experience of readers, rather than sketching a dubious 'ideal'), but 
that it is more likely to reveal the rich complexity of The Faeroe 
Queene than Kouwenhoven's Procrustean formula could ever hope - or 
even try - to do. 
The answer to John Livingston Lowes, then, is that the decision as 
to whether a-character 'is' or 'seems' at any one moment is only to be 
made in the context of an actual reading, and that this decision, and 
the confusion which prompts it, and the degree of certainty with which 
it is made, are all part of the vital experience of the poem, rather 
than a problem which can be overcome in some a priori fashion before 
one begins to read. 
This sort of decision is not a phenomenon unique to allegory. 
Although the question of character may arise in allegory in a 
particularly noticeable farm, the issue is inherent in all fiction. 
Novels which strive to give an impression of verisimilitude may never- 
theless have 'themes' which the characters are made to serve, and bet- 
ween these more diffuse masters and the rigid allegorical imperative 
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lies perhaps-not so much a sharp qualitative distinction as a gradual 
increase in the proportion and explicitness of allegorical elements. 
As Angus Fletcher writes, 'whether one thinks there is such a thing as 
pure storytelling, or only degrees of abstract thematic structure 
(Aristotle's dianoia) underlying every fiction, the main point is 
surely that in discussing literature generally we must be ready to 
discuss in almost any work at least a small degree of allegory. " A 
fictional character is no less fictional for being put in a 'natural- 
istic' setting. Certain genres attach more importance to the main- 
tenance of the fictive illusion, but it is an illusion none the less. 
For Jonathan Goldberg, the habitual shifting of figures from 
exemplary to analogical roles in The Faerie Queene makes it effect- 
ively impossible to read, since we are always denied the means to make 
even a tentative inference as to the text's meaning: 
We witness textual transformations that disarm our abilities 
to make distinctions, to preserve the identities of 
characters, and to hold onto their meanings. Formalist 
criticism invites readers to take any moment in a text as 
definitive and exemplary; in this text, all moments are 
equally provisional. This text cannot be held to mean if we 
are to read the unreadable; what occurs textually conditions 
our understanding of theme. What are we to make of desire, 
how are we to understand the self, when those supposedly 
natural categories are revealed as textual creations? 2 
I would say that the very prominence of the 'textual transform- 
ations' to which Goldberg refers make it easier to read The Faerie 
Queene than is the case with more immediately accessible works. True, 
Angus Fletcher, A11egory; The Theory of a Syibolic Node (Ithaca: Cornell U, P  1964), p, 8, 
2, Jonathan Goldberg, Endlesse Yorke,, Spenser and the Structures of Discourse 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins U, P  1981), p. 88, 
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the supposedly natural categories of 'desire' and 'self' are textual 
creations, but this is not to say anything new about the nature of 
fiction, which has always been a matter of creating an illusion of 
reality. Where allegory, and The Faerie Queene in particular, differs 
from other genres is in the explicitness with which it admits its own 
artificiality, a fact which if anything seems likely to inhibit 
superficial misreading. While I agree with Goldberg as to the 
impossibility of definitive readings, this is not to say that pro- 
visional readings are without meaning. As A. Leigh Deneef has pointed 
out, to see all readings as provisional is not 'to concede to a 
pessimistic model of infinite regression or to plunge us into a 
Derridean void of absence'. On the contrary, it is the condition of 
life, the very seedbed of meaning, not its absence: 'the word-means 
what we can make it mean... the word is both an opportunity of and an 
invitation to the making of meaning'. ' When one textual concern - the 
supposedly natural category of character - is affected by another - 
the unfolding of a series of actions which the reader is able to 
identify as analogous to some didactic point - then ambiguities will 
occur, and definitive interpretation will prove impossible; but this 
is no more reason to question the status of character as a product of 
the text than that of allegorical content. In fact, both have a 
provisional status, and exist only in the interaction of text and 
reader. In this chapter I shall be examining the nature of this 
interaction. 
The first part of the thesis was devoted to a theoretical dis- 
cussion of different 'levels' of allegory. We described what appeared 
A. Leigh Deneet, Spenser and the Motives of Metaphor (Durham, N, C,; Duke U, P,, 
1982), p, 176, 
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to be an impossibly wide conceptual gulf between the exemplary and 
analogical modes of writing. At the same time we maintained that 
these modes coexist, even that a single figure may at one or different 
times be subject to both sorts of interpretation. We have gone some 
way to give a historical explanation of these phenomena, and to show 
the ways in which the text accomodates and takes advantage of the 
contradictions they imply. But while we have been at pains to show 
that the account of Faerie presented in The Faerie Queene is not 
logically consistent, we have mentioned only in passing one principle 
which may provide Faerie with a means of resolving that inconsistency, 
and on its own terms. The startling juxtapositions of exemplary and 
analogical writing, the changes of direction which so abruptly under- 
mine our confidence about plot and character, far from subverting our 
sense of Faerie as an imaginatively integrated location, actually 
enhance it. For Faerie, as its name implies, is a magical place, 
where wonders beyond ordinary experience must be expected. Faerie's 
rich unpredictability is the source of its variety - but is also its 
distinguishing mark. Where may we expect to find dragons and damsels 
in distress but in a story of Faerie? In what other locus do the 
magical and the supernatural appear so 'natural'? We have noted that 
many allegories take the form of dream visions, mimicking the lacunae 
and lack of probable sequence which characterise dreams, and so 
binding themselves less restrictively to the requirements of narrative 
consistency. In The Faerie Queene this function is served not by 
dream but by magic. In placing his poem in a setting which already 
has magical associations Spenser has made out of necessity one of the 
poem's chief virtues, its ability to awe the reader into wonder. In 
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this, at least, the much-vilified critics of the nineteenth century 
did not sell The Faerie Queene short. Spenser does present us with a 
world of marvels, of gorgeous panoramas. And, as Kathleen Williams 
insists, this adds to rather than detracts from our sense of the 
poem's coherence: 'The romance element... contributes to our sense of 
inwardness, of reality subjectively known, of facts which seem mean- 
ingless yet take shape within our minds as we live them. " The main- 
tenance of illusion, which is the joint work of the storyteller and 
his audience, is a task much facilitated here by the terms of the 
illusion to be maintained, in which the textual transformations 
brought about by extra-literary (for example didactic) pressures may 
themselves be accomodated as magical or wondrous events in the 
narrative. 
This interconnection of form and magic links The Faerie Queene with 
another poem which had an enormous influence on Spenser as on the rest 
of Elizabethan poetry - Ovid's Metamorphoses. Particularly in its 
approach to character and identity, the Metamorphoses seems to fore- 
shadow many of the concerns of allegorical poetry, and in this chapter 
I would like to examine Spenser's work through the perspective of the 
earlier poem. 
In his recent book on the JIletamorphoses Leonard Barkan has this to 
say about the function of metamorphosis in Ovid: 
The universe is structured in layers - in this case divine, 
human and animal - and metamorphosis is the vehicle whereby 
individuals are transported among the layers. -m 
1, Kathleen Williams, Spenser Is Faerie Quesne The Morld of Blass (London; Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1966), p, xviii, 
2, Leonard Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh,, Metamorphosis J the Pursuit of Paganism (New 
Haven and London: Yale U, P,, 1986), p, 2, 
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Barkan is talking here about physical metamorphoses, from trans- 
formation into a cow to stellification and everything in between, but 
his language resembles that we have used.. to describe analogical 
'levels'. In the Metamorphoses the means by which the different 
orders of being are linked is miraculous metamorphosis. Similarly, we 
have noted that The Faerie Queene maintains the integrity of its 
narrative illusion by making magic a component of its fictive 
universe, and allows the coexistence of analogical and exemplary 
elements to be expressed narratively in magical terms. 
But the similarity runs deeper than this. The consistent delinea- 
tion of character is, as we have seen, confessedly problematical for 
the allegorist, and Ovid's poem too inevitably addresses the question 
of identity, as Barkan says: 
The experience of metamorphosis... raises essential questions 
about selfhood, typically for the first time. For identity, 
as soon as metamorphosis divorces it from corporeal shape, 
suddenly comes to be isolated as a thing in itself. ' 
The analogy between physical metamorphosis and transition from 
exemplary to analogical allegory should be clear enough. The sort of 
problem raised by Ovid's mythological treatment - 'Does it make sense 
to refer to that stone as "Hiobe"? I, and so on - finds its echo in the 
question of whether figures in allegory who are amenable to both 
analogical and exemplary interpretation can properly be said to have 
the same 'character' in both contexts. 
ibid., p, ia, 
- 169 - 
In answer Ovid offers two solutions which are, it seems to me, vir- 
tually contradictory. Both have relevance to Spenser, however, and I 
shall consider them in turn. 
First, there is a persistent idea in the Xetamorpboses that in 
spite of any external transformation the 'essence' of a personality - 
the soul, to use a convenient term - survives, and even dictates the 
precise form of that transformation. A good example of this is the 
metamorphosis of the tyrant Lycaon into a wolf, ' an event which seems 
to owe as much to the spontaneous eruption of Lycaon's true nature as 
to Jove's wrath. One more time I shall quote Barkan: 
Jupiter does not produce the rabid wolf; the god merely hurls 
his thunderbolt, and Lycaon himself takes care of the rest 
because his own character is so intrinsically rabid and wolf- 
like from the start. 2 
Lycaon's change is not so much a loss of identity as a honing of 
it, a purification to essence. Echo, too, living entirely for and 
through another, eventually wastes away to nothing but her repetitious 
power of response. 3 
Ovid's 'spontaneous' metamorphoses (those in which divine agency is 
not explicitly invoked as the cause, though of course one is always at 
liberty to infer it) seldom exhibit such obvious propriety, but it is 
quite common for offended gods to mete out punishments designed to fit 
the criminal, where the transformed victim continues to behave char- 
Ovid, Shakespeare's Ovid, Being Arthur 6olding's Translation of the 
Metag'orphoses, trans, Arthur bolding (1567), ed, W, H, D, Rouse (1904) (London: 
Centaur Press, 1961), I 266-79, I consistently use holding's translation and 
line numbering, 
2, Barkan, p, 25, 
3, Ovid, Metasorphoses, III 489-97, 
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acteristically: hence the Pierides continue to chatter as magpies, ' 
Arachne still spins, ' and Alcmene's maid Galanthis, who as a weasel 
gives birth through her mouth because lies from her mouth helped a 
woman give birth, continues in the same house, 'free... / as shee did 
before' .3 
Physical metamorphoses are relatively rare in Spenser, but where 
they do occur they are usually of this 'appropriate' type. Lycaon's 
closest relative is the wicked Adicia in Book V. On learning of the 
Souldan's death, Adicia goes mad and runs into the woods: 
There they doe say, that she transformed was 
Into a Tygre, and that Tygres scath 
In crueltie and outrage she did pas, 
To proue her surname true, that she imposed has. 
V. vii1.49.6-9 
As with Lycaon, the emphasis is on the continuity of Adicia's cruel 
nature, even as a beast. Or rather, her nature leads her to become 
that beast - the change erupts from within herself. The role of magic 
here is to enforce a decorum between appearance and nature. 
This can also be said of the transformation of Malbecco from 
jealous husband into the very person of Gealosie. Here, physical 
metamorphosis becomes the explicit means of crossing the void between 
exemplary and analogical representation. Malbecco, having lost both 
Hellenore and his fortune, hurls himself from a cliff in his mad fury, 
only to find that 
1. ibid V 829-30, 
2, ibid., VI 74-181, 
3, ibid., IX 389-90, 
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... through long anguish and selfe-murdring thought He was so wasted and forpined quight, 
That all his substance was consum'd to nought, 
And nothing left, but like an aery Spright, 
That on the rockes he fell so flit and light, 
That he thereby receiu'd no hurt at all... 
III I. x. 57.1-6 
Malbecco's manlike body seems to have atrophied, or been sloughed 
off, reducing him to his primary characteristic of jealousy. The 
phrase 'selfe-murdring thought' expresses this change, for although 
Kalbecco's jealous thoughts have been the cause of his wasting away 
physically, they have also murdered his 'seife', his identity as a man 
independent of his obsession. Eventually only jealousy itself is 
left, and this, in its cruel introspection, continues its own self- 
murder. Malbecco has in his long fall become a representative rather 
than an exemplar of jealousy. Deprived as he is of the two main 
objects of his passion, his money and his wife, his actions are now 
abstract and emblematic: instead of being jealous in any recognisable 
narrative way, the new Malbecco merely exhibits the restless anxiety 
of jealousy, as he fearfully watches a rock 'which euer and anon/ 
Threates with huge ruine him to fall vpon' (FQ III. x. 58.4-5). He 
loses even his human appearance, becoming a thing with 'crooked 
clawes' (FQ III. x. 57.8), whose deformity grows in time so great that 
he forgets 'he was a man' (FQ III. x. 60.9), distilled into the 
embodiment of his vice. 
If Malbecco's experience corresponds to Lycaon's spontaneous 
metamorphosis, the appropriate but imposed transformations of 
Arachne, 
Galanthis and the rest find an equivalent in the enchantments of 
Acrasia. That Acrasia's former lovers are kept in the Bower in the 
form of monsters is first mentioned at FQ II. v: 
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(Acrasia] Does charme her louers, and the feeble sprightes Can call out of the bodies of fraile wightes: Whom then she does transfarme to monstrous hewes, 
And horribly misshapes with vgly sightes... 
II. v. 27.4-7 
This is explicit enough, but the two inhabitants of the Bower 
described prior to FQ II. xii - Mordant and Cymochles - do not appear 
to have suffered any such physical debasement, however monstrous their 
lusts. True, in Mordant's case there is a transformation, but it 
applies to his powers of judgement rather than his bodily form - he is 
'transformed from his former skill' (FQ 11.1.54.4). And though real 
beasts are duly encountered by Guyon and the Palmer at FQ II. xii. 39, 
this curious equivocation serves to remind the reader of the 
metaphorical propriety of the transformation. It comes as no surprise 
when, after Acrasia's capture, Guyon asks the Palmer, in effect, to 
interpret the monsters' significance: 'Then Guyon askt, what meant 
those beastes, which there did ly' (FQ II. xii. 84.9). The Palmer's 
reply confirms that the basis of their transformation is the adapt- 
ation of their physical to their spiritual conditions. They are 
beasts because they are beastly: 
Said he, These seeming beasts are men indeed, 
Whom this Enchauntress hath transformed thus, 
Vhylome her lauers, which her lusts did feed, 
Now turned into figures hideous, 
According to their mindes like monstruous. 
I I. xi 1.85.1-5 
With Malbecco there had been an ontological shift from the 
exemplary to the analogical - he truly became Gealosie. In this case 
the narrative concern of Acrasia's enchantment predominates, and her 
lovers remain primarily men who have been transformed into a form 
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which is unnatural to them, if illustrative of their failings: 'These 
seeming beasts are men indeed'. 
The Palmer follows his verbal interpretation by removing the spell 
with his staff and restoring the beasts' human form. Here as 
elsewhere in The Faerie Queene the distinguishing mark of beneficent 
magic is its capacity to reveal truth, particularly those truths 
concealed by evil enchantment. In Spenser the practitioners of magic 
are almost always placed in a definite moral perspective' which 
habitually defines their function. While evil enchantment deceives, 
disguises and conceals (Archimago, the witch of Book III and Acrasia 
being some of its exponents) the complementary function of good magic 
is to reveal enchantment and undo it. Hence Florimell's enchanted 
girdle exposes the False Florimell's unchastity at FQ IV. v; while the 
staff of the maleficent Genius of the Bower, which 'charmed semblants 
sly' (FQ II. xii. 49.9), is matched against the virtue of the Palmer's 
staff, which can 'all charmes defeat' (FQ II. xii. 40.3). Both sorts of 
magic may involve transformation, but, as becomes clear, the allegor- 
ical effect of such transformation is very different. 
In an environment such as we have described for Faerie, where magic 
provides the narrative means for the integration of exemplary and 
analogical allegory, the undoing of magic can be associated with the 
interpretation, and undoing, of allegorical situations. The Palmer's 
reversal of Acrasia's spell achieves precisely this, removing the 
analogical element of the situation by destroying the correspondence 
1, Stephen Barney claims that Cupid and Proteus, 'being gods', cannot be categorised 
either as white or black magicians, However, their individual actions certainly 
do not fall outside the ambit of moral interpretation, See Stephen A, Barney, 
R! legories of History, R legories of Love (Hamden, Conn,: Archon Books, 1979), 
p. 277, 
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between the lovers' inner and outer states. Thus, to take away their 
outward beastliness is not to improve their nature: 'being men they 
did unmanly looke' (FQ II. xii. 86.3). 
Acrasia's lovers are disenchanted in more ways than one - none is 
glad of the restoration. The Palmer has done more than simply to 
explain the allegory. By using his staff to make the connection 
between animal form and the beastliness in men which it represents 
explicit he has destroyed the allegory altogether. What we are left 
with at the end of Book II is a naturalistic situation, where the 
'hoggish mind' (FQ II. xii. 87.8) of Grill inhabits a form that is 
'naturall' (FQ II. xii. 86.9). It is a neat manoeuvre by Spenser, and 
one that he executes not without humour, to allow the identification 
of enchantment and allegory to go so far that the breaking of one 
entails the interpretation and dismantling of the other. 
Exegetes and revealers of truth are nothing new in romance; it is 
common for a hermit to be at hand to explain dreams or mysterious 
happenings. In The Faerie Queene his representatives include the 
hermit of Book VI, the priest of Isis, Merlin, and indeed the Palmer 
himself, all of whom are adept at interpreting allegorical events. 
But in using magic for this purpose the Palmer in effect makes the 
events interpret and unravel themselves. Just as the 
Elizabethan 
reader of allegory saw himself as stripping away the rind of 
fictional 
events to reveal a core of meaning, so the Palmer removes 
the outward 
appearance of Acrasia's beasts to reveal the intemperate men 
they 
signify allegorically. 
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So far our examination of metamorphosis in both Ovid and The Faerie 
Queene has been such as to suggest that, however disconcerting the 
transformations in themselves, there is some continuity of identity in 
those who undergo them. Magic, or one's own nature, may cause one to 
be shifted from one 'level' to another - in the case of Ovid, from 
human to divine, animal, vegetable, or mineral - but the disting- 
uishing features of one's personality survive, manifesting themselves 
in ways appropriate to the new form - human or animal, exemplary or 
analogical. Ovid's Pythagoras, maintaining the immortality of the 
soul in different bodily forms, assumes that this correspondence 
holds: 
And even as supple wax with ease receyveth fygures straunge. 
And keepes not ay one shape, ne bydes assured ay from chaunge, 
And yit continueth alwayes wax-in substaunce: So I say 
The soule is ay the selfsame thing it was, and yit astray 
It fleeteth intoo sundry shapes. ' 
In this imposition of coherence and rationality upon the flux of 
physical forms Pythagoras provides the basis for an optimistic view of 
the survival of 'character" which might usefully inform our reading of 
Spenserian metamorphoses, even when these involve shifts from 
exemplary to analogical allegory. Certainly, Spenser's few explicit 
cosmological statements in The Faerie Queene are such as to encourage 
the Pythagorean view of the soul's constancy. 2 
This, however, is only one side of the Ovidian equation. The 
Xetamoorphases, for all the triumphalism of its ending, is a poem about 
change, not persistence. The sheer number of the metamorphoses 
1, Ovid, hetaiorphoses, XV 188-92, 
2, See FQ III, vi, 37-38, FQ VII. vii, 58, 
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related tends to leave us punchdrunk, undermining our sense of such 
transformations as rare and miraculous events, disorientating our idea 
of normality. The narrative structure of the poem reflects this, its 
serendipitous wanderings denying our expectation of set beginnings and 
conclusions. More, the Metamorphoses works within no consistent 
ethical framework. While some of those who undergo metamorphosis do 
so as a punishment, reward or mercy, others are transformed because of 
a chance action - Actaeon' and Dryope2 are examples. The arbitrary 
effect on humanity of the Olympians' traditionally capricious loyal- 
ties and hatreds is emphasised in Ovid: his universe is an unpredict- 
able place in which no certain rules for action can be inferred. 
Against the continuity and propriety we found in Lycaon's transform- 
ation may be set a large number of metamorphoses where no such decorum 
is apparent: there is nothing particularly bovine about Io, 3 for 
instance, nor arboreal about Baucis and Philemon; " Medusa's victims 
turn to stone not because the sight of her face triggers a latent 
tendency to stoniness, or literalises any characteristic of their own, 
but because of the properties of the face itself, which exert an 
influence external to the identity of its beholders. 
Given that questions of identity and self are, as we have said, 
inevitably involved in metamorphosis, this lack of continuity becomes 
profoundly disturbing. Whereas with 'appropriate' metamorphoses one 
could at least perceive that the essence of the person was continued, 
1, Ovid, op, cit,, III 205-208, 
2, ibid,, IX 405-22, 
3, ibid., I 754-55, 
4, ibid  VIII 894-904. 
-177- 
and was therefore presumably independent of bodily form, now all such 
comforting certainties are removed. In place of Ovid's Pythagoras, 
with his assurance of the soul's immortality, we may place the views 
of another, less sanguine Pythagorean, Simmias from Plato's Pbaedo 
(86. b-d), who sees the soul as an attunement of material substances 
which is destroyed at their dissolution. To insist on so intimate a 
link between minds used to thinking of themselves as rational and 
immortal and bodies which are subject to change and decay is to 
provide a powerful vision of the human condition -a fact which Ovid 
exploits to the full. 
Time and again in Ovid's poem, the account of a metamorphosis 
focuses upon a halfway moment, a limbo where change is taking place, 
but its victim still retains enough human consciousness to register 
horror at it: 
No sooner Scylla came 
Vithin this plash, and too the waast had waded in the same, 
But that shee sawe her hinderloynes with barking buggs atteint. 
And at the first, not thinking with her body they were meynt 
As parts therof, she started back, and rated them. And sore 
Shee was afrayd the eager curres should byght. But the more 
Shee shonned them, the surer still shee was to have them there. 
In seeking where her loynes, and thyghes, and feete and ancles were, 
Chappes like the chappes of Cerberus in stead of them shee found. ' 
My luster did not know so much, who when shee backward came 
Afrayd at that that shee had seene, and having sadly prayd 
The Nymphes of pardon, too have gone her way agen assayd: 
Her feete were fastned downe with rootes. Shee stryved all she 
myght 
Too plucke them up, but they so sure within the earth were pyght, 
That nothing save hir upper partes shee could that present move. 
A tender barke growes from beneath up leysurly above, 
And softly overspreddes her loynes: which when shee saw, shee went 
About to teare her heare, and full of leaves her hand shee bent. 
Her head was overgrowen with leaves. And little Ampbise (so 
1, ibid  XIV 66-74. 
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Had Eurytus his Graundsyre naand hir sonne not long ago) 
Did feele his mothers dugges wex hard. And as he still them drew 
In sucking, not a whit of milke nor moysture did ensew. ' 
For by and by he bound 
The Thracian women by the feete with writhen roote in ground, 
... eche of theis, when in the ground they fastned were, assayd Aflayghted for to fly away. But every one was stayd 
With winding roote which hilld her downe: her frisking could not 
boote. 
And whyle she lookte what was become of To, of nayle, and foote, 
Shee sawe her leggs growe round in one, and turning intoo woode. 
And as her thyghes with violent hand shee sadly striking stoode, 
Shee felt them tree: her brest was tree: her shoulders eeke were 
tree. 
Her armes long boughes yee myght have thought, and not deceyved 
bee. 2 
It is this moment of Ovidian horror which lives with the reader. 
It is in this discovery that one's nature may be dissolved and recon- 
stituted differently that the question, 'that am I? ' becomes unavoid- 
able, and the assumption of some indestructible essence suddenly less 
plausible. Yet Ovid's account, of those who suffer arborification for 
instance, is not altogether clear. Does he consider them to retain 
human consciousness, to be 'trapped' inside the tree whose form they 
have taken, or have they simply become trees? 
Of Myrrha, whose metamorphosis is granted at her own request. we 
hear that, 
Shee made no taryence nor delay, but met the comming tree, 
And shroonk her face within the barke thereof. Although that shee 
Toogither with her former shape her senses all did loose, 
Yit weepeth shee, and from her tree warme droppes doo softly woose: 
The which her teares are had in pryce and honour. 3 
1, ibid., IX 420-32, 
2, ibid., XI 77-93. 
3, ibid,, X 571-75. 
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Myrrha loses her senses rather as Malbecco forgets 'he was a man' 
(FQ III. x. 60.9), but she still weeps as if those senses were not lost. 
Is this truly contradictory, or are the drops of myrrh to be taken 
merely as a decorative coincidence, siezed on by the poet? When 
Myrrha's child is ready to be barn, the tree apparently grows into the 
shape of a woman in labour: again this might not imply any con- 
sciousness on its part, but it also utters moans, indeed Ovid refers 
to its 'greef' (dolores). ' Throughout, Ovid's language is ambiguous; 
but the suggestion that something recognisable as Myrrha is still part 
of the tree gives the description much of its power, as the reader 
tries to exercise his imagination on this seemingly impossible 
subject. Unused as we are to dealing with such miracles as physical 
metamorphosis, its accompanying psychological ramifications remain a 
subject for speculation - we are unsure how to respond to the woman- 
tree, and Ovid is not about to relieve our uncertainty. 
In Spenser too we find a metamorphosed tree - the hapless Fradubio 
(FQ I. ii) - though his direct ancestry leads rather to Ariosto's 
Astolfa and, more particularly, Virgil's Polydorus, on the account of 
whose discovery Spenser's passage is largely based. 2 Fradubio's 
disturbance by Redcross is certainly horrific: 
He pluckt a bough; out of whose rift there came 
Small drops of gory bloud, that trickled downe the same. 
I. ii. 30.8-9 
ibid., X 581, 
2, Ariosto, Orlando furioso 6 26-51, Virgil, Enid 3 22-48, See also Dante, Inferno 
13, 
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Redcross' reaction to this grisly sight resembles that of Aeneas, 
but with the added (and prophetic) implication that the tree's fate 
has become his own: 
Astond he stood, and vp his Kaire did houe, 
And with that suddein horror could no member moue. 
I. ii. 31.8-9 
Here we have horror aplenty, but the horror is Redcross', not 
Fradubio's, and seems to derive not so much from the consciousness of 
metamorphosis per se as from the ominous reversal of the natural order 
implied by a branch which bleeds human blood. Redcross' is the horror 
of the numinous - his immediate interpretation of what he sees is a 
supernatural one: 
What voyce of damned Ghost from Limbo lake, 
Or guilefull spright wandring in empty aire, 
Both which fraile men do oftentimes mistake, 
Sends to my doubtfull eares these speaches rare... 
I. 11.32.5-8 
In fact Fradubio's case is deceptive in its similarity to the 
Ovidian tree metamorphoses. His own account of his enchantment has 
none of the ambiguity to be found in the passage on Myrrha. There is 
no doubt that Fradubio retains full consciousness - unlike his Ovidian 
counterparts he even has unimpaired use of his voice. Just as 
Acrasia's enchanted lovers, though monstrous in form, were 'men 
indeed', so Fradubio and his mistress are simply 'enclosd in wooden 
wals full faste' (FQ I. ii. 42.8), imprisoned but psychologically in- 
tact. 
The only Spenserian creations who exist equally and paradoxically 
as both conscious beings and unconscious objects are his animistic 
local deities. The identity of Spenser's nymphs and river gods is 
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habitually confused with that of the pools and springs in their guard- 
ianship. This is not, however, a cause for horror but part of their 
traditional nature, the duality of which has been exploited poetically 
since Homeric times. ' Spenser confines his treatment to a series of 
ingenious puns. The first extended instance of this occurs in Colin 
Clovts Come Home Againe, in the 'mery lay' (CC 157) of Bregog and 
Mulla, two streams-cum-nature-gods who consummate their secret love by 
running their courses together underground. The story of Mulla's 
sister Mollana (told in the first of the Mutabilitie Cantos) relates 
how, after helping Faunus, she is eventually received into the 'bed' 
(FQ VII. vi. 53.6) of her lover Fanchin, despite being 'whelm'd with 
stones' (FQ VII. vi. 53.4) by Diana's nymphs -a punishment which sounds 
disproportionately harsh until seen in its alternative light, as an 
explanation of why the river is so 'shole' (FQ VII. vi. 40.7). The 
marriage of Thames and Medway (itself a geographical pun) affords 
opportunities for many similar plays on words. Thames is the 'son' of 
Thame and Isis, and is surrounded by minor rivers who pay 'tribute' to 
him as to their Lord' (FQ IV. xi. 29.4). Stoure has six 'heads' (FQ 
IV. xi. 32.2); Thame is bowed through the weight of Oxford on his back; 
and Isis must be 'sustained' (FQ IV. xi. 25.1) by her two supporters, 
Churne and Charwell. These points are witty, but their wit seems 
self-sufficient, its own justification. There is none of the un- 
settling horror of Myrrha's dubious state. 
1, See, for instance, the conflict between Achilles and the River Scamander 
described in the Iliad, Book XXI, Thoughout, the ambiguity as to Scamander's 
status is maintained, and Achilles is unable to fight the god, who appears to 
possess the attributes of both river and human, 
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2. The Empathetic Response 
We have seen that Ovid deals with two very different sorts of 
physical metamorphosis. In the first, there is an implication that 
the essential part of a being is continued, whatever physical form 
that being may assume. This 'decorous' type of transformation is 
sometimes used in The Faerie Queene as a device to mark the transition 
from exemplary to analogical allegory. In the second sort of meta- 
morphosis there is no such propriety: instead, Ovid stresses the dis- 
turbing implications of metamorphosis for any concept of stable 
personal identity. Such a concern is rather less evident in Spenser- 
ian physical metamorphoses; however, analogous considerations do arise 
over our empathetic response to characters in allegory, who are prone 
to metaphorical transformations every bit as startling as the physical 
ones described in the Metamorphoses. 
We can approach this subject via a restatement of our original 
problem. To what extent can we view a figure in The 
Faerie Queene as 
we might a character in a less obviously artificial mode of writing, 
or indeed a real person? Are they not, insofar as they are 
there 'to 
make a point', merely counters which can 
be pushed around at the 
writer's whim? Does not any attempt to speak of 
them as realistic 
characters show a wilful disregard of generic convention? 
Certainly, 
if we interpreted the events related in The Faerie 
Queene without 
reference to their allegorical application, and used 
them as the basis 
for a series of psychological portraits of 
the poem's main figures, 
the result would be a very curious set of case studies. 
Yet the 
opposite position, in which 
the existence of character is flatly 
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denied, seems to me equally unsatisfactory, since it conflicts almost 
absurdly with the common experience of the poem's readers. 
Rosemary Freeman, comparing The Faerie Queene and The Pilgrim's 
Progress, distinguishes between personifications such as Shamefast- 
nesse in the Castle of Alma (FQ II. ix. 40-43) and Bunyan's pilgrims by 
declaring that whereas the pilgrims are human characters who exemplify 
the quality with which they are associated, Shamefastnesse is merely 
an abstraction, indistinguishable from the idea she represents. She 
concludes: 
Such is the nature of the majority of the characters in The 
Faerie Queene, and as such they must weaken the persuasiveness 
of the allegory for all but the most philosophically-minded 
readers. Bunyan's method, by which an abstract quality is 
always seen as part of human nature and never merely as an 
idea, is without question the more successful. ' 
Now, it is clear that even within The Faerie Queene there are 
different degrees of sophistication in the presentation of 'char- 
acter', and it is certainly not true that the majority of the figures 
in the poem are presented in quite so self-consciously allegorical a 
manner as Shamefastnesse. Nevertheless, Freeman's distinction between 
those figures who simply emphasise a particular quality in the context 
of a nature which is recognisably human and those who are 'merely' 
ideas is at first sight appealing, and might encourage us to attempt a 
division of the figures in The Faerie Queene along similar lines. 
Indeed, it would be relatively easy to draw up the rules for such a 
separation. 
Rosemary Freeman, English fables gooks (London: Chatto and Windus, 1948), p, 111, 
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The first group would comprise those figures, corresponding to 
Bunyan's pilgrims, who are seen as undergoing adventure. To give a 
passive characterisation, they are the figures to whom things happen, 
for whom monsters and enchanters lie in wait; more actively, they also 
tend to be the figures with quests to fulfil, either chivalric or 
amorous. In many cases their part in the poem is extended over 
several episodes, the most notable examples being the patron knights 
themselves. Often they come complete with a personal history, 
provided either by themselves (the Squire of Dames at FQ III. vii". 
53-60; s¬mylia at FQ IV. vii. 15-18; Meliboe at FQ VI. ix. 24-5) or 
courtesy of the narrator (Satyrane at FQ I. vi. 21-30). They are 
usually knights, squires or ladies. The second group consists of the 
monsters, enchanters, paynims, and pyschological and moral person- 
ifications who seem to form part of the Faerie landscape, who are not 
so much participants in adventure themselves, but adventures waiting 
to happen. With these figures allegorical meaning is much more 
obviously pervasive and inescapable, and the discussion of character 
consequently more problematical. 
Having drawn this rough distinction, let us consider each of the 
groups in more detail. In the first category the question of char- 
acter does not always appear in an unignorably acute form. Rather 
than accept or deny character as a point of principle, we tend in the 
process of reading about relatively complex figures, like Redcross and 
Britomart, to develop a modus vivendi between the two approaches. The 
habitual continuity and internal logic of these figures' actions 
creates an impression of character - Britomart's love for Artegall, 
for instance, is a constant feature of her representation, and as such 
is one of the distinguishing traits by which we define her. But this 
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impression of character is always provisional, and any break in the 
logic of a figure's actions can act as a signal for its suspension. 
This phenomenon might be compared with the experience of a person 
focusing his gaze first on a distant object and then on a nearby one. 
The two resulting images do not appear chaotic or contradictory 
because the differing focal length is unconsciously compensated for, 
and the conscious mind is presented with a unified model of the sur- 
roundings. Similarly, quite complex figures can, at particular times 
and for local purposes, ossify into allegorical abstractions without 
rendering nonsensical the reader's idea of their 'characters': that 
idea simply ceases to be the immediate point at issue, while the focus 
of conscious attention is turned on the passage's allegorical import. 
Of course, the above paragraph represents an oversimplification. 
The decision as to whether a particular action constitutes a break in 
the internal logic of a figure's character or merely a development of 
it is bound to be attended by some uncertainty, and from this flows 
the ambiguity inherent in all allegory, which is to a large extent the 
subject of this thesis. In the terms of our visual metaphor, allegory 
is a kind of optical illusion in which the depth of objects is 
ultimately impossible to determine. For this reason, the 'suspension' 
of our idea of a figure's character can never be total: as I shall 
argue below, the literal sense of the text is not to be so lightly 
ignored. For now, though, the point which needs to be established is 
that, at least in the case of the patron knights and several other 
figures in The Faerie Queene, a putative conception of character does 
exist in the reader's mind, however much it may be altered by other 
considerations in the act of reading. 
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The status of the second category appears at first to be rather 
different. Figures like Shamefastness, Digestion, or the Dragon of 4 
Book I, whose names, appearance and actions all identify them in- 
separably with their allegorical roles, and who only appear in 
situations where those roles have direct relevance, do not seem able 
to claim the partial independence of allegorical associations which 
characterises the figures of the first group. 
I would claim, however, that the apparent distinction between these 
groups is in fact illusory. It seems to me axiomatic that by the very 
act of giving an allegorical figure (or for that matter a statue, a 
picture, or any other product of representational art) human - or 
elfin - form, features, expression and attitude the text is inviting 
an empathetic response from the reader, an impulse to 'think how they 
may ache in icy hoods and mails'. As Harry Berger pointed out long 
ago, 'Though Image A is introduced into the fable to illustrate Idea 
B, the image has its own concrete character. " The concrete character 
of the image is the basis of a nascent narrative character. The text 
itself is only one side of the imaginative collaboration between poem 
and reader. Human nature abhors a vacuum, and will allow as much 
meaning into a given situation as it will bear, in spite of critical 
fiat: 'the word means what we can make it mean'. 
This is true even of such radically allegorical figures as 
Concoction and Digestion, whom Guyon meets on his visit to the kitchen 
of Alma's castle, and to whom only five lines are devoted: 
1. Harry Berger Jr, The A1legorical Temper, Vision and Reality in Book 11 of 
Spenser's 'faerie Pueene' (New Haven and London: Yale U, P, and O, U, P, 1957), 
p, 122, 
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The maister Cooke was cald Concoction, 
A carefull man, and full of comely guise: 
The kitchin Clerke, that hight Digestion, 
Did order all th'Achates in seemly wise, 
And set them forth, as well he could deuise. 
II. ix. 31.1-5 
In terms of the physical allegory of Alma's castle, Concoction and 
Digestion seem to represent the digestive processes, breaking down 
food and distributing its constituents to the various parts of the 
body. This function of decomposition is presented as analogous to the 
preparation of food in a kitchen, a choice which seems paradoxical in 
that such preparation would normally involve bringing constituent 
ingredients together. The apparent contradiction is obscured by the 
ambiguity of the phrase 'set them forth', which may be taken to refer 
either to the distribution of the food or to its decorous presentation 
for serving. Yet this verbal obfuscation does not prevent a certain 
confusion as we try to visualise the process being described. The 
image of Concoction and Digestion carefully preparing dishes and the 
consciousness of their biological function in breaking food down 
cannot be held in the mind simultaneously: to which meaning should we 
give priority? In the course of our imaginative labours it seems 
inevitable that we will attempt to see the scene from the point of 
view of its main actors. That do Concoction and Digestion think they 
are doing? Do they realise the significance of their names? 
As articulated here this sort of personal response seems at best 
inappropriate, at worst hopelessly naive, even childish. But in the 
reading of a text such responses are not invalidated by articulation, 
because they are not articulated at all as part of a conscious 
interpretation. Interpretation will point out the paradox involved in 
the passage's conception, explain it by reference to allegorical 
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theory, and, perhaps, notice the way in which the alternative readings 
are reconciled by an ambiguous phrase. Interpretation can order and 
evaluate our response, but it has no power to act as a critical Canute 
to forestall a particular response: it cannot pre-empt. Indeed, the 
attempt to 'fix' the amount of naturalism with which it is proper to 
respond to any particular figure is one of the great wild goose chases 
of Spenserian criticism. The tendency to empathetic response lies in 
the reader, not in the text itself, and cannot be eliminated (though 
it may be frustrated) by anything in the text. 
On the contrary, the text often seems actively to encourage such 
responses, for instance by presenting an episode (at least partially) 
from the point of view of a 'strictly' allegorical figure. This 
occurs several times in the account of Redcross' battle with the 
Dragon at FQ I. xi. On all these occasions the Dragon is startled and 
rather fearful at Redcross' tenacity: 
No wonder if he wondred at the sight, 
And doubted, whether his late enemy 
It were, or other new supplied knight. 
Then fraught with rancour, and engorged ire, 
He cast at once him to auenge for all... 
Then freshly vp arose the doughtie knight, 
All healed of his hurts and woundes wide, 
And did himselfe to battell readie dight; 
Whose early foe awaiting him beside 
To haue deuoured, so soone as day he spyde, 
When now he saw himselfe so freshly reare, 
As if late fight had nought him damnifyde, 
He woxe dismayd, and gan his fate to fear... 
I. xi. 35.2-4 
I. xi. 40.5-6 
I. xi. 52.1-8 
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This reaction of the Dragon has no easily perceived allegorical 
significance -- it serves only to establish in the reader's mind an 
awareness of the Dragon's own viewpoint. Rather than being simply the 
unthinking personification of Unholiness, the monster is revealed as 
sufficiently self-conscious to speculate about the identity of his 
enemy, and to fear for his own fate. If this does not win him 
sympathy, it certainly encourages an empathetic response from the 
reader. 
This is only one of several ways in which such a response may be 
elicited. Consider the figure of Shamefastnesse, whom Freeman sees 
'merely as an idea'. The passage in which she appears is certainly 
one in which Spenser's fascination with the ontological anomalies 
implied by allegory becomes explicit, as we noted earlier when con- 
sidering Alma's explanation to Guyon: 
Why wonder yee 
Faire Sir at that, which ye so much embrace? 
She is the fountaine of your modestee; 
You shamefast are, but Shamefastnesse it seife is shee. 
II. ix. 43.6-9 
The direct juxtaposition of the exemplary and analogical represent- 
atives of shamefastness forces on our consciousness the fact of their 
mutual existence in the same narrative, and our confusion leads us 
into a logically fruitless but imaginatively compelling consideration 
of how such a meeting can be possible. So far from being the unre- 
marked norm in The Faerie Queene, it is the disoncerting unnaturalness 
of this meeting which is stressed: not only the reader, but Guyon too, 
wonders at the maiden's 'vncouth cace' (FQ II. ix. 43.5). Shamefastness 
must here react rather than merely be. What causes her to blush? 
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Could she ever be brought to do anything else? These questions, 
though naive in one sense, are in another demanded by the narrative 
context. 
Again, we might consider the figure of Despair at FQ I. ix. 
Although the general structure of Book I leads us to consider 
Despair's role primarily in relation to the moral history of Redcross, 
his presentation is such as to draw the reader into speculation about 
his own psychological state. When he is first directly described it 
is not in the act of leading Redcross or any other knight into 
despair, but in a solitary moment of bleak and melancholy intro- 
spection: 
That darksome caue they enter, where they find 
That cursed man, low sitting on the ground, 
Musing full sadly in his sullein mind; 
His griesie leckes, long growen, and vnbound, 
Disordred hong about his shoulders round, 
And hid his face; through which his hollow eyne 
Lookt deadly dull, and stared as astound... 
I. ix. 35.1-7 
This suggestive picture, combined with Despair's subsequent 
attempts to kill himself (FQ I. ix. 54), seems to encourage speculation 
as to his motivation. For all his gloom here, in persuading Redcross 
to suicide he shows every sign of job satisfaction, displaying an 
almost comic shopkeeper's pride in the range of implements available 
with which to do the deed: 
Then gan the villein him to ouercraw, 
And brought vnto him swords, ropes, poison, fire, 
And all that might him to perdition draw; 
And bad him choose, what death he would desire... 
I. ix. 50.5-8 
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It is the same problem we raised in the last chapter in connection 
with Care. ' Is Despair merely a deceiver, or does he actually believe 
his own arguments, as the glimpses of his 'off-stage' existence 
suggest? One might translate this question into the formula: 'Does 
exemplary or analogical allegory have priority in Despair's 
presentation? ' But as I argued earlier, this interpretation of the 
allegorical situation cannot replace the empathetic response, however 
well-versed the reader may be in the theoretical niceties of allegory. 
Despair's narrative presentation, his potential as a character, 
remains a fact to which we respond before such theoretical criteria 
can be applied. 
When Ovid described the metamorphosis of Myrrha he maintained a 
double-view of her existence as a tree, at some points implying that 
consciousness had ceased, and at others, perhaps playing on the inter- 
pretative inertia of readers used to thinking of her as a conscious 
being, implying the continuation of her psychic presence. It is this 
persistent manipulation of the empathetic response, applied to 
allegorical figures, which in my opinion provides the strongest link 
between the imaginative sensibility behind The Feerie Queene and 
Ovid's masterpiece. Where the reader of the Xetamorphoses must exer- 
cise his imagination on the experience of being a tree, a cow or a- 
stone, the receptive Spenserian will. find himself prompted into the 
equally anomalous position-of looking at a situation from the point of 
view of an abstract moral quality. Theoretetical questions of char- 
See pp, 147-48 above. 
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acter are inevitably raised by these passages, but before such 
questions can be considered the anomalies which give rise to them must 
first be felt by the reader in all their disorientating strangeness. 
We noted previously that one of the recurring centres of interest 
in the Metamorphoses is the particular halfway moment when 
metamorphosis is actually taking place, when the inescapability of 
change and bodily dissolution is most horrifically apparent, and the 
question of self-identity unavoidable. Is it possible to find an 
equivalent moment in The Faerle Queene - not in the field of physical 
metamorphosis, but at the border between exemplary and analogical 
allegory? Is there an analogous psychological limbo state, the horror 
of which can be exploited by the allegorist? In the rest of this 
chapter I want to explore passages which present just such a situa- 
tion. 
When Guyon is conducted through Mammon's domain, one of the figures 
he meets is Tantalus (FQ II. vii. 57-80), who is depicted in his 
traditional position, up to his chin in water which he cannot drink, 
just below a bunch of fruit which continually flies out of his grasp. 
The description forms a tableau or emblem, in which Tantalus plays out 
the same small part in perpetuity, always hoping that this time he 
will be able to quench his hunger and thirst: 
Deepe was he drenched to the vpmost chin, 
Yet gaped still, as coueting to drinke 
Of the cold liquor, which he waded in, 
And stretching forth his hand, did often thinke 
To reach the fruit, which grew vpon the brincke... 
II. vi1.58.1-5" 
'Did often thinke/ To reach the fruit': it is not desire alone that 
remains alive in Tantalus: so does hope, and consequently disappoint- 
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ment. The repetition of Tantalus' actions suggests the time-bound 
nature of his predicament. The description is not of a single moment 
of frustration, but of an eternity. In this we may contrast his 
position with that of another figure forever unable to compass his 
desire: 
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss, 
Though winning near the goal- yet, do not grieve; 
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss, 
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair! ' 
Keats' tone is whimsical - the lover is granted his putative 
consciousness for no longer than the poet is prepared to sustain his 
conceit. But whereas the lover is frozen forever at a precise 
instant, Tantalus is presented as active and aware of his fate. though 
apparently unable to learn by the infinitely repeated experience of 
failure. He is sufficiently conscious of his environment to notice 
Guyon and importune him for food: 
... if that thou be such, as I thee see, 
Of grace I pray thee, glue to eat and drinke to mee. 
II. vii. 59.8-9 
By making this appeal for pity Tantalus stakes his claim to be 
treated as a being like Guyon, a wretch in need of mercy; but as Guyon 
recognises, the nature of his eternal doom is such that he may only be 
treated as an allegorical sign. Hence, instead of helping Tantalus, 
Guyon merely interprets him: 
Abide the fortune of thy present fate, 
And veto all that laue in high degree, 
i. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, 11,17-20, in The Complete Foers, p, 345, 
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Ensample be of mind intemperate, 
To teach them how to vse their present state. 
I I. vii. 60.2-5 
Tantalus is imprisoned by the contradiction inherent in his status, 
both conscious being and 'ensample' to be interpreted. While the 
reader is presented with an unchanging tableau, part of the scene's 
potency lies in the imaginative invitation to extend its duration over 
an indefinite period of time. It cannot be wholly abstracted from the 
temporal sphere and made into a simple moral lesson - 'Do not be 
intemperate' - because the punishment which gives that lesson its 
force has precisely to do with the conscious passing of time in pain. 
Hence, rather after the manner of Despair and Nalbecco, Tantalus is in 
his combination of the naturalistic and the abstract both mortal and 
immortal: 'He daily dyde, yet neuer throughly dyen couth' (FQ II. vii. 
58.9). 
In the face of this paradoxical state of existence our powers of 
empathy are confused in a manner thoroughly Ovidian. Our efforts to 
comprehend Tantalus' situation, to place it in the context of our own 
experience and so defuse its horror, are frustrated. As with Keats' 
Beadsman, our 'weak spirit fails'. 
The case of Mirabella in Book VI is in some ways similar, though 
its greater allegorical complexity tends to impede straightforward 
analysis. 
Glimpsed briefly at FQ VI. vi. 16.6-9, Mirabella is first described 
at length a Canto later, when Spenser prefaces Timias' attempt at 
rescue with an account of her history. Mirabella, we are told, is 
beautiful but low-born. In her pride she scorns the attentions of her 
worthy suitors, caring nothing that she sends many of them to their 
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deaths. This callousness attracts Cupid's attention, and he orders 
that the person responsible for the demise of so many of his followers 
should be arrested. Duly attached, Mirabella is at first defiant, but 
on hearing the sentence passed 'as is by law ordayned/ In cases like' 
(FQ VI. vii. 36.5-6) she pleads for mercy, and Cupid relents so far as 
to abate her punishment. She is doomed to wander the earth, under the 
continual chiding of Scorn and Disdain, 'Til she had sau'd so many 
loues, as she did lose' (FQ VI. vii. 37.9). 
In the next Canto this story is retold by Mirabella herself, as she 
explains her situation to Arthur (FQ VI. viii. 19-25). Her account is 
largely compatible with the previous one, with the major exception 
that there is no mention of saving lovers. Mirabella describes an 
alternative penance: 
Here in this bottle (sayd the sory Mayd), 
I put the teares of my contrition, 
Till to the brim I haue it full defrayd: 
And in this bag which I behinde me don, 
I put repentaunce for things past and gon. 
Yet is the bottle lecke, and bag so torne, 
That all which I put in, fals out anon; 
And is behinde me trodden downe of Scorne, 
Who mocketh all my paine, and laughs the more I mourn. 
VI. viii. 24 
Mirabella's experience divides into three phases. In her early 
life of pride and disdain she is described in exemplary terms as a 
conceited young girl. By FQ VI. vii, however, she forms part of an 
allegorical tableau, chivvied by psychological abstractions, and 
carrying (what is rather hard to visualise literally) a bag for 
putting repentance in. The pivotal passage in effecting this tran- 
sition from exemplary to analogical environments is the account of the 
trial at the court of Cupid (FQ VI. vii. 32-37). The difficulty of this 
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passage stems ultimately from the dual nature of Cupid himself. Cupid 
may be read figuratively, as a poetic name for love; but he is also a 
god, and in a mythopoeic universe like Spenser's gods can be as 
objectively real as knights, monsters and proud young ladies. 
Inevitably in such a case, ambiguities arise. 
If we emphasise the figurative definition of Cupid, we shall pro- 
bably agree with Hamilton's note: 'In submitting to Cupid, Mirabella 
falls in love'. ' To understand the account of Cupid's court in this 
way is already to move away from an exemplary reading. We are trying 
to find out what the court 'represents', to interpret it as an 
elaborate metaphor. Love here certainly has a claim to be the 
'iudgement... as is by law ordayned/ In cases like'. Scorners of love 
from Chaucer's Troilus to Sidney's Musidorus (to -say nothing of 
Spenser's own Prince Arthur) have traditionally been punished with an 
infatuation of their own. 2 On this reading Scorn and Disdain would 
seem to be the scorn and disdain of Mirabella's new love, her own 
weapons justly turned upon her. 
The alternative is to let the literal truth of the account stand. 
If we think of Mirabella's arraignment as an objective experience, 
then the charge is one not of scorn but the murder of her lovers: 
... foule Infamie, and fell Despight 
Gaue euidence, that they were all betrayd, 
And murdred cruelly by a rebellious Hayd. 
VI. vii. 34.7-9 
i, Edmund Spenser, The (aerie Queene, ed, A, C, Hamilton (London and New York: 
Longman, 1977), Vl, vii, 36,6-9n, 
2. See Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, 1183-273; Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of 
Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed, Jean Robertson (Oxford; Clarendon 
Press, 1973), p, 38; fQ I, ix, 10-15, 
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For murder, of course, the 'iudgement... by law ordayned/ In cases 
like' is rather more severe, and the effect of Mirabella's pleas is 
that her punishment is commuted to a period of community service, 
saving lovers where she had previously destroyed them. In this inter- 
pretation the figures of Scorn and Disdain mocking Mirabella suggest 
the bitter memory of her past misdeeds, driving her on to make amends. 
In the end it is neither possible nor necessary to decide between 
these readings. Together they describe a prison of obsession and 
guilt which maintains and defines Mirabella's captive state. Sig- 
nificantly,. the means by which she might escape her plight are pushed 
to the margin of the narrative, unfocused and apparently unrealisable. 
I have already mentioned the difficulty of visualising Mirabella 
filling her bag with repentance, but a similar objection might be made 
to her task of 'saving' lovers. What exactly are we to imagine 
Mirabella doing to save these lovers? Can she give her heart to all 
of them? In fact the formula, 'sau'd so many loues, as she did lose', 
disguises its lack of meaning in its own symmetry: the idea of making 
up for past misdeeds by doing an equal number of opposite good deeds 
seems so obviously just that we tend not to pursue its precise 
reference further. 
This absence of imaginative realisation in her tasks suggests their 
futility - while Mirabella has 'saved' two lovers, there are still 
'two and twenty more' outstanding. As the poet declares in apparent 
despair: 'Aie me, how could her laue make half amends therefore? ' (FQ 
VI. vi1.38.9). ' The torn bag and the leaking bottle can never be 
1. Twenty-two is of course a finite number, but its formulaic use here seems to be 
in the spirit of Matthew 18,22: 'I say not unto thee, Until seven tines: but, 
Until seventy times seven, ' That is, forever, 
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filled, and whatever she puts in is trodden down by Scorn. In both 
instances we are led away from the conception of Mirabella as a real- 
istically drawn young woman with a definable and limited quest -a 
sort of female Squire of Dames - towards the idea that she is merely 
the representative of a psychological state, essentially unchanging 
and abstracted from the realm of action. Arthur cannot in the end 
rescue Mirabella - the nature of her condition is such that she is 
insulated from his intervention. In pleading foi Disdain (FQ VI. viii. 
17.8-9) she admits the extent-, to which she is to be identified with 
(and by) her allegorical companions. 
Mirabella's constant search for lovers to save, her constant 
refilling of the bottle and the bag, has something of the perpetually 
disappointed efforts of Tantalus, whose anomalous position she shares. 
To the extent that she retains memory and self-awareness she remains a 
realistically portrayed lady whom knights may try to rescue, just, as 
Tantalus could appeal to Guyon for help; but her static situation, the 
hopelessness of which declares itself in her vain attempts to fulfil 
the conditions of her release, makes her effectively an emblematic 
figure. 
In all these examples of figures caught in allegorical or 
metamorphic limbo, it is possible to identify two apparently contra- 
dictory aspects of their environment, which form as it were the two 
poles between whose dual attraction they are suspended. With Myrrha 
it is the juxtaposition of consciousness and insentience, implied by 
her human and arboreal form; with Tantalus it is the placing of a mind 
which works in temporal terms - where consciousness of hunger expects 
its satisfaction - in the context of changeless eternity; for 
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Nirabella too the ability to communicate with the outside world, to 
tell her story, to remember and repent her past, is combined with an 
inability to move from a rigid, two-dimensional prison. In each case 
the contradictions inherent in the victims' position make imaginative 
participation in the relevant passages a profoundly unsettling 
experience for the reader, but the immanence of the supernatural in 
Faerie renders it narratively plausible. 
Finally, I want to look in some detail at a major episode in The 
Faerie Queene in which a figure is again trapped in a situation whose 
ambiguity arises from the competing claims of two coexistent yet 
apparently incompatible views of her environment: the captivity of 
Amoret in the house of Busyrane at FQ III. xi-xii. The difference 
between this and the previous cases we have examined lies in the 
elaborate artificiality of Busyrane's house, which is raised entirely 
through his use of 'idle shewes' and 'false charmes' (FQ III. xii. 
29.9). With Busyrane we are able say; as we could not with the super- 
naturally sanctioned metamorphoses of our other. examples, that one 
view of Amoret's state is 'false' and must be rejected. Indeed, its 
rejection - and the consequent resolution of the situation's ambiguity 
- is the means of her eventual release. 
The active participant in this process is not Amoret but her 
rescuer, Britomart. It is Britomart's ability to perceive the Nask of 
Cupid - and the house in general - in a way that is not Busyrane's way 
which provides her with immunity against his insidious spells: but to 
anyone reading the passage both ways must be apparent, or the crucial 
awareness of the choice will be lost. What is needed is an approach 
which takes its ambiguity out of the realm of analytic hypotheses and 
presents it to the reader directly and poetically. 
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Isabel McCaffrey, in her book on Spenser's allegory, has a passage 
on Busyrane's tapestries that places the question of perspective in 
just such a context. ' In mimetic theories, good art is that which by 
its skill blurs the distinction between itself and the reality it sets 
out to represent. The artistry of the tapestries is repeatedly 
praised on these grounds - three times the pictures are called 
'liuely' (FQ III. xi. 30.8,37.6,39.9), indicating that the border 
between art and life is close to being obliterated. For someone in 
Britomart's position, then, there is an element of uncertainty as to 
the exact status of the tapestries, arising from their likeness to 
their subjects. MacCaffrey shows that Spenser creates a similar doubt 
for the reader by failing to distinguish between straightforward 
description of the tapestries and authorial digression. Ve are 
viewing the tapestries through the medium of another work of art (the 
poem), and it is impossible to say exactly where one ends and the 
other begins. Hence the doubt which an observer of the tapestries 
feels as to whether they are works of art or the reality itself is 
reflected at a further remove in our doubt about the relationship of 
the poetic description to the objects described. This problem is 
analogous to our original question as to the relationship of fictional 
'characters' to their textual environment. 
The implication is that we, in reading Spenser's poem, are placed 
in a position similar to Britomart's, a fact which shapes our own 
response. Britomart's reaction to the works of art in Busyrane's 
house, as MacCaffrey points out, is never an indifferent or passive 
one, even when she is merely observing: 
1, Isabel G, MacCaffrey, Spencer's Allegory, The Anatoay of hag/nation (Princeton; 
Princeton U, P,, 1976), pp, 105-106, 
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That wondrous sight faire Britomart amazed, Ne seeing could her wonder satisfie, 
But euermore and more vpon it gazed, 
The whiles the passing brightnes her fraile sences dazed. 
III. xi. 49.8-9 
[Britomart] Did greatly wonder, ne could satisfis Her greedy eyes with gazing a long space... 
III. xi. 53.3-4 
We are made to share Britomart's fascination. Her curiosity, her 
puzzled ignorance of the significance of what she sees ('much she 
muz'd yet could not construe it/ By any ridling skill, or commune wit' 
(FQ III. xi. 54.4-5)), her impotent desire to break through to the 
secrets of the third room, all find their equivalents in our own 
response to the passage. 
Britomart's experience in Busyrane's castle (and, through her, 
ours) is a quasi-aesthetic one: what she sees can be 'read' in more 
than one way, and it is this choice that determines success or 
failure. Her quest becomes an act of faith: Just as Guyon in Mammon's 
domain undergoes the threat of physical dismemberment if ever he casts 
a 'lustful eye' (FQ II. vii. 27.2) on what he sees, so Britomart must 
reject an environment in which everything is calculated to place love 
in a cruel or debased light, and where the god of love is seen only in 
the distorting mirror of Busyrane's art. The flame in front of the 
house, the tapestries, idol and maskers are indeed 'idle sheaves' and 
'false charmes', but only if regarded as such - as a scorched 
Scudamour finds to his cost. ' Spenser's direct warning about Cupid's 
1, As a test of faith, compare the river of Death in The Pilgrim's Progress, which 
'You shall find,,, deeper or shallower, as you believe in the king of the place, ' 
John Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress, ed, J, B, Wharey, second edition rev, 
R, Sharrock (D, U, P, 1960), p. 157, 
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arrows seems to confirm that this is our proper area of concern: 'Ah, 
man beware, how thou those darts behold' (FQ III. xi. 48.5. My 
italics). 
It is worth briefly tracing the development - of Busyrane's 
enchantment up to its culmination in the Mask: for the things which 
Britomart sees in his house, various as they are in form, all serve to 
confirm a particular sort of vision, a vision that rejects altruism, 
rejects love freely given and pleasure freely enjoyed, and replaces 
these with a flaunting of power, and a cynically sadistic view of love 
which finds its ultimate expression in Amoret's plight. Part of the 
power of these Cantos lies in Spenser's ability to sustain at such 
length and without lapsing into predictability the bombardment of 
images which confirm this perspective, disorientating both the reader 
and his protagonist and effectively excluding the world outside the 
castle. For her part, Britomart's feat is also one of stamina, since 
(again like Guyon at Mammon's house) she refuses to drop her guard 
throughout her three day ordeal: 
Yet nould she doff her weary armes, for feare 
Of secret daunger, ne let sleepe oppresse 
Her heauy eyes with natures burdein deare, 
But drew her seife aside in sickernesse, 
And her welpointed weapons did about her dresse. 
III. xi. 55.5-9 
The cornerstone of Busyrane's version of love is the doctrine that 
pleasure and pain are inseparable. Here Spenser takes his cue from 
the end of the previous Canto, where Gealosie (nd Malbecco) person- 
ifies a state in which no pleasure is pure, but 'painefull pleasure 
turnes to pleasing paine' (FQ III. x. 60.4). This interdependence is 
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typical of what we are to find in Busyrane's house. Thus the Dragon 
at the base of the altar-Cupid enfolds the idol's left foot with his 
tail, despite being irremediably wounded by him (FQ III. xi. 48.6-9) - 
an emblem which suggests a dependence on the source of its pain 
similar to that we have seen in Malbecco. In its iconographic setting 
the dragon also shares-Malbecco's fretful immortality - Malbecco too 
is transfixed with 'deathes eternall dart' (FQ III. x. 59.9), though 
final death is as far from him as from Despair. Paradoxically, his 
wound is even the mechanism of his survival: he 'doth himselfe with 
sorrow new sustaine, / That death and life attonce vnto him gives' (FQ 
III. x. (5 0.2-3). 
Both Malbecco and the Dragon prefigure Amoret, whose heart is 
similarly wounded by a 'deadly dart' (FQ III. xii. 21.3) and whose 
failing steps are supported by her torturers, Despight and Cruelty, so 
that she is dependent on them for her life. She later makes this 
dependence explicit with regard to Busyrane. If he were to die, she 
tells Britomart, as Mirabella is to tell Arthur three Books later, 
'her paine/ Should be remedilesse' (FQ III. xii. 34.5-6). This is a 
condition which renders Spenser's question, 'Ah who can laue the 
worker of her smart? ' (FQ III. xi. 31.7) something more than rhetorical. 
Everything within Busyrane's domain is calculated to reinforce this 
view. The tapestries of the first room, though their ostensible 
purpose is to reduce 'all 'the gods to emblems of lust', as Harry 
Berger has said, ' nevertheless concentrate almost exclusively on rep- 
1. Harry Berger Jr, 'Busirane and the War Between the Sexes: An Interpretation of 
The (aerie Queene III xi-xii', ELR, 1 (1971), 99-121, p, 104. 
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resenting 'mournfull Tragedyes' (FQ III. xi. 45.6), a choice of genre to 
be confirmed by Ease's entrance, 'in costly garments, fit for tragicke 
Stage' (FQ III. xii. 3.9). Even the overt theme of the tapestries, 
Cupid's triumph over the gods, is a reflection of the psychological 
condition that the house implies. The uncertainties which underlie 
the jealous mind give rise to a tyrannous desire to control its 
environment. Busyrane's house, protected by magic from outside 
penetration and filled with costly artefacts, effectively bolsters and 
maintains (with a good deal of what Jonson would have called 'envious 
show')' a highly grandiose self-image, a claustrophobic alternative to 
the universe in which everything is subordinated to the cruelty of its 
creator. The tapestries form part of a massive attempt to project 
onto Nature this suffocating singleness of vision. Following the 
Ovidian example of Arachne, they portray the Olympians in a series of 
distinctly undignified poses; but just as striking is the continual 
emphasis on Cupid as the 'Victor of the Gods' (FQ III. xi. 49.2). 
Cupid, a jealous god, is Busyrane's cosmic alter-ego, and in these 
depictions he not only defeats but supplants the gods, assuming his 
own sufficiency to fill their offices. The most obvious example of 
this is his boastful usurpation of Jove's own seat: 
The winged boy did thrust into his throne, 
And, scoffing, thus vnto his mother sayd, 
Lo now the heauens obey to me alone, 
And take me for their Ioue, whiles Ioue to earth is gone. 
III. xi. 35.6-9 
1, Ben Janson, To Fenshursr, 1,1, in The Complete Poems, ed, George Parfitt 
(Harnondsworth; Penguin, 1975), p, 95, 
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But there are other instances: his victory over Mars is expressed in 
the martial language of wounds (FQ III. xi. 44); while the 'broken bowes 
and arrowes shiuered short' (FQ III. xi. 46.7) which decorate the border 
of the tapestries are presumably intended as an insult to Diana, as in 
the similar passage in The Parliament of Fowls: 
... in dispit of Dyane the chaste, Ful many a bowe ibroke heng on the wal... ' 
Cupid's gesture of power in the mask - 
With that the darts which his right hand did straine, 
Full dreadfully he shooke that all did quake, 
And clapt on hie his colourd winges twaine, 
That all his many it affraide did make. 
III. xii. 23.5-8 
parodies Neptune's earlier gesture in the tapestry: 
His three-forkt Pyke 
He stearnly shooke, and therewith fierce did stryke 
The raging billowes, that on euery syde 
They trembling stood. 
III. xi. 40.4-7 
Neptune, after all, is one of Cupid's 'many'. 
Cupid's next triumphant manifestation is in the idol of the altar, 
where the cosmic claims made for him in the tapestries are linked with 
the felt effects of love in the world. This is the object of daily 
devotion, in whose blindfold randomness infinite power is combined 
with zero responsibility. It is the executive side of Busyrane's 
vision, not only presenting a point of view but actively threatening. 
The description of the idol utilises the technique of ambiguity 
1, Geoffrey Chaucer, The Parliament of fowls 11,281-82, in The Complete Works, ed, 
F, N, Robinson, second edition (O, U, P  1966), p, 313, 
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employed with the tapestries, obscuring the distinction between the 
idol and the power it represents, to sinister effect: 
Blindfold he was, and in his cruell fist 
A mortall bow and arrowes keene did hold, 
With which he shot at randon, when him list... 
III. xi . 48.1-3 
The impression is fostered that the statue itself is doing the 
shooting, presenting Britomart with a more immediately ominous 
spectacle, and, incidentally, an extra reason for not averting her 
eyes. The idolaters referred to at FQ III. xi. 49 exist in the same 
conditional sense, more to emphasise the statue's status as an idol 
and the multitude of its worshippers than to suggest their physical 
presence. The idol implies and threatens activity, invites or demands 
worship, merely by virtue of the assumptions it embodies. 
In his article on these Cantos Berger' makes unnecessary dis- 
tinctions between lust, 'false loue', and 'cruell loue' (FQ III. xi. 
51.8,52.5). It is the unity of these features of love, the fact that 
they are part of the same phenomenon, that needs to be stressed. 
'Laue' here is not, as his use implies, simply an abstract noun 
signifying an emotional state: 'false loue' and 'cruell loue' are not 
different varieties of such states, one characteristic of the male and 
the other of the female. 'Loue' is a name, if ironic, for Cupid. To 
call him 'false' and then 'cruell' is not to refer to two things or to 
change his character but to characterise him more fully. This is not 
a quibble, for Cupid in this house is not merely a personified 
abstraction of Elizabethan psychology who can without harm be divided 
1, Berger, 'War Between the Sexes", p. 105, 
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into subspecies to suit the analyst's convenience. Part of the 
perversity of Busyrane's house is that on the contrary he is perceived 
as external, uncontrollable and threateningly real. 
The externalisation of Cupid is as necessary to Busyrane's version 
of love as the ascription to him of omnipotence and a tyrannical 
nature; indeed, it is a condition of these. Rather than see the Mask 
as a projection of Amoret's or Scudamour's psychic condition, I would 
suggest that it is just what (to the reader) it first appears to be - 
an elaboratedly constructed fiction, which Busyrane attempts to impose 
as an objective account of how love must inevitably progress. 
The Mask is, in short, a lie. Like most persuasive lies, it 
includes a good deal of truth with its falsehoods. Many of the 
attitudes represented by the Maskers can be found in any relationship 
between lovers, although in reality they would temper and complicate 
each other rather than appear in such grotesque isolation. Busyrane's 
crime lies in extrapolating as inevitable the consequences which in 
the Mask follow as a 'confused route' (FQ III. xii. 25.1) terminating in 
Death. 
Felicity Hughes has summed up this situation well: 
Thus there are internal, as well as external indications that 
the dream represented by the masque is false. But... it would 
be possible for an inexpert or perturbed witness to be misled 
into believing that it was true. The difference this would 
make is important since it would give the account of love 
conveyed by the masque the status of prophecy - that love ends 
in vile poverty and death with infamy. ' 
With Amoret, as with Mirabella, interpretative ambiguity arises 
from Cupid's dual nature as both god and poetic trope. But whereas a 
1, Felicity A, Hughes, 'Psychological Allegory in The (aerie Queene III, xi-xii', 
RES, 29 (1978), 129-46, p, 141. 
-208- 
consistent interpretation of Mirabella's experience proved ultimately 
unattainable, here we are told quite simply that the elaborate 
apparatus of Busyrane's house is nothing more than a collection of 
'idle shewes' and 'false charmes'. While it is perfectly possible to 
find a more arcane 'meaning' for Busyrane, as critics have proved, it 
does not seem necessary to go any further than Helen Gardner's 
straightforward formulation, 'the false enchanter'. ' More important 
is that the version of love represented by the Mask should be 
perceived by the reader as false, for that perception is not only the 
moral concern of the Cantos, but also the narrative means of Amoret's 
release, as Maureen Quilligan has remarked: 
Caught in a web of pernicious metaphor, neither [Amoret] nor 
Scudamour can escape from the abuse of language literalized by 
Busyrane's bloody versus, [sic] until Britomart breaks the 
"spell" and makes Busyrane those same bloody lines reverse. 
With the pun on "verse" Spenser completes the process of 
redemption and signals to his reader that the real subject of 
Britomart's adventures has been the terms in which one can 
define love. -'2 
Amoret's problem is of the quasi-aesthetic kind described earlier, 
a danger that by being found amongst the two-dimensional person- 
ifications in the Mask she may come to be 'misread' as equally 
two-dimensional. Then she will be nothing more than Suffering Love, 
the role allotted her, emptied of all other facets by a tyrannical 
Cupid. Britomart's rescue cuts her loose from this emblematic 
1, Helen Gardner 'Some Reflections on the House of Busyrane', RES, 34 (1983), 403- 
13, p, 405, 
2, Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory (Ithaca and London: Cornell U, P,, 
1979), pp, 84-85. 
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environment, just as Scudamour's kidnap is to do in Book IV. When 
Britomart forces Busyrane to undo the spells that maintain the mask we 
witness once again how the undoing of enchantment also entails the 
decomposition of an allegorical situation; but in this case the 
allegory is itself the prison that must be escaped. Amoret's torture 
is in effect ended by default, for everything that combined to impose 
Busyrane's vision is found to be 'vanisht vtterly, and cleane 
subuerst' (FQ III. xii. 42.3); a state which makes possible (at least in 
the 1590 edition) the rapturous affirmation of -love and pure pleasure 
with which the Book ends: 
... she faire Lady ouercommen quight 
Of huge affection, did in pleasure melt, 
And in sweete rauishment pourd out her spright: 
No word they spake, nor earthly thing they felt, 
But like two senceles stocks in long embracement dwelt. 
III, xii. 45.5-9 
In describing the embrace of Amoret and Scudamour Spenser alludes 
to another Ovidian metamorphosis, that of Salmacis and Hermaphroditus, 
and again there are suggestions of a loss of identity that would in 
other contexts be disturbing; but here that loss paradoxically becomes 
a gain, as the lovers, lost in each other, also find a consummation. 
I began this chapter by quoting Jonathan Goldberg's opinion that 
'supposedly natural categories' such as desire and self cannot survive 
a reading of the The Faerie Queene without being revealed as 'textual 
, creations' subject 
to 'textual transformations', a revelation which 
makes the text 'unreadable'. The fundamental weakness of this pos- 
ition is that it places all the responsibility for maintaining 
'natural categories' upon the text, and none upon the empathetic and 
-210- 
fiction-making powers of the reader, whose collaboration in the 
creation of illusion is an essential part of the narrative aesthetic. 
Goldberg's complaint is not only reductive, it misses the point - as 
if he had pointed to a landscape painting and complained that its 
hills and lakes and clouds were impossible to perceive once they were 
revealed as mere brush strokes, and its apparent depth as a trick of 
linear perspective. 
In the face of the radical textual transformations we have 
discussed in this and other chapters, the surprising thing is the 
extent to which the fictive illusion is maintained. Rather than the 
text being fragmented into unreadability by such transformations, the 
transformations themselves become the groundplot of profitable 
invention. The Faeroe Queene's basis in romance creates for it a 
context in which magic, and hence metamorphosis, can be accommodated 
as part of the form. The effect of this is more than simply to 
camouflage a 'weakness' in the structure of allegory. By allowing 
transformations to become a matter for scrutiny within the narrative, 
the allegory provides models of itself, clues for its own reading. 
Busyrane's allegorical representation of love becomes the subject of 
interpretation and mis-interpretation, of reading and misreading, and 
hence an object lesson for the readers of Spenser's own fiction. 
Britomart, like the Palmer disenchanting Acrasia's lovers, exemplifies 
the action of the allegorical exegete. 
The price of such understanding, however, is in both cases the 
destruction of the allegory itself. True, both Busyrane and Acrasia 
are seen as deceptive enchanters, whose evil works are manifestly 
deserving of destruction; but does not all allegory, as we have 
indicated, depend on the maintenance of illusion? And is not the act 
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of interpretation essentially the replacement of the fiction with its 
'meaning'? These questions are never far away in any discussion of 
allegory, but when allegory becomes self-referential, self-unravel- 
ling, they assume a peculiar urgency. Is not all allegory, in effect, 
'selfe-murdring thought'? 
These are the questions I will be considering in the conclusion to 
this thesis. What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that the 
logically contradictory situations to which Spenserian allegory gives 
rise can still be imaginatively patent. For every case in which the 
understanding of allegory entails its decomposition, there are others, 
as with Mirabella and Tantalus, where understanding is yoked by divine 
decree to the continuance of the allegorical state, and where self- 
interpretation serves to emphasise rather than defuse the disorient- 
ating horror of that incongruity. 
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CONCLUSION 
THAT LOUELY BAND': ALLEGORY AND THE DESIRE FOR UNITY. 
Allegory, runs the traditional definition, occurs when one thing is 
said and by that another thing is understood. In this thesis I have 
tried to explore the problems and opportunities presented by the fact 
that allegory is a divided mode. The problems include ambiguity of 
meaning, empathetic confusion, and inconsistency in narrative and 
description. The art of allegorical decorum lies partly in the 
ability to ameliorate these phenomena by finding terms for the 
allegory in which the literal and analogical meanings are not overtly 
or jarringly incompatible. But I have also tried to show that there 
are alternative strategies, by which these very difficulties can be 
acknowledged and turned to rhetorical advantage. Inconsistency or 
absurdity can be a means of signalling the presence of hidden sig- 
nificance in a passage. Ambiguity can be controlled so as to suggest 
ambivalence and moral complexity. The disjunctive nature of allegor- 
ical language can be made the basis of magical events such as 
metamorphosis, and thus pressed into the service of the explicit 
narrative. 
As Bacon pointed out, allegory has been used both to reveal and to 
conceal meaning. ' Allegorical decorum, an art which aims to mediate 
between the different ways in which an allegorical text may be read, 
1, See p, 15 above, 
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inherits this duality of purpose. On the one hand, it is the means 
whereby the fictive illusion is maintained, and the senses of the text 
kept in some sort of proportionable relationship. On the other, it 
accomodates allegory's impulse to push the reader to an empathetic 
distance by pointing to its own artificiality. In what follows I 
shall argue that the conflict between these two tendencies is the 
basis of a dialectic which forms (to borrow the terminology of 
medieval allegory) the anagogic sense of The Faerie Queene. The sheer 
imaginative effort involved in Spenser's attempt to find terms in 
which to marry particular actions to universal meaning reflects a deep 
faith in the inherent significance of human experience; but his 
constant undermining of his own fiction betrays an equally deep 
mistrust in the ability of language to achieve such a marriage. I 
shall suggest that the sense of this opposition becomes the means by 
which the reader is led to seek a source for the reconciliation of the 
particular and the universal beyond the realm of language, in God. 
We may start by developing a point made in the last chapter. 
There, an analogy was drawn between the manifestation of Acrasia's 
lovers as hideous beasts in Book II of The Faerie Queene and the 
nature of allegorical fiction. Just as allegory uses fictional terms 
to communicate a veiled truth, so too the lovers' appearance is both 
truthful and deceptive. Truthful, because there is a decorum between 
their spiritual nature and their outward form - the 'sence and the 
sensible'; ' but also deceptive, since 
their 'naturall' state (FQ 
1, George Puttenham, The rte of English Poesie (1589), in Gregory 6, Smith, ed,, 
Elizabethan Critical Essays (O, U, P  1904), II, 1-193, p, 174, See p, 36 above, 
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II. xii. 86.9) is that of men, and Acrasia's enchantment has distorted 
them into monstrous shapes. When the Palmer reverses the enchantment 
he removes that distortion; but he also destroys the decorum. 
Similarly, the reading of allegory involves the recovery of a sense 
beyond the literal sense - and a recognition that what is said and 
what is meant are two distinct things. 
Compare this with the stripping of Duessa at FQ I. viii. 45-49, a 
metamorphosis no less radical, if not so obviously magical. In the 
tradition of morality drama which informs so much of Book I Duessa's 
role is a familiar one: a vice disguises herself as a virtue and acts 
as a misleading guide and counsellor to the fallible hero. Here. too, 
the removal of an outer layer (in this case Duessa's clothes) becomes 
an act of interpretation, and Spenser introduces it as such, with the 
ringing formula, 'Such as she was, their eyes might her behold' (FQ 
I. viii. 46.6). Like allegory, Duessa's beautiful appearance 'says' one 
thing but 'means' another, and the stripping away of this duplicitous 
surface serves to reveal her true nature. However, whereas the inter- 
pretation of Acrasia's beasts moved us away from analogical allegory 
towards a more 'naturall' situation, with Duessa it is the apparently 
natural situation which must itself be interpreted, to reveal the 
abstract moral verities that lie beneath. Where Guyon's task lay in 
interpreting a situation recognised as allegorical, the problem for 
Redcross is to realise the allegorical nature of the situation at all. 
Compared with the deceptiveness of her literal surface the analogy 
between Duessa's physical and moral ugliness is easily, almost 
instinctively, perceived, and Una is quick to draw the appropriate 
conclusion: 'Such is the face of falshood' 
(FQ I. viii. 49.4). 
-215- 
These two different sorts of magical exegesis exemplify the double 
strain under which the fiction of The Faerle Queene labours. 
Enchanters like Duessa, Archimago, Acrasia and Busyrane must be 
recognised as such; while the understanding of their enchantment often 
entails its unravelment. The first of these operations tends to 
affirm the supernatural basis of Faerie, centring its creatures in 
magic and abstraction: 'Such is the face of falshood'. The second 
moves the poem's focus towards what is 'naturall' in the world outside 
the poem - for example the existence of intemperate men. The effect 
of revelations like those of the Palmer and Arthur is to polarise 
these two categories of being. Duessa, revealed in all her physical 
malformation, ceases (until she can again transform herself) to be 
effective as a deceiver. She becomes an unnatural creature, who can 
exist only as part of a magical world, and cannot be related to the 
world of experience except by way of an analogical understanding of 
the vice she represents. The intemperate lovers of Acrasia, by con- 
trast, are brought out of their enchanted state towards a more 
'naturall' setting in which they exemplify, rather than represent, 
intemperance. They are changed back into human form, and the Bower, 
with its seductive magic, is destroyed. 
The contrast between the natural and the magical, and the movement 
from one to another via metamorphosis, seems to me to be just as 
important an axis of Spenser's universe as the more widely addressed 
distinction between nature and art. The changes in representation 
occasioned by such transformations tell us much about the poem's 
imaginative environment. When Duessa is unmasked, we (with Redcross) 
see how apparently natural encounters can in practice be imbued with 
universal significance. His dalliance is more than a moment's lapse - 
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he has paid court to the demonic embodiment of Deceit. Equally, the 
unnatural monsters surrounding the Bower are not merely the idle 
fancies of a poet's brain - their transformation into men shows that 
the fiction derives its moral authority from the concerns of the 
phenomenal world. These metamorphoses bring to the explicit narrative 
something which is implicit in any use of the allegorical method: at 
concern with the ways in which the universal can be seen in the 
particular, and the particular in the universal. 
Allegory's 'brilliant resolution of the problem of the relation of 
particulars and the general or universal" is for Rosemond Tuve its 
major strength. 'It is because its particulars may at any moment be 
seen for their metaphorical meaning that allegory could keep them so 
transparently tied to universals... 12 Our reading of The Faerie 
Queene has certainly involved the ways in which the universal and the 
particular can be made to stand for each other; but the recurring 
feature of such coexistence has been its instability: it is associated 
with ambiguity, empathetic confusion, fissures in the poem's 
imaginative realisation. Indeed, it is in part the presence of these 
disconcerting elements which keeps us aware of the interaction of the 
universal and the particular in the text: the very artificiality of 
the conjunction goads us towards understanding. 
To read allegory, however, is to destroy that conjunction. By 
reading, we separate and distinguish what the poem combines into a 
single fiction. In trying to escape the text's apparent contra- 
1, Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery; some mediaeval books and their posterity 
(Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1966), p, 252, 
2, ibid  p, 253. 
0 
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dictions we are led to make distinctions between what is literally and 
what is metaphorically spoken. Like the Palmer and Arthur, untangling 
enchantment by separating the truly magical from the 'naturoll', the 
reader of allegory reaffirms the polarity of the universal and the 
particular, and sends the different elements of the text hurrying back 
to their respective ontological categories. 
To read allegory is to make it less allegorical. There is a 
constant desire - which is the desire for understanding itself - to 
unravel allegory, to interpret it and divide it into its discrete 
elements. As readers we seek a context in which the poem's contra- 
dictions may be resolved, and in doing so dismantle the world which 
the poet has constructed. The integration of the universal and the 
particular can be perceived only at the moment of its dissolution. In 
order to sustain his fiction, the poet must always be spending himself 
in spinning out new threads with which to bind his world. The Faerie 
Queene is the product of a prodigious stamina, not only because of its 
length, but because of the imaginative labour needed to find new terms 
in which to express and renew its meaning. 
Essential to this point is the fact that Spenserian allegory is a 
kinetic, not a pictorial, medium. Walter Ong has written of allegory 
in diagrammatic terms, ' but in fact it is only the set of allegory's 
analogical referents which may be described in this way, not the 
allegory itself. Allegory is a way of using language, and like all 
language it moves only in time. The experience of reading allegory 
comprises more than the instant at which an enigmatic text yields its 
meaning: it is also the pressure towards understanding which comes 
1. See pp, 73-76 above, 
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from the sense of that meaning inarticulately felt, the moment when 
the contradictions of the text are held before the reader like a 
sustained discord which must be resolved by some new harmony; and it 
is the moment of relief when that harmony seems to come, and the 
allegory lies disposed into patterns of meaning as if in final and 
definitive stasis, only to be cast into new relationships by the 
inexorable movement of the text, revealing what was said before as a 
provisional part of a larger argument whose character lies hidden in 
enigma, and so again building the--desire to understand. 
Allegory- depends for its effect upon a succession of moments, a 
process which is bound to time. Yet time is also the agent of 
impermanence and decay. Mutabilitie's case at FQ VII. vii largely 
depends upon her production of the signs of time, over all of which 
she holds sway: seasons, months, day, night, hours, life and death: 
... Times do change and moue continually. 
So nothing here long standeth in one stay. 
YI I. vii. 47.6-7 
Quod me destruit me nutrit. Allegory must work within time, for 
'mutability... is the secret gate through which the universal-invades 
the particular" - the condition for the experience which can reveal 
meaning beyond experience. But time is also the agent of allegory's 
disintegration. What we noted in the last chapter with regard to 
Malbecco, Amoret and Mirabella is also true of allegory itself - that 
it is sustained by the very force which tends to its destruction. The 
versatility and length of The Faerle Queene are a heroic gesture 
1, Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (Faber and Faber, 1958, rpt. with 
revisions 1968, rpt, O, U, P., 1980), p, 196, 
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against the onslaught of mutability, but the constant effort of 
renewal is ultimately insupportable. 
Time is the condition of the sublunary world. Still more 
important, it is also the condition of the sinful world. By being the 
opposite of God's ever-present eternity, in which all things are 
instantaneously and completely manifest, mutable time becomes the 
ultimate sign of man's fallen state. Thus Lucifera's house is topped 
with 'a Diall' to tell 'the timely howres' (FQ I. iv. 4.9); while 
Mutabilitie, who presides over time's effects, is introduced in terms 
which suggest both Luciferan ambition and the sin of Adam: 
Ne shee the lawes of Nature onely brake, 
But eke of Iustice, and of Policie; 
And wrong of right, and bad of good did make, 
And death for life exchanged foolishlie: 
Since which, all liuing wights haue learn'd to die, 
And all this world is woxen daily worse. 
0 pittious worke of MVTABILITIE! 
By which, we all are subiect to that curse, 
And death in stead of life haue sucked from our Nurse. 
VII. vi. 6 
Within this picture of a post-lapsarian world, the suggestion that 
the 'world is woxen daily worse' strikes a peculiarly Spenserian 
note. ' Not only is time a sign of sin in itself, but its passing 
accompanies a steady deterioration in the world's state -a fact 
which, as I shall suggest, has disconcerting implications for alle- 
gory. Spenser's most extensive disquisition on the theme appears in 
the Proem to Book V: 
1, See, for example, fQ I, xii, 14,8-9, fQ Il, vii, 16-17, fQ III, i, 13, fQ IV, viii, 
29-33, For references to other Elizabethan expressions of the same sentiment see 
Hiram Haydn, The Counter Renaissance (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 
1950), pp. 532-33, 
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So oft as I with state of present time, 
The image of the antique world compare, 
When as mans age was in his freshest prime, 
And the first blossome of faire vertue bare, 
Such oddes I finde twixt those, and these which are, 
As that, through long continuance of his course, 
Me seemes the world is runne quite out of square, 
From the first point of his appointed sourse, 
And being once amisse growes daily wourse and wourse. 
V. Proem. 1 
Spenser goes on to draw a parallel between man's moral decay and 
the state of the universe, in which the constellations have moved out 
of their original position: 
For who so list into the heauens looke, 
And search the courses of the rowling spheares, 
Shall find that from the point, where they first tooke 
Their setting forth, in these few thousand yeares 
They all are wandred much; that plaine appeares. 
V. Proem. 5.1-5 
This principle can also be applied to language. Martha Craig, in 
her important essay on 'The Secret Wit of Spenser's Language', ' has 
shown that Spenser's use of words corresponds with the view expressed 
by Socrates in Plato's Cratylus. In the Cratylus, Socrates rejects 
the suggestion that the names applied to objects are merely conven- 
tional, and claims that each. object's true name is given to it by a 
legislator, who names it according to its nature. Although language 
has changed since objects were first given names, their true (that is, 
original) meaning can often be recovered by studying their etymology. 
Craig shows that Spenser's archaic language, which many readers have 
1, Martha Craig, 'The Secret Wit of Spenser's Language', in Elizabethan Poetry; 
Modern Essays in Criticism, ed, Paul Alpers (O, U, P  1967), pp. 447-72, rpt, in Essential Articles for the study of Edmund Spenser, ed, A, C Hamilton (Hamden, 
Conn,: Archon Books, 1972), pp, 313-33. 
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seen as an affectation, ' might more usefully be considered as an 
attempt to restore words to their proper use: 'The search for older 
forms is a search for the true forms that are ideally expressive. '2 
Archaism becomes the means of redeeming the language from the decay 
imposed upon it by time. 
Craig goes an to show how Spenser's etymological spelling of words 
can produce witty effects, providing an explanatory or ironic gloss on 
the use of contemporary words. What she does not stress is that, 
insofar as archaism is the mechanism of Spenser's wit, the fact of the 
language's decay becomes the necessary precondition of that wit. If 
the language had remained in its pristine state, no wit deriving from 
the difference between former and present use would be possible. As 
Angus Fletcher has written, 'puns generated from [an etymological] 
ground have the properties accruing to it, chief of which is a rooted 
characteristic of structure in time' (his italics). a If we place this 
principle in the context of a philosophy in which time is a symbol of 
flux and impermanence, and its passing serves only to mark the 
deterioration of the world into further corruption, it appears that 
the ability to make etymological puns is the perogative of a fallen 
world. 
1. This is the most frequent complaint made against Spenser by his contemporaries, 
including Sidney in his Defence and Ben Jonson in Tuber, Even E, K. felt it 
necessary to include a pre-emptive justification in the preface to The 
Shepheardes Calendar, See Sir Philip Sidney, R Defence of Poetry, ed, J. A, Van 
Dorsten (O, U, P  1966), p, 64; Ben Jonson, The Complete Poess, ed. George Partitt (Harmondsvorth; Penguin, 1975), p. 428; Edmund Spenser, Poetical forks, ed, J, C. 
Smith and E, de Selincourt (O, U, P  1912), pp. 416-17. Other comments on Spenser's language and style are conveniently gathered in R, M, Cummings, ed,, 
Spenser, The Critical Heritage (New York; Barnes and Noble, 1971), pp, 277-343. 
2, Craig, p, 317, 
3, Angus Fletcher, The Prophetic Mloment, An Essay on Spenser (Chicago and London: 
Chicago U, P  1971), p, 103, 
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I think that this is true of allegory in general, and it suggests 
another way in which allegory is destructively dependent on time. The 
decay of language means that what words mean and what they seem to 
mean become two different things - they no longer manifest that 
'ideally expressive' quality which leaves no room for misunderstanding 
or deception. But allegory depends on just such a duality. The 
difference between seeming and being - between the literal sense and 
the analogical - is the structural basis of allegorical meaning. 
The precondition for allegory is also the precondition for sin. 
The deception of Duessa relies an the difference between appearance 
and reality. The Blatant Beast, as Humphrey Tonkin has written, 'is 
able to flourish only in situations where being and seeming have 
parted company'. ' Acrasia's base lover Grill can be changed into a 
form which expresses his moral state and yet is not 'naturall' only 
because his sin has destroyed the correspondence between his human and 
moral natures: he has 'forgot the excellence/ Of his creation, when he 
life began' (FQ II. xii. 87.2-3). He seems to be a beast, and yet he is 
a man. Restored, he seems to be a man, and yet he is beastlike in his 
lusts. In playing on this fact, Spenser may attempt to redeem 
language; but he can do so only by taking advantage of the fact that 
it is not redeemed. 
In Chapter 1 we examined two episodes from The Faerie Queene - 
Scudamour's adventure in the Temple of Venus, and Calidore's entrance 
1, Humphrey Tonkin, Spenser's Courteous Fastoral, Book Six of The 'Faerie Queene' 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p, 410, 
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to the pastoral world of the shepherds - in which the exemplary and 
the analogical senses of the text appeared to be incompatible. We 
found that, despite this incompatibility, neither way of reading could 
be maintained independently of the other. The resulting aesthetic 
confusion became the medium of an underlying ambivalence about the 
natures of courtship and of courtesy: in these cases at least, 
allegory's theoretical distinction between discrete senses was not 
allowed to effect a factitious resolution of extra-literary issues. 
Nevertheless, because allegorical fiction does combine the metaphor- 
ical and the literal, it is liable to the sort of 'punning' use of 
language which can seem to resolve tensions in the world of 
experience. In such cases the ability of language to mean more than 
one thing becomes a way of figuring forth a paradox or mystery, and 
the allegorical text becomes visionary. 
Perhaps the most important example of this in The Faerle Queene is 
the passage describing the scene upon Mount Acidale at FQ 
VI. x. Ve 
have said that in Book VI the poem addresses the competing claims of 
two definitions of courtesy: one courtly and formal, associating 
virtue with high rank; the other pastoral and stoical, locating virtue 
in the breast of the individual. The Book opens with an affirmation 
of the courtly view, relating courtesy to its etymological origin: 
'Of 
Court, it seemes, men Courtesie doe call' (FQ VI. i. 1.1). But in Book 
VI the court is no longer 'ideally expressive' of courtesy: its decay 
into vanity means that it has lost its claim to be the sole exemplar 
of its eponymous virtue. And with the change of 
the court, the 
language of 'courtesy' has become ambiguous and doubtful. 
Acidale 
seems to offer a means of resolving that ambiguity. 
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Acidale is in part a pastoral vision. Its rusticity is indicated 
both by its setting in the shepherds' country, and in the figure of 
Colin Clout, who sustains the scene with music from his bagpipes. But 
an equally prominent feature in Spenser's presentation is the emphasis 
on rank and formality, essentially courtly traits. One sign of this 
is the small court of birds at FQ VI. x. 6, recalling Chaucer's 
Parliament in its insistence on precedence: 
It was an hill plaste in an open plaine, 
That round about was bordered with a wood 
Of matchlesse hight, that seem'd th'earth to disdaine, 
In which all trees of honour stately stood, 
And did all winter as in sommer bud, 
Spredding pauilions for the birds to bowre, 
Which in their lower braunches sung aloud; 
And in their tops the soring hauke did towre, 
Sitting like King of fowles in maiesty and powre. 
VI. x. 6' 
A 
Nymphs and fairies sit on the banks of the stream at the bottom of 
the hill, ready to repel wild beasts and 'the ruder clown' (FQ VI. x. 
7.4), while on top. of the hill the maiden at the centre of the vision 
is surrounded by concentric rings of ladies and (nearer the centre) 
the three Graces. This part of the vision appears to allude to the 
April Eclogue of The Shepheardes Calender, in which the list of 
attendants at Eliza's pastoral court descends in due rank from gods 
such as Phoebus and Cynthia, through the Muses, the Graces and the 
'Ladyes of the lake' (April 1.127) (nymphs, as E. K. informs us, 
typically classicising Spenser's practice), down to mere shepherds' 
daughters. Such a hierarchy is appropriate, for Acidale too is a 
court, albeit a recreative one: 
Compare Chaucer, The Parliament of fowls, 11,323-29, 
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They say that Venus, when she did dispose 
Her seife to pleasaunce, vsed to resort 
Vnto this place, and therein to repose 
And rest her seife, as in a gladsome port, 
Or with the Graces there to play and sport; 
That euen her owne Cytheron, though in it 
She vsed to keepe her royall court, 
And in her soueraine Maiesty to sit, 
She in regard hereof refusde and thought vnfit. 
VI. x. 9 
Venus does not appear in this vision, however. At the centre of 
the circle of Graces, where we might expect to find her, there stands 
instead a humble country girl. This is a shocking, even anarchic, 
inversion of the decorum established in the preceding stanzas; ' yet 
Spenser insists that the sight is fitting: 
She that in the midst of them did stand, 
Seem'd all the rest in beauty to excell, 
Crown'd with a rosie girlond, that right well 
Did her beseeme. 
VI. x. 14.3-6 
The exact status of this girl seems uncertain: a moment before 
Colin declares that she is 'certes but a countrey lasse' (FQ VI. x. 
25.8) he speculates as to whether she is 'a creature, or a goddesse' 
(FQ VI. x. 25.4). In the next two stanzas the paradoxical answer 
emerges: the maid's many virtues have inspired the Graces to make her 
one of their number, thus conferring on her heavenly rank: 
Another Grace she well deserues to be, 
In whom so many Graces gathered are... 
VI. x. 27.1-2 
1, As so often, the way that people Misread the poem can tell us much about the 
manipulation of our expectation, Stevie Davies, for instance, unconsciously 
restores the decorum of this passage by writing that Colin identifies the girl to 
Calidore as 6loriana herself, Stevie Davies, The Idea of Voran in Renaissance 
Literature; The Feiinine Reclaimed (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1986), p, 40. 
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This is the linguistic crux of the description, the point at which 
the punning capacity of allegorical language is utilised to rescue 
nature from its own contradictions. By using his mythopoeic powers to 
make the Graces both qualities in the maid and objective beings, 
Spenser unravels a contradictory set of doctrines about the con- 
flicting claims of personal desert and social rank, and makes of them 
a consistent narrative. The maid is no longer simply a 'countrey 
lasse', because the favour of the Graces has made her a Grace. Yet 
what do the Graces represent but just those qualities which are 
praised in the maid as 'Graces'? The capitalisation of 'Graces' at FQ 
VI. x. 27.2 highlights this equivalence. In a sense it is the maid's 
desert (which is her own despite lowly birth) which confers high rank, 
which in turn is the courtly prerequisite for the higher virtues 
constituting desert. The situation is logically circular, but this 
circularity provides the means for a punning resolution of the Book's 
major doctrinal tension. The vision of the girl is revealed as an 
icon in which contrary doctrines are infolded. 
But The Faerie Queene is a product of language, not of visual art, 
and its pictorial visions cannot be sustained. The text moves on, 
stanza after stanza. As readers, we cannot let the resolution offered 
by the vision be definitive, for the narrative concerns of Calidore's 
quest and his love for Pastorella stand unresolved, and in unresolved 
opposition. Moreover, we, like Calidore, seek to understand our 
experience, and the vision's flight stands between us and Colin's ex- 
position - 'a chastening sequence for interpreters to reflect upon': ' 
1, Alastair Fowler, 'Emanations of glory: Neoplatonic order in Spenser's Faerie 
Queena', in Judith M, Kennedy and James A, Reither, ed A Theatre for 
Spenserians (Toronto: Toronto U, P,, 1973), pp. 53-82 (p, 63). 
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Therefore resoluing, what it was, to know, 
Out of the wood he rose, and toward them did go. 
But soone as he appeared to their vew, 
They vanisht all away out of his sight, 
And clean were gone, which way he neuer knew; 
All saue the shepheard, who for fell despight 
Of that displeasure, broke his bag-pipe quight... 
VI. x. 17.8-18.5 
To read allegory, I have said, is to make it less allegorical. 
Calidore, like a chivalric version of the man from Porlock, interrupts 
the process of creation, which 'by no meanes thou canst recall againe' 
(FQ VI. x. 20.3). But his action is more than a piece of random 'ill 
fortune' (FQ VI. x. 20.7): it exemplifies the process of all reading, 
which strives towards understanding, even to the point of destroying 
that which it seeks to understand. What the vision combines, Colin's 
explanation to Calidore separates and defines: his exegesis interposes 
itself between us and the beauty of the Graces' dance, freezing it 
into a set of analogical relations: 
Therefore they alwaies smoothly seeme to smile, 
That we likewise should mylde and gentle be, 
And also naked are, that without guile 
Or false dissemblaunce all them plaine may see, 
Simple and true from couert malice free: 
And eeke them selues so in their daunce they bore, 
That two of them still froward' seem'd to bee, 
But one still towards shew'd her selfe afore; 
That good should from vs goe, then come in greater store. 
VI. x. 24 
The paradox which enables Colin's love 'to be another Grace' (FQ 
VI. x. 16.9) is not sustained. In the stanzas following Colin's inter- 
pretation the social distinctions which the vision had seemed to 
circumvent return with greater force. Spenser (in the person of 
1, 'forward' in the 1596 text, 
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Colin) apologises to his sovereign for devoting two stanzas to the 
praise of his mistress, and already the woman is no more than a 'poore 
handmayd' (FQ VI. x. 28.6), her status as a fourth Grace forgotten, or 
acknowledged merely as a complimentary fiction. By the end of the 
Canto Meliboe and his people have been carried off by a band of 
lawless brigands, who destroy the pastoral world as effectively as the 
Blatant Beast could ever have done; and by the end of the Book 
Calidore's country love Pastorella will have been revealed (by osten- 
tatiously conventional means) as an aristocrat. This factitious nar- 
rative device does not solve the difficulty of defining courtesy - 
rather, it highlights the poem's inability to do so outside the 
fragile environment of Acidale, and thus foreshadows the final failure 
implicit in the escape of the Blatant Beast into Elizabethan England 
(FQ VI. xii. 40-41). Allegory could never provide a definition of 
courtesy short of paradox, because the contradictions involved in such 
a definition are not something over which it has control. The world 
to which allegory addresses itself is corrupt, and the language of 
allegory mirrors that corruption. As Jacqueline Miller has said: 
The act of creation that could produce the ideal Faeryland of 
Book II also insists that Faeryland ultimately is part of the 
actual world where those ideals cannot be permanently 
possessed, a world from which those ideals recede as soon as 
they draw near. The poet does not see conflict between Faery- 
land and actuality, he sees congruence; he does not so much 
acknowledge. that) *real life" contradicts his art, but that it 
defines and structures it. ' 
Allegory does not have the power to achieve a perfect and durable 
harmony between the universal and the particular. In a fallen world 
1, Jacqueline T, Miller, 'The Status of Faeryland: Spenser's 'Vniust Possession", 
$S9 V (1984), 31-44, pp, 40-41. 
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that is impossible, and one effect of Acidale's disintegration is to 
remind us of the impossibility. ' Rather, the distinctive feature of 
allegory is the sustained effort with which it attempts to keep its 
intractable materials in a relationship of decorum. Allegory centres 
our attention where it should be centred, at 'the place where 
particular fact meets universal meaning. The allegorical universe is 
constantly unmade, but it is constantly remade by the Protean poet, 
whose skill shows itself in the discovery of new ways in which to 
reveal the immanence of meaning in experience. 
If we seek a symbol of this poetic effort, we shall find it not so 
much in Acidale as in the description of Concord and the two half- 
brothers Love and Hate, a group found by Scudamour in the parch of the 
Temple of Venus: 
On either side of her, two young men stood, 
Both strongly arm'd, as fearing one another; 
Yet were they brethren both of halfe the blood, 
Begotten by two fathers of one mother, 
Though of contrarie natures each to other; 
The one of them Night Loue, the other Hate, 
Hate was the elder, Loue the younger brother; 
Yet was the younger stronger in his state 
Then th'elder, and him maystred still in all debate. 
Hathlesse that Dame so well them tempred both, 
That she them forced hand to ioyne in hand, 
Albe that Hatred was thereto full lath, 
And turn'd his face away, as he did stand, 
Vnwilling to behold that louely band. 
Yet she was of such grace and vertuous might, 
That her commaundment he could not withstand, 
But bit his lip for felonous despight, 
And gnasht his yron tuskes at that displeasing sight. 
IV. x. 32-33 
1. The Appendix to this thesis suggests a possible source for the description of 
Acidale which tends to confirm the importance of this aspect of the passage, 
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The first of these stanzas depicts the 'contrarie natures' of Hate 
and Love analogically, through their physical antagonism. Neither 
party visibly exemplifies his eponymous quality: their simple 
oppositional stance could equally represent Night and Day, Life and 
Death, or any other pair of binary opposites. Those things which 
particularly distinguish them - age, strength and parentage - are not 
differences of temperament but analogical signs, requiring interpret- 
ation. Otherwise, the two figures are described in similar terms: 
each is a young man, each is armed, each is fearful for his safety. 
In the second stanza this analogical description is elaborated. If 
the physical antagonism of Hate and Love symbolises the moral opposi- 
tion of the qualities they represent, then one might expect that both 
would be unwilling to shake. Indeed, the two are not differentiated 
at the beginning of the stanza: both are 'tempred' by Concord, and 
'forced' to join hands. However, while there is no reference to the 
specific reaction of Love to this coercion, Spenser lingers for 
several lines over Hate's detestation of the gesture. By this device 
he is able to insinuate the suggestion that Hate exemplifies, as well 
as represents, hatred. 
Hate's reaction to the handshake is as explicit a manifestation of 
the tension between analogical and exemplary interpretation as any in 
The Faerie Queene. How can he shake hands, and yet be Hate? Hate 
cannot even bear to see his own action; but he is unable to refuse the 
command of Concord. Concord does not make these forces compatible, or 
turn Hate into Love, but their 'louely band' is sustained by her will. 
The unspeakable contradiction which makes Hate gnash his 'yron tuskes' 
is thrown into still greater prominence by the fact that Spenser does 
not describe bow Concord's injunction is enforced. Her power is 
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implicit in the nature of the poetic universe. Like the poet, Concord 
must restrain and order the recalcitrant elements of a fallen world 
which continually threatens to lapse into chaos: 
By her the heauen is in his course contained, 
And all the world in state vnmoued stands, 
As their Almightie maker first ordained, 
And bound them with inuiolable bands; 
Else would the waters ouerflow the lands, 
And fire deuoure the ayre, and hell them quight, 
But that she holds them with her blessed hands. 
IV. x. 35.1-7 
Concord's unseen power might stand for the secret power exerted by 
all allegory, as it attempts to marry the universal and the par- 
ticular. If the gesture which Concord sustains in the Temple of Venus 
seems to promise the existence of some wider perspective in which the 
apparent opposition of Hate and Love may be seen as part of a larger 
unity, allegory too is founded on an optimistic premise - that the 
apparent dichotomy between experience and significance is limited and 
ultimately illusory. The Canto in which Concord appears illustrates 
both these points: the literal kidnap of Amoret by Scudamour stands in 
apparent opposition to its own analogical significance; but his 
siezure of Amoret's hand - another handshake resented by one of the 
parties - meets with the approval of Venus, confirming the analogy of 
courtship which underlies its literal violence, and marking it as an 
example of Concord's discordia concors: 
And euermore vpon the Goddesse face 
Mine eye was fixt, for feare of her offence, 
Whom when I saw with amiable grace 
To laugh at me, and fauour my pretence, 
I was emboldned with more confidence... 
4 
IV. x. 56.1-5 
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Discord as the sign of a higher unity - this is a Neo-Platonic 
commonplace with which Spenser could hardly have been unfamiliar. ' 
Here it expresses itself in the hermaphroditic Venus, who combines 
contrary sexes in her own body (FQ IV. x. 41) -a motif which is to find 
its ultimate expression in the figure of Nature herself: 
This great Grandmother of all creatures bred 
Great Nature, euer young yet full of eld, 
Still moouing, yet vnmoued from her sted; 
Vnseene of any, yet of all beheld... 
VII. vii. 13.1-4 
Paradoxical language of this kind is a recurring feature in The 
Faerie Queene. The language of the mutable world may be disabled by 
its own corrupt nature from direct reference to objects beyond that 
world, but by denying its own premises - like the axiom which forbids 
self-contradiction - it can at least point tropically to the existence 
of such objects. Nature, young yet old, moving yet still, lies beyond 
the power of Time and mutability. In Acidale the trees 'all winter as 
in sommer bud' (FQ VI. x. 6.5); while in the Garden of Adonis, where 
Adonis lies paradoxically 'eterne in mutabiltie' (FQ III. vi. 47.5), 
there is 'continuall spring, and haruest... / Continuall' (FQ III. vi. 
42.1-2). Time is the agent of change and decay, and thence of 
contradiction, but contradictions such as these suggest the des- 
truction of Time, as all its effects are gathered into one changeless 
and eternal moment. 
There are similar implications in the use of the allegorical method 
itself. Allegory, in labouring to join the universal and the par- 
1, See Wind, pp, 191-217, for its occurrence in Cusanus, Ficino, Pico and Bruno 
amongst others, 
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ticular, the essential and the contingent, implies an aspect in which 
they are truly harmonious, even though the only terms in which this 
harmony can manifest itself are those of contradiction. Although the 
logical and empathetic complications involved in reading allegory 
betray themselves in absurdity, it is precisely in the destruction of 
the allegorical fiction that we can perceive the faith which its para- 
doxical nature implies. This ambiguity at the heart of contradiction 
is well described by Ronald Levao, writing on that most subtle 
exponent of paradox, Nicholas of Cusa: 
The coincidence of minimum and maximum recalls to us God as 
the absolute unity that unites all things. The manifesting of 
these points also recalls the dynamic potential of the human 
mind as it attempts to reconcile opposing geometrical forms, 
enlarging its domain even as it seeks to collapse its 
distinctions. Finally, the coincidence of opposites has 
symbolized the limit beyond which the mind cannot go; an 
illustration not of the divine but of the mystery that 
prevents the individual from comprehending it, because it is 
"far and away beyond our understanding, which is fundamentally 
unable by any rational process to reconcile contradictories. " 
The coincidence of opposites, then, represents the infinite, 
the finite, the reconciliation of the infinite and finite, and 
the immeasurable gulf between them. It becomes a powerful 
symbol of the ambiguities of human discourse, not an escape 
from them. ' 
Paradoxical or self-contradictory language - and in this descrip- 
tion I would include the implicitly contradictory language of allegory 
- provides a means by which a world subject to mutability can refer to 
things which are immutable. It is thus the sign both of discord and 
of the impulse towards a transcendent harmony, and can be used as 
evidence for either. In the debate between Jove and Mutabilitie in 
Book VII, the fact that everything in the world is changeable provides 
1, Ronald Levao, Renaissance Minds and their fictions; Cusanus, Sidney, Shakespeare 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California U, P,, 1985), p. 31, 
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the basis of Mutabilitie's case for rule of the heavens, but Jove, 
without challenging the evidence provided, gives it a different and 
transcendent interpretation: 
Right true it is, that these 
And all things else that vnder heauen dwell 
Are chaung'd of Time, who doth them all disseise 
Of being: But, who is it (to me tell) 
That Time himselfe doth moue and still compell 
To keepe his course? Is not that namely wee 
Which poure that vertue from our heauenly cell, 
That moues them all, and makes them changed be? 
So them we gods doe rule, and in them also thee. 
VII. vi1.48.1-9 
To this argument Mutabilitie responds with Stratonician scepticism: 
Ye may attribute to your selues as Kings, 
And say they by your secret powre are made: 
But what we see not, who shall vs perswade? 
VII. vii. 49.3-5 
The basis of the debate does not lie in a dispute about the 
behaviour of things on earth, but in the question of whether there is 
a privileged perspective from which to view that behaviour. 
Hutabilitie refuses to admit the existence of any perspective beyond 
that of the mutable flux itself. Even the gods, she claims, are 
subject to her law: and in evidence she points to the eccentric orbits 
observed by the planets above the lunar sphere (FQ VII. vii. 50-52). 
However, the very attempt to pursue her claim through due process of 
law tends to undermine her denial of a transcendent perspective, as 
James Hohrnberg has pointed out: 'By appealing to the de Jure 
authority of Nature, Mutabilitie inevitably recognizes the existence 
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of a "nature" other than her own, a nature characterized as a law- 
giver, rather than a lawbreaker. " 
Nature's judgement reaffirms Jove's view that time is in reality 
the servant of the objects it seems to destroy: 
I well consider all that ye haue sayd, 
And find that all things stedfastnes doe hate 
And changed be: yet being rightly wayd 
They are not changed from their first estate; 
But by their change their being do dilate: 
And turning to themselues at length againe, 
Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate: 
Then Quer them Change doth not rule and raigne; 
But they raigne ouer change, and doe their states maintaine. 
VI I. vii. 58 
In this overarching perspective the sublunary view of change as a 
meaningless flux is denied. Instead, mutability is revealed as the 
means by which the universe fulfils its own identity. Things change, 
but only to become (in the Aristotelian sense) more perfect, more 
themselves. As R. L. Colie notes, 'The solution Nature presents is the 
paradox uniting Being and Becoming. ' The assurance that things turn 
, to themselues at length againe' serves in part to show that the 
months and seasons who are Mutabilitie's witnesses actually contribute 
to a natural order whose state is maintained, not changed, by their 
cyclical progression. But Nature's words also allude to the Neo- 
Platonic doctrine whereby the universe is represented as taking part 
in a continuous process of emanation from and return to the One. In 
this theory, the changing state of time and space is simply the means 
1, James Nohrnberg, The Analogy of 'The Faerie Queene' (Princeton: Princeton U, P  
1976), p, 744, 
2, Rosalie L, Colie, Paradoxia Epideaica (Princeton: Princeton U, P  
1966, rpt, 
Archon Books, 1976), p, 345. 
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by which engendered objects fulfil their own, intrinsically mutable 
nature. ' 
One problem with-this optimistic teleology is that it sits very ill 
with Spenser's repeated statements elsewhere in the poem that the 
world, so far from becoming more ideally expressive of its own nature, 
is in a state of chronic decay. Although her words do not disallow a 
belief in the original perfection of the universe, or even in a sub- 
sequent departure from that pristine condition, it is noticeable that 
Nature avoids, or at least defers, any direct reference to the tricky 
issue of why things turn from 'themselues' in the first place. This, 
after all, is a question to which Luther and Plotinus give very 
different answers. As more than one critic has observed, the Cantos 
makes it clear that Mutabilitie is both the cause and the result of 
the Fall, -2 and this logical contradiction inevitably frustrates any 
effort to find (within the terms of these Cantos) an extrinsic 
explanation for the original corruption of nature. The universe 
described in the first part of Nature's judgement exhibits mutability 
as an intrinsic principle of its own development. It is only in the 
second part that this development is placed in the context of 
eternity: 
1, For the relationship of Nature's description to Plotinian and Boethian theory see 
Robert Ellrodt, Neoplatonisa in the Poetry of Spenser (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 
1960), pp, 68-70; William Nelson, The Poetry of £daund Spenser; a Study (New York 
and London: Columbia U, P  1963), pp, 307-14; John Erskine Hankins, Source and Meaning in Spenser's Allegory, A Study of 'The faerie Queene' (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971), pp, 290-91; Patricia A, Parker, Inescapable Roaance; Studies in the 
Poetics of a Mode (Princeton: Princeton U, P,, 1979), pp, 54-64. 
2, Maurice Evans, Spenser's Rnatoay of Heroisa; a commentary on the 'faerie Queene' 
(C, U, P  1970), p, 231; Marion Campbell, 'Spenser's Hutabilitie 
Cantos and the End 
of The Faerie Queene', Southern Review; Literary and Interdiscipinary Studies, 15 
(1982), 46-59, p, 48, See fQ VII, vi, 5-6, 
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Cease therefore daughter further to aspire, 
And thee content thus to be rul'd by me: 
For thy decay thou seekst by thy desire; 
But time shall come that all shall changed bee, 
And from thenceforth, none no more change shall see. 
VII. vii. 59.1-5 
These lines attack Mutabilitie's position on ontological rather 
than teleological grounds. Within the limited perspective proposed by 
Mutabilitie, change implies a lack of decorum between being and 
seeming, essence and contingent effect. She describes a world of 
constant alteration, where things can no longer be ideally expressive 
of their own nature. For her rule to be extended to the heavens even 
the gods must be shown to be subject to the same chaotic tendencies. 
And yet, as we have pointed out, the very fact that Mutabilitie makes 
her claim through law, submitting herself to the arbitration of Nature 
(whose sergeant is Order (FQ VII. vii. 4.6)), suggests that she accepts 
that Nature has authority to make judgements according to the true 
nature of things, and is therefore not limited to mutable appearance. 
In fact, not only does her claim admit this perspective, it actually 
depends upon it, for her right to rule everything that is mutable is 
based upon the perception of a correspondence between the mutability 
of things in the world and her role as Mutabilitie itself. 
This paradox lies at the heart of Mutabilitie's position. and is 
made explicit in Nature's warning that her actions undermine her very 
nature. Mutabilitie is a product of the world she rules, and 
" consequently any desire to impose a decorum which is antithetical to 
that world's nature threatens her own status. The reference to the 
Apocalypse brings this contradiction into sharp relief. At the end of 
the world being and seeming shall again be one: but for a creature 
whose existence depends upon their separation this is equivalent to 
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extinction - hence the perversity of pursuing such an end through law: 
'For thy decay thou seekst by thy desire'. The logical manoeuvre used 
by Nature here is familiar in literature dealing with the transition 
from the temporal to the eternal world. It finds famous (and 
pertinent) expression both in Donne: 
One short sleepe past, wee wake eternally, 
And death shall be no more; death thou shalt die. ' 
and in Shakespeare: 
So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men, 
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then. -- 
In the two stanzas of the 'vnperfite' eighth Canto of Book VII 
Spenser turns from Nature, whose paradoxical nature implies the eter- 
nal, to a consideration of eternal God Himself. The poet, led by the 
divided language of his own allegory, contemplates the ultimate unity 
to which it points. But this is a task which Spenser recognises is 
not possible in the terms of mutable language, and the poem ends not 
in description but in a prayer to see that which is hidden to mortal 
eyes: '0 that great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that Sabaoths sight' (FQ 
VII. viii. 2.9). As Michael Holahan comments, this is 'a new kind of 
invocation that marks the end rather than the beginning of poetic 
3 Inspiration'. 
1, John Donne, 'Death be not proud', 11,13-14, in Poetical i'orks, ed, Herbert J, C, 
Grierson (O, U, P,, 1971), p. 297, 
2, William Shakespeare, Sonnet 146,11,13-14, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed, 6, 
Blakemore Evans, Harry Levin of a! (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 
p, 1776, 
3, Michael Holahan, 'laique opus exegi: Ovid's Changes and Spenser's Brief Epic of 
Mutability', (LR, 6 (1976), 244-70, p, 267, 
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When, in An Hymne of Heavenly Beavtie, Spenser tries to describe 
the beauty of God, he finds that it cannot be stated in direct terms - 
'How then can mortall tongue hope to expresse, / The image of such end- 
less perfectnesse? ' (HHB 104-105). However, it can be approached 
through seeing the ways that God's beauty is made manifest in 
creation. Nature is a 'looking glasse' (HHB 115), or a 'brasen booke' 
(HHB 130) in which God's beauty can be read. Behind its mutable sur- 
face Nature carries divine meaning - it is an allegory of God. The 
task of His creatures is to find Him in creation, and then turn from 
creation to Him. The Hymne, like the Mutabilitie Cantos, ends with a 
rejection of the world, and an embracing of the eternal sabbath: 
... looke at last vp to that soueraine light, 
From whose pure beams al perfect beauty springs, 
That kindleth loue in euery godly spright, 
Euen the loue of God, which loathing brings 
Of this vile world, and these gay seeming things; 
With whose sweete pleasures being so possesst, 
Thy straying thoughts henceforth for euer rest. 
HHB 295-301 
Allegory deals with the construction of fictions: it enfolds 
meaning into itself, and thus imitates nature, in which the beauty and 
love of God are enfolded. But allegory is also concerned to unfold 
its meaning: by doing so it makes its purpose manifest, just as nature 
shows mortal creatures a way of viewing God's beauty, 'as in a brasen 
booke' (HHB 130). Allegory's ends and nature's ends are one: both 
point to ways in which they must be overgone. As the poet of the 
Hymne finally rejects the nature which shows him the way to God, so 
the reader of allegory must seek beyond its contradictions, for those 
contradictions are a sign of language's inadequacy to describe its 
ultimate subject. Allegory is part of 'this state of life so tickle' 
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(FQ VII. viii. 1.6): although it may lead its reader to the edge of the 
mutable world it cannot go beyond the simple contradiction of terms 
which is language's nearest approximation to the mystery of the 
Godhead. That which is in itself ideally expressive stands in no need 
of description - and in the sabbath of eternity the language which 
depends upon the succession of moments will have no place. This is a 
conclusion which Cusanus foresaw: the doctrines of enfolding and 
unfolding, complicatio and explicatio, cease to have meaning or 
function in the presence of God: 
When I behold Thee, my God, in Paradise, girt by that wall of 
the coincidence of opposites, I see that Thou dost neither 
enfold nor unfold, whether separately or together. For dis- 
junction and conjunction alike are that wall of coincidence, 
beyond which Thou existest, set free from all that can be 
spoken or thought. ' 
1, Nicholas of Cusa, Dc Visione Doi, in John Patrick Dolan, ed,, Unity and Refora; 
Selected Uritings of Nicholas Da Cusa (Chicago and Crawfordsville; Notre Date 
U, P  1962), pp. 133-84 (p. 152), 
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SPENSER AND PETRARCH'S CANZONE CCCXXIII. 
Petrarch's Canzone CCCXXIII is one of a series of poems lamenting 
the death of Laura. It begins with five twelve-line stanzas, in each 
of which the poet sees a sight of great beauty -a hind, a ship, a 
laurel tree, a spring and a phoenix - only to witness its sudden and 
violent destruction. Although the exact significance of these visions 
is a matter of dispute, it is generally agreed that each corresponds 
allegorically to some aspect of Laura's virtue or beauty, which is 
admired by the poet and then wasted by death. ' A sixth stanza follows 
in which the lady herself is seen walking: but a snake bites her and 
she dies. The lady mounts up to heaven, and the poet reflects that on 
earth only tears are certain to endure. The Canzone ends with a short 
envoy in which the poet desires death: 
Canzon, tu puoi ben dire: 
Queste sei visioni al signor mio 
Han fatto un dolce di morir desio. 2 
In 1569 a translation of. Petrarch's poem appeared as part of the 
first English edition of John Van der Boodt's militantly Protestant 
s 
work entitled A Theatre, wherein be represented as wet the miseries 
1, See Stephen Minta, Petrarch and Fetrarchlsa; The English and French Traditions 
(Manchester: Manchester U, P., 1980), pp. 88-91, 
2, Canzone CCCXXIII, 11,73-75, in Minta, p, 81, 
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and calamities that follow the voluptuous worldlings as also the 
greate joyes and pleasures which the faithfull do enjoy. An argument 
both profitable and delectable to all that sincerely love the Word of 
God. This volume also includes blank verse translations of several 
sonnets by Joachim du Bellay, and four sonnets based on the Book of 
Revelation, illustrated with woodcuts and gathered under the general 
title of Sonets. ' The theme of du Bellay's sequence is 'the worldes 
unstedfastnesse' (Sonets 1.12). A ghost appears to the poet in his 
sleep, and shows him a series of visions of apparent magnificence -a 
strong building, a giant and the spirit of Rome, amongst others - all 
of which are subsequently undermined and destroyed. The ghost 
comments that 'onely God surmountes the force of tyme', and that 
therefore confidence should be placed 'in God alone' (Sonets 11.13- 
14). 
The similarities between the visions of du Bellay and those of 
Petrarch are clear enough - indeed, it was Karat's translation of 
Petrarch which provided du Bellay's inspiration. Even some of the 
objects they see destroyed -a tree, a spring of water - are the same 
in both sequences. However, in Petrarch's poem, as I have said, each 
stanza represents not earthly glory in general but an aspect of 
Laura's virtue. Although Laura's death convinces the poet of the 
transience of earthly felicity, at this point in the Cazizoniere he 
reacts not with the contemptus mundi of du Bellay but with grief and a 
simple weariness of life. Despite his confidence that Laura has gone 
to heaven, the poet's final wish for death seems concerned more with a 
1. The poems from the Theatre are included as an Appendix in Edmund Spenser, 
Poetical Porks, ed, J, C, Smith and E, de Selincourt (0, U, P,, 1912), pp, 605-608, 
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release from pain than with any desire for the eternal. This 
difference is emphasised in Marot's version of the envoy, in which the 
poet, so far from asking to see God, wishes merely to rest in the 
earth ('sous la Terre'). 
The translation of the Canzone which appears in the Theatre (which 
is taken from Karat's French rather than directly from the Italian) is 
divided into six separate poems under the title Epigrams, each Epigram 
being illustrated with its own woodcut. In this way the appearance of 
the poem is made to resemble that of the sonnet sequence by du Bellay 
in the same volume - two of the Epigrams are even padded out to sonnet 
length, perhaps in an aborted attempt to impose some sort of 'house 
style'. The separation of the Canzone's stanzas also tends to 
disguise the very different tones of Petrarch's and du Bellay's work. 
Although Van der Eoodt was aware of the allegorical nature of the 
Canzone, ' the form of its presentation is such as to obscure its 
allegorical structure. The climactic prominence of the poet's last 
vision, in which he finally sees his beloved undisguised by allegor- 
ical devices, is largely dissipated, as each Epigram is made to stand 
alone, merely one in a series of images of transient beauty. From 
being an allegorical lament for the death of of Laura, Petrarch's poem 
becomes, like du Bellay's, primarily a demonstration of the fickleness 
of earthly life. 
The first suggestion that Spenser was the author of these trans- 
lations came in 1591 when, following the success of the first part of 
See Peter Bayley, Ed®und Spenser, Prince of Poets (London: Hutchinson Univ, 
Library, 1971), p, 29. 
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The Faerie Queene, its publisher William Ponsonbie produced a 
collection of poems by Spenser under the title Complaints. Containing 
sundrie small Poemes of the Worlds Vanitie, which included versions of 
the translations of du Bellay and Petrarch. Of these, The Visions of 
Bellay had been considerably reworked from their appearance in Van der 
Noodt's book. Several new translations had been added, and they had 
been converted from blank verse to Shakespearian sonnet form. The 
Visions of Petrarch were very much closer to their original state, 
except in two respects. First, those Epigrams which were previously 
left with only twelve lines were now expanded to fourteen. Secondly, 
Petrarch's small envoy was replaced with a new sonnet: 
When I behold this tickle trusties state 
Of vaine worlds glorie, flitting too and fro, 
And mortall men tossed by troublous fate 
In restles seas of wretchednes and woe, 
I wish I might this wearie life forgoe, 
And shortly turne vnto my happie rest, 
Where my free spirite might not ante moe 
Be vext with sights, that doo her peace molest. 
And ye faire Ladie, in whose bounteous brest 
All heauenly grace and vertue shrined is, 
When ye these rhymes doo read, and vew the rest, 
Loath this base world, and thinke of heauens blas: 
Although ye be the fairest of Gods creatures, 
Yet thinke, that death shall spoyle your goodly features. 
The addition of this sonnet serves to accentuate the shift of 
emphasis given to Petrarch's poem in the Theatre. Where Petrarch's 
envoy had simply expressed a desire for death, here the destruction of 
beauty in the previous six sonnets spurs the poet to an emphatic 
rejection of all earthly beauty, and a wish for the everlasting bliss 
of heaven; while the death of Laura, which had been the climax of 
Petrarch's lament, is now the occasion for a warning to other women 
not to put trust in their own good looks. This altered version of the 
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poem is plainly in keeping with the other 'small Poemes of the Worlds 
Vanitie' in the Complaints, which include not only du Bellay's visions 
and his Ruines of Rome, but Spenser's own Visions of the worlds 
vanitie, and The Ruines of Time, with its closing injunction: 'So vnto 
heauen let your high minde aspire, / And loath this drosse of sinfull 
worlds desire' (The Ruines of Time, 11.685-86). 
Spenser's treatment of Canzone CCCXXIII, both in the Theatre and 
then again in the Complaints, is such as to turn it from a poem of 
mourning over the death of a woman into a meditation on the vanity of 
the world in general. I have gone to some lengths to show this, 
because it seems to me that it casts a significant light on his use of 
the Canzone in the account of Acidale at FQ VI. x. 
Lines 37-48 of the Canzone, which became first Epigram 4 and then 
the fourth of The Visions of Petrarch, describe the destruction of a 
spring by an earthquake. It is rendered in the 1591 version as 
follows: 
Within this wood, out of a rocke did rise 
A spring of water, mildly rumbling downe, 
Whereto approched not in anie wise 
The homely shepheard, nor the ruder clowne; 
But manie Muses, and the Hymphes withall, 
That sweetly in accord did tune their voyce 
To the soft sounding of the waters fall, 
That my-glad hart thereat did much reioyce. 
But while herein I tooke my chiefe delight, 
I saw (alas) the gaping earth deuoure 
The spring, the place, and all cleane out of sight. 
Which yet aggreeues my hart euen to this houre, 
And wounds my soule with rufull memorie, 
To see such pleasures gon so suddenly. 
I suggest that an adaptation of the first two quatrains of this 
sonnet became the stanza FQ VI. x. 7, which forms part of the initial 
description of Acidale. Spenser has just been describing a wood: 
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And at the foote thereof, a gentle flud 
His siluer waues did softly tumble downe, 
Vnmard with ragged mosse or filthy mud, 
Ne mote wylde beastes, ne mote the ruder clowne 
Thereto approch, ne filth mote therein drowne: 
But Hymphes and Faeries by the bancks did sit, 
In the woods shade, which did the waters crowne, 
Keeping all noysome things away from it, 
And to the waters fall tuning their accents fit. 
It is more difficult with Spenser than with most writers to be 
confident that he is alluding to his own work. To begin with, the 
repetitive rhyme scheme of the Spenserian stanza means that particular 
groups of words tend to recur in close proximity, which can give a 
misleading impression of allusion. Secondly, there are descriptive 
motifs to which he returns repeatedly in his work, where it would be 
implausible to suppose a conscious network of allusion to exist bet- 
ween all their occurrences. One of the details shared by the passages 
quoted above, for instance - that of voices singing to the sound of 
water - may also be found in the description of the Bower of Blasse, 
and twice in The Shepheardes Calender (FQ II. xii. 71, April 1.36, June 
1.8). ' In a poetic output the size of Spenser's this sort of 
repetition is hardly surprising. 
The point at which coincidence or mental habit becomes a less 
persuasive explanation than allusion for the mutual resemblance of two 
passages is not something which can be defined precisely. I can only 
record my own belief that in this case that point has been passed. In 
part this is indeed because of a similarity in language. The exact 
1, Noted in The &'orks of Edound Spenser; .4 Variorus Edition, ed, E, A, Greenlaw, F, M, 
Padelford, C, G, Osgood at a! (Baltimore: John Hopkins U, P,, 1932-49), The Faerie 
Queene; Books Six and Seven (1938), p, 247, Although the Variorua notes the 
occurrence of this motif both at FQ VI, x, 7 and in the fourth Epigram, the wider 
resemblance between the two passages seems to have been overlooked, 
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repetitions of certain phrases - 'the ruder clowne' and 'waters fall' 
- are reinforced by the near-repetitions of other, larger units: 
'mildly rumbling downe' and 'softly tumble downe'; 'Whereto approched 
not in anie wise' and 'Ne mote... thereto approch'; 'Muses, and the 
Aymphes' and 'Nymphes and Faeries'; 'did tune their voyce/ To the soft 
sounding of the waters fall' and 'to the waters fall tuning their 
accents fit'. More telling than particular phrases, however, is the 
near identity of the verses' general argument. In both cases the poet 
describes a spring flowing in or by a wood; he stresses that unclean 
creatures (whether beasts, shepherds or yokels) are not allowed to 
approach it, and that the spring is attended by nymphs, who sing to 
the sound of the falling water. 
The idyllic scene at Acidale is not of course obliterated by an 
earthquake, but it is dispelled by the appearance of Calidore, at 
whose entrance the nymphs 'vanisht all away out of his sight, / And 
cleane were gone, which way he neuer knew' (FQ VI. x. 18.2-3). The 
couplet Spenser added to Petrarch's lines in expanding them to sonnet 
form (11.13-14 of the sonnet quoted above) emphasises just this sudden 
loss of pleasure, and might serve as a gloss on Colin Clout's 
reaction: 
Not I so happy, answerd then that swaine. 
As thou vnhappy, which them thence didst chace, 
Whom by no meanes thou canst recall againe, 
For being gone, none can them bring in place... 
VI. x. 20.1-4 
If Spenser was thinking of his translation of Canzone CCCXXIII in 
the composition of FQ VI. x, what is the significance of this fact? 
Again, any answer must necessarily be speculative. Certainly there is 
no easy correspondence of tone between the Acidale passage and the 
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poems which appeared as The Visions of Petrarcb. In particular there 
is no suggestion that the vision accorded to Calidore is one which 
should be rejected as a vain example of earthly pleasures. In the 
aftermath of the Graces' disappearance it is loss, rather than 
contemptus munde, which is the dominant note. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Spenser drew for his description on a poem which, in his hands, 
had been modified from a lament for the loss of a beloved woman into a 
series of visions of the world's vanity, suggests the proximity of 
these two attitudes in his mind. For Spenser, the consciousness of 
the brevity of all mortal pleasures and the instinctive turning for 
assurance to God are never far apart. It is the constant theme of the 
Complaints; it is the concluding exhortation of the Fowre Hymnes (HHB 
288-301); and it is the argument of the last lines of The Faerie 
Queene, as it has come down to us (FQ VII. vii1.1-2). Spenser may have 
intended Acidale as a- celebration of the power of earthly love to 
inspire poetic vision, but his choice of symbol - an image he 
repeatedly associated with the transient nature of all mortal glory - 
implies the reflexive way in which he tends to associate any human 
achievement with its ultimate futility. If Acidale affirms the claim 
of art to offer a vision of truth, its disappearance also emphasises 
the tentative nature of that claim. Even the inspired poet belongs 
ultimately to the fallen world, and it is grace, not 
inspiration, 
which provides an escape from it. 
0 
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